

KASHMIR ENIGMA

ENTANGLED STRANDS

(A KASHMIRI VIEW POINT)

SYED TASSADQUE HUSSAIN



Residency Road, Srinagar 190001 Kashmir
www.gulshanbooks.com

DS
485
K256
H481
2009

First Edition by Gulshan Books, 2009
© Author

ISBN: 978-81-8339-072-9

All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced in whole or in part,
or stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form
or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including
photocopying and recording or otherwise,
without written permission of the publisher.

Published by Sheikh Ajaz

Gulshan Books

Residency Road, Srinagar-190001 Kashmir

Tel. +91 - 2477287 Fax: +91 - 194 - 2477287

Email: gulshanpub@rediffmail.com

www.gulshanbooks.com

Distributed by:

Sheikh Mohammad Usman & Sons

Booksellers, Publishers & Distributors

Residency Road, Srinagar-190001 Kashmir

Exchanges Road, Madinah Chowk,

Srinagar-190001 Kashmir

Printed and bound in India

Dedicated

to

dearest

EZRA

**Who inspired me to express my self,
without fear of public animadversion,
who taught me, to be true to myself,
the most wonderful women, I have met in my life!**

Syed Tassadque Hussain

[Acknowledgments]

I acknowledge with gratitude and thanks the benefits I have derived from the various works published by following publishers, that, I have copiously consulted while writing this Monograph on Kashmir History and Politics.

- Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street,OX26 D.P. London

- Penguin books Ltd., 80, Strand, London,WC2R-ORL, England

- Feroze Sons Ltd., Lahore, Pakistan

- Western View Press, 36, Lonsdale Road,London

- Rupa & Co., M/16 Ansari Road,Darya Ganj, New Delhi

- Natraj Press, Dheradhun, India

- Light and Life Publishers,New Delhi

Also I acknowledge with thanks other Publications referred to in my book, that gave me an insight in understanding the Enigmas and entanglements that constitute the core of Kashmir politics.

Writer

Contents

Chapter-I	1
Chapter -II	27
Chapter-III	49
Chapter-IV	73
Chapter-V	103
Chapter-VI	133
Chapter-VII	163
Epilogue	195
Select Bibliography	235

[CHAPTER - II]

KASHMIR politics is deeply shrouded in mystery. The self-proclaimed Kashmiri leaders are endeavouring at the moment to present [Conflict Resolution Mode] for resolution of Kashmir dispute, that has become a bone of contention between India and Pakistan. These politicians are regarded by people as Charlatans who endeavour to divine future, in the fashion of street corner fortune tellers. Often these fortune tellers, look awry, at the visage of a consumer, then shuffle out some [TARO] cards, and without blinking their eyelids, spell out the details of the Futuristic life of the inquirer; (of course, without fear of any contradiction). This atmosphere of proliferating confusion instigated me to write this small monograph on Kashmir history and Politics. I avow that logical talos of this monograph is to find out why despair and despondency has once again engulfed this Valley of Pompous culture, of Pongee silk, of Papier machie and wood-craft artifacts, of Lotus flowers, of lakes and rivulets, that are overshadowed by a circular girdle of mountains, and myriad coniferous jungles, symbolising the uncertainty of Kashmiri identity and ethos. Only some political scientist will be better able to trace out the chemistry of this nuclei -plasma of despair, that has become an ingrained part of the current Kashmiri Political Culture. To find out the answers to some of these queries I would be guided by Eric Hobsbawn, who in a lecture delivered at London School of Economics pointed out: (to quote his own words)

“ My own view is that it is desirable, possible, and even necessary to forecast the future to some extent. This implies neither that the future is determined, nor, even if it were, that it is know-

able. It does not imply that there are no alternative, choices or outcomes, and even less that forecasters are right. The questions I have in mind is rather: How much Prediction? Of what kind? How can it be improved? And where do historians fit into this? Even if anyone can answer these questions there still be much of future, about which we can know nothing, for theoretical or practical reasons, but at least we may concentrate our efforts more effectively." Unquote

The intendment of this monograph [On Kashmir History and Politics] is to present a narrative of facts, that should be comprehensible, even to school going kids in, a simple language. In the words of Eric Hobsbawn this way, - "We may concentrate our efforts more effectively". This monograph is meant for the faceless, common men in the street who has been fed on fables and myths about his past history. The problem with fables is that they can be effective means of mythicising the reality. Mythicising history, culture or religion is the greatest bane of a civil polity. I characterize it the greatest of moral, evil, that can befall a society. Some one has rightly commented that it is like "Paying toll to the devil". But I don't regard it as a necessary evil. Robert Southey [1774-1843] English poet laureate used to say: "As surely as God is good, so surely there is no such thing as "necessary evil". I hundred percent agree with him. The narrative I present should be a concatenation of demythicised events. James A Garfield, the twentieth President of the United States rightly said: "History is philosophy teaching by example and also by warning, its two eyes are geography and chronology."

So I commence with these two tools of utility i.e. geography and chronology, while explicating some historical events of Kashmir's history. In my view the geography of Kashmir is important. It delineates the correct apercu of its strategic importance. My own view is that the strategic location of Kash-

mir, in South Asia has also contributed in shaping its history. Kashmir is bounded by some of the most strategic States of South Asia - Most important on North East is Sinkiang Province of China - on Eastern side by Tibet, now a province of China and on North West by Afghanistan undoubtedly it provided one of the approaches to India from North West. The CORE of this triangle is formed by the Valley of Kashmir. Till 1947 the Shin States of Yaghistan, Chilas, Darrel and Tangir paid tribute to its ruler. The ridges thrown out by Nanga Parbhat 26,600 feet run Southwest and South East from the controversial North watershed boundary of Kashmir. A sierra of mountains divides the valley of Kishenganga from that of Astor - On Eastward we reach Zojila Pass that is 10,850 feet above sea level. The Greeks called the Jhelum river in their earliest chronicles *Hydas pes*, that flows through Muzzafar Abad making a confluence with Kishen Ganga into present day Pakistan. This geographical location of Kashmir emphasises its contiguity to Central Asia. I would not be overstating the importance of the fact that Kashmir Valley, defines the periphery of modern day Central Asia. After all Zojila and Burzil Passes are only one hundred kilometres away from the city of Srinagar. Kashmiri historian PNK Bamzai is of the opinion "that the dialects spoken by the people of Ladakh, Baltistan and Kashmir Valley are closely allied to the Tibetan and Dardic Languages." Another important strategically located Central Asian State is Afghanistan. The proximity of Kashmir to Afghanistan has also contributed a lot to the shaping of its history. According to Prof. P.N.K. Bamzai, to quote his own words:

"In ancient times Kashmir Valley had close political and cultural relations with Ghandara the North-West Frontier of India. The passes leading to Central Asia plains through the Kabul Valley also formed important lines of communication with Kashmir. The road from the Valley followed closely the course of Jhelum and after

crossing Ursha (Hazara) district, joined caravan route from India. It was over this route, the Western Gate of Kashmir; that it *Hiun Tsiang* and *Ou Kong* travelled to reach the Valley." Unquote.

[See his book, *Kashmir and Central Asia*, Light and Life Publishers, Delhi]

This bird eyes view of Kashmir geography would not be complete without mentioning that Leh and Yarkand from times immemorial were connected by Caravan routes with Kashmir. Srinagar and Leh are connected through Zoji - Law Pass. Bernier who accompanied Emperor Aurangzeb on his visit to Kashmir says:

"The following which I now relate is such a well established fact that no one here doubts it, namely, that it is not twenty years since caravans went annually from Kashmir to Katay. They used to traverse the mountains of great Tibet, enter Tartary and reach Katay in about three months. The Caravans returned with Musk, China wood, Rhubarb and Momiron, a small root in great repute for cure of bad eyes: and in returning through Tibet they further loaded themselves with the produce of that country, such as, musk, crystals, Jade and especially with a quantity of very fine wool of two kinds, the first from sheep of that country, and, the latter which is known as 'toos' and resembles the beaver." Unquote

As late as 1819, this trade with Central Asia, according to Baron Hugel flourished between Srinagar and Yarkand. For lay reader, I may explain that Ghandara region of Afghanistan included Peshawar and Tribal territory that now is in proximity of Pakistan Administered Kashmir and forms that part of the territory, that has soured Pakistan's relations with Karzais

Afghanistan. In the backdrop of the strategic location of Kashmir Valley, one Question that has often been asked but never answered by the Jammu scholars of Kashmir history is, why Kashmir could trade with Kandhar and Kabul and never with Jammu, Udhampur and Kathua towns* till 1847? Kashmir Valley had interaction with Poonch, Rajouri, Kishtawar, Doda, and Bhaderwah regions of Jammu area but not with Jammu, Udhampur, Kathua towns, Why? And there is another question begging the answer, why the scholars of yore so far Jammu, Udhampur and Kathua towns are concerned never historicised the past history of these regions till sometime after the year 1750 A.D? Even a historiette in any language is not available that tells us any authentic information of political significance about this region. Why? Another rebus in this Jig saw puzzle is the question why Jammu was considered ethnically, religiously, socially and culturally an extension of Kangra culture and not Kashmir? In 1846 the British endowed Maharaja Gulab Singh with sovereignty over certain Areas with Hindu population in Kangra region. Gulab Singh, politically avoided to accept this offer? Why? On the contrary according to conventional historians this Dogra Chief wanted to cheaply buy the Muslim subjects of the Kashmir Valley, although Gulab Singh before he could do it had to militarily crush the Muslim rebellion in Muzaffar-Abad, Rajouri, Kishatwar and Poonch, in order to consolidate his strong hold over Kashmir Valley. Was he compelled by the British to buy this headache is the million dollar question, that calls for an answer? At the time of the execution of sale deed of Kashmir at Amritsar, Maharaja Gulab Singh, the vendee with folded hands stood up and debased himself to the British and in an obsequious manner. He described himself "as a gold boughten slave of the British" Why? These questions are to be considered from the angularities of historical realities of those times. In 1837, Syed Ahmad Brelvi led an armed revolt against the British and made Punch his chief base for his military operations. Within nine years of this Muslim revolt the

* These are parts of Jammu & Kashmir State

British decided to decimate Sikh State of Punjab. Anglo-Sikh War of 1846 was an unprecedented gory conflict for the British in India. After winning the Sikh war, to demoralise the entire Sikh community, Ranjit Singh's son Dalip Singh was immured at Shimla. He was publicly baptized into a Christian. For nine long years he stayed in the Company of a British Abbot at Shimla, and was later sent to England to present the diamond KOHINOOR to Queen Victoria. This should have been the greatest provocation to the Sikhs. Yet they accepted this state of affair with non-chalance. Why? After the Anglo-Sikh War of 1846, the Sikh Power was totally deracinated. In 1857 the Muslims under the banner of last Mughal Emperor, went into rebellion against the British. Some Hindu Rajas also joined this rebellion. Iran at that time had promised to lend its assistance to the forlorn titular Mughal Ruler of India. Unfortunately at that time Iran got embroiled into a bloody war and 1857 Muslim Uprising in India could not last more than five months. It was quelled by the British with the help of Sikh forces. Only eleven years earlier the British had destroyed Sikh rule in Punjab. How could Sikh now avow loyalty to the British? It is one of the great enigmas of Indian history. Sixty thousand Muslims and a small number of Hindus [who sided with Mughal Emperor Bahadurshah Zaffar] were publicly hanged? This formed the prelude to the British Crown taking over the sovereignty of India formally in the year 1857.

How could British trust Sikhs and employ them to ruthlessly quell the 1857 Muslim insurrection in India? Delhi was recovered by British, with the help of Hindu and Sikh Forces. How do we explain this loyalty of the Sikhs to the British?

Some historians complain that historical records have been fudged. Correspondence and historical materials were faked to create a version of history by the British for misleading Indian masses. Another inference is that the Muslim revolt of 1836 led by Syed Ahmed Brelvi popularly known as [Operation Balakote] in fact, enabled the British to win over the loy-

alty of Sikh populace on religious grounds. The war of 1846 was only meant to supplant, the family rule of Ranjit Singh. Sikhs wanted that Punjab be incorporated into British Raj. Sikhs were not mindless jugheads. They did not protest when the only son of Ranjit Singh, Maharaja Dalip Singh was baptized as a Christian by a British Abbot at Shimla? The sale deed of Amritsar of 1846 by virtue whereof the Kashmir Valley was vended to Maharaja Gulab Singh was not a jumble sale. At that time Gulab Singh was not in a position to pay sale consideration of Rupees Seventy-Five Lakhs, and yet the British agreed to accept the amount in easy instalments. Why? If the British were really in need of money, they would not have so readily accepted the payment in easy instalments? To answer these questions the British record of events, as, perpetuated by them in official correspondences, memoirs, and other official records requires fresh perscrutation. Future Indian historians will have to undertake this arduous task. They will have to sift grain from the chaff. According to some Indian politicians the British have constructed the Indian history of that period into an 'invultation', for the purpose of political witchcraft, and have mesmerized the Indian intellectuals, with their version of history, creating a sense of involuntional psychosis amongst the Indian intellectual classes, who were ultimately westernized by them in a very subtle manner. Such an inference is the Agit-Prop material to create a make believe, concatenation of events with a tendentious objective. Let us examine this objective dispassionately. Let us ask the question, how much the strategic location of Kashmir Valley itself dictated the emergence of choices that were open to British diplomacy of those critical years? A brief excursus at this stage would show that in the later period of the rule of Aurangzeb, Captain Nicholsan was deputed to conquer the coastal India. His Telos was conquest of Chittagong, that would be future seat of the East India Company, but Aurangzeb was the biggest obstacle to be tackled by the British. In 1686 the English suffered humiliation by Mughals at Hugli. The Company was compelled to adopt a policy of evacu-

ation of Bengal. Sir John Child then adopted a Policy of Sea-Piracy to stop the Pilgrimage traffic to Mecca. Aurangzeb, to facilitate pilgrimage to Mecca was induced to grant Amnesty to the British. He listened to the British overtures for peace, but, according to historian P.E. Roberts, the terms he conceded "were harsh and contemptuous". In Feb. 1690 he granted the British Pardon, and, a new license for trade provided they paid a fine of seventeen thousand Sterling pounds. These facts may be gleaned by the historical records, 'Some Reports upon the Present State of East India Company's Affairs', published in London in 1690. The most important lesson that the British learnt was that Hindu subjects of the Mughal Rulers, were tired of Muslim Rule. According to historian P.E. Roberts this feeling by 1750 had got rooted in the ethos of Hindu masses. This was the period when Dupleix reached the apogee of his fortunes in Carnatak. British realised that henceforward the Hindu masses would collude with any Western power to supplant Mughal rule in India. Aurangzeb died in 1707. In January 1751 Ahmad Shah Abdali had crushed the Mughals and sacked Delhi. He had also crushed the Marathas. A vacuum was left to be filled in by the British. This British Policy of colluding with the Hindus in India would also dictate their political options in Punjab in 1846. Ranjit Singh died in 1839. Ahmad Shah Abdali had employed for a pittance, the peasant forbears of Gulab Singh of Jammu as his informers to report about the Sikh rise of power in Punjab to the Afghans in Kabul. After the death of Ahmad Shah Abdali, turmoil engulfed Afghanistan. Gulab Singh saw his opportunity and took employment with Ranjit Singh, on Rupees ninety per Mensem. In fact he was an informer of the British in Sikh court. This inference reinforced by Post-1846 events. Within two years of the death of Ranjit Singh the Sikh rule was teetering on the brink of a precipice. Sher Singh in 1841, according to inferential evidence, on the advice of Gulab Singh, implored the help of Lord Auckland to tide over political difficulties. The British realised that Sikh Rule in Punjab was on a suicidal course. In 1845 just six years after

the death of Ranjit Singh they with the help of Gulab Singh induced the Sikh army to acknowledge five-year-old child Daleep Singh, as ruler of Punjab. Daleep Singh was only a reputed son of Ranjit Singh. The real power was wielded by Dogra brothers in the name of Rani the mother of Daleep Singh, whose reputation as a licentious broad, had touched the nadir. Lord Hardinge, used to call her contemptuously as "the Messalina of the North". The British who were in league with Gulab Singh and the seditious elements in the court of Daleep Singh have distorted facts. They have falsified history and given a misleading version that on December 13, 1845, the Sikh began to cross the Sutlaj. On the contrary it was the British forces that invaded Punjab. What role did Gulab Singh play in this episode is shrouded in Mystery? A question may be asked, Why did not the British Commander at Ferozepur, who had forty thousand soldiers, and hundred guns at his command, resist the passage of the Sikh army, if actually the Khalsa had crossed the Cis-Sutleg borders of the British territory? Why were the British really unprepared for this Sikh onslaught? The battle at Mudki was fierce. On that occasion 872 British soldiers were killed. The battle at Ferozeshah left 694 British soldiers dead but Sikhs were estimated to have lost eight thousand men. The Sikhs were defeated by dissensions in their ranks? Who was then responsible for the treacherous conduct of their leaders? The Sikhs were routed in the battle of Sobaraon on February 10, 1846. Ten thousand Sikh army was killed and British lost 2,383 soldiers. The Sikh war had lasted fifty-four days. No answer has been provided to the question that if Ranjit Singh was an old and faithful ally of the British why, soon after his death, the Sikh Rulers became hostile to the British? Why did not Lord Auckland heed to the implorings of Sher Singh, who wanted his succour soon after the death of Ranjit Singh? Who was responsible for the murder of Sardar Attar Singh Sindhanwalia? He had bitterly opposed Gulab Singh. According to Sir Lapel Griffin: to quote his own words:

"Raja Gulab Singh, Raja Dhyan Singh and Raja Suchet Singh were of a Dogra Rajput family of humble origin (it is the same family that worked as informers for Afghans against Singh Rule during the ascendancy of the rule of Ahmad Shah Abdali - author's note) but by sheer force - of character and ability, rose to great Power during the latter days of Monarchy. Raja Dhyan Singh, the second brother was, during the Maharaja's lifetime, the most important of the three. He succeeded Jamadhar Khushal Singh incharge of Deorhi, and, was virtually for some years Prime Minister being the channel of communication, between Maharaja and the people, and having general control of all departments except those of finance and foreign affairs, which were respectively in the hands of Raja Dina Nath and Fakir Azizuddin. His brother Gulab Singh, was generally employed on military duties, but after the death of Maharaja, and the murder of his brother, Dhyan Singh [who was involved in the intrigue that led to the murder of Dhyan Singh?] He became the most important person in the Lahore State and his services to the British during the first Sutluj campaign were such, that he was granted the independent sovereignty of the province of Kashmir by the Governor-General." Unquote.

[See Ranjit Singh by Sir Lepel Griffin, Published by S.Chand & Co. by arrangement with, the Oxford University Press, Bombay].

This excerpt explains why the Sikhs who were an ally of the British till June 1839, took a U-turn and went on a collision course with the British. It is quite obvious Sikhs were misguided by Maharaja Gulab Singh whose aim was to destroy Sikh rule

in Punjab, so that he could become Maharaja of Kashmir. So far Maharaja Ranjit Singh's Policies towards British are concerned, Sir Lepel Griffin in frank, forthright and candid manner comments in the same book, with some added emphasis that:

"To one friendship the Maharaja remained over constant. From one alliance, he never sought to shake himself free. This was the friendly alliance with the British government then represented in Hindustan by the East India Company. In the first years of Century, before he had appreciated the Power and Policy of the English, he was doubtful, what line to adopt, towards his new neighbours, and in December 1808, had all but decided on war with them. But when his and their position was once defined and assured by the treaty of 1809 by which he renounced for ever all supremacy over the Cis-Sutlug Chiefs, he frankly accepted the duties and responsibilities which the agreement imposed, and for thirty years remained the true and faithful ally of the British Government. He trusted its word with calculated confidence, which was astonishing in so suspicious and unscrupulous a ruler and which, at the same time, was the highest proof of statesmanship." Nor was his confidence misplaced. The British Government invariably treated Ranjit Singh, in a spirit of frankness and friendship; they realised that he was a useful buffer between their unconsolidated Provinces and the unknown shadowy power beyond the passes of North-West Frontier, whence so many invading armies had poured down on the plains of Hindustan, and they never made a hostile movement against him. The Lahore State even-

tually fell from inherent weaknesses, and, not from any design on it by the British Government." Unquote.

The nagging question that calls for an answer is that if for thirty long years Ranjit Singh was a trusted ally of the British, soon after his death in June 1839, the Sikh Darbar took a U-turn, and, became a foe to the British, especially when British had no design on Punjab. Why? What were the weaknesses of the Lahore Darbar, that dictated a U-turn, in its policy towards the British? During this critical period what secret services were rendered by Raja Gulab Singh to the British? Has any British or Indian historian chronicled those services of Maharaja Gulab Singh to the British from June 1839 till 1846; i.e. the fall of Lahore? The answer is no. If British wanted Punjab to be a buffer between their territory and Afghanistan, why in 1846 itself, they annexed Punjab into British India? How within seven years commencing from June 1839- to 1846, this need of British for the buffer State of Punjab, vanished into thin air? If in 1845 the Sikhs had fought a terribly bloody and gory war with British on the plains of Sutluj, how within eleven years, the core of the Khalsa forces turned their loyalty to the British, who then used the Khalsa army to quell the Muslim mutiny of 1857? In fact the Sikh forces enabled the British to regain the control of Delhi. Ultimately in 1857 Mughal Sovereignty of India passed to British Crown? If British did not consider it feasible in 1846 that Punjab should continue to remain a buffer State between British territory and Afghanistan and incorporated it into British India, the question arises. Why did they bestow the Sovereignty of Kashmir Province upon Raja Gulab Singh? It was British who after 1846 carved out the North West Frontier Province, and, incorporated it physically in British India. So much so, that Kashmir could not be a buffer State between British India and Afghanistan. Then why did British make a sale of Kashmir Province to Raja Gulab Singh? This intriguing question has, eluded a direct answer. In 1845, Duleep Singh the reputed son of Ranjit Singh was baptized, as a Chris-

tian by a British Abbot in Shimla, and recently the Sikhs had fought a bloody war with the British, they had lost their Kingdom, were considered a deadly foe of the British, then why did not they rise in revolt against the British in 1857? The proximity of Delhi to Punjab, that was the hub of the rebellion against British Rule in India in 1857 should have induced them to rise in revolt. On the contrary the Sikh and Dogras provided succour to the British to quell this mutiny. Why? What sort of a political drama was being enacted on the plains of India? Ranjit Singh was encouraged by the British to seize Kashmir in 1819. Why? He was twice defeated by Afghans and could not capture Peshawar. The internecine war between Durrani and Barakzai, in Kabul, in 1822, enabled him to compel Afghan Governor of Peshawar to pay him tribute. This was followed by accession of Lord Auckland as Governor-General of India in 1837. On October 1st. 1838, Lord Auckland decided to invade Kabul. It was decided that "Sikh expedition accompanied by Shah Shuja's son [who was the ousted Durrani from Kabul] would invade Afghanistan through Khyber Pass, while the British Army under Sir John Keane, and Sir Willoughby Cotton, accompanied by Shah Shuja himself would enter by the Bolan Pass after traversing Sindh. This actually happened in August 1839. In June 1839 Ranjit Singh died. In August 1839, the Khalsa was supporting the British as an ally in the First Afghan war that ended virtually by December 11, 1841, when Macnaghten, concluded a humiliating treaty with Afghans. On 6th January 1842, the British forces and Camp followers retreated from Afghanistan. The British lost 16000 men, after this retreat became a rout, and one man Dr. Brydon was able to escape this decimation. At that time Khalsa was a formidable force. It comprised fifty thousand and odd soldiers and two thirty two guns. According to another estimate, the Regular Infantry was fifty three thousand and seven fifty six men, regular cavalry was six thousand and two thirty five men, irregular Cavalry was sixteen thousand and two ninety two, artillery was 10,968, camel swivels, 584, Miscellaneous, eight hundred

twenty seven, and in addition to this the contingents provided by Jagirdars totalled thirty thousand men. This Khalsa was the most trusted ally of the British, till July 1842, according to British 'Chroniclers' of that period. Now we should revert to the basic question, that how within three years i.e., 1842-1845 the same Khalsa force became a dreaded foe of the British and fought the suicidal Cis-Sutlej War? What role did Gulab Singh play in this Murky affair? This question is to be answered in the light of the observations made in the settlement reports collected by Mr. Ibbetson, and published in 1883. According to Mr. Ibbetson to quote, his own words:

[This report is available in India Office Library, London]

"Still as Sir Robert Egerton recorded, the Sikh population were soldiers almost to a man, and their one object was to wring from Hindu and Mohammedan cultivators the utmost farthing, that could be extorted without compelling them to abandon, their fields. The Rajput especially, who refused to join the ranks of an Organization in which his high caste was disregarded, was the peculiar object of their hatred and oppression. Not to be for them was to be against them, all who had any pretensions to wealth or influence were mercilessly crushed." Unquote. The question arises that if Sikhs had such a visceral hatred of the Rajputs why did they repose so much confidence in Gulab Singh and his brothers, who were Dogra Rajputs? There were not many Jammu Dogras, enlisted, in the Army of Ranjit Singh. In fact even today, the backbone of the Sikh community is the Jat Caste of Punjab who converted to Sikhdom. We should not ignore the fact that Ahmad Shah Abdali, had employed the forbears of Gulab Singh as informers upon the rise of Sikh Power in Punjab. Ahmad

Shah Abdali, had crushed the rising Sikh Power in 1762 when he gave a battle to them near Sutlej and massacred twenty thousand Sikh soldiers. In these circumstances, the conundrum remains unsolved how could Sikh trust the three Dogra Rajput brothers who rose to great eminence in the court of Ranjit Singh? One interpretation of this Rebus in the jigsaw puzzle is that after enlisting Ranjit Singh as an ally in 1809 the British encouraged Ranjit Singh to encourage the Dogra brothers. These Dogra brothers were the informers of the British in the court of Ranjit Singh. This is the only interpretation that throws some light on the following commentative remarks of Sir Lepel Griffin; who has examined the rule of Ranjit Singh in great detail. According to Sir Lepel Griffin.*

"His brother, Gulab Singh, was generally employed on military duties, but after the death of Maharaja and the murder of his brother Dhyani Singh he became for time the most important person in Lahore State, and his services to the British during the first Sutlej campaign, were such that he was granted the independent sovereignty of the Province of Kashmir by Governor General."

No Jammu historian uptill now has explored the nature and character of the Dogra brothers and their services to the British? Even to this day Gulab Singh's role in the events leading to first Sutlej Campaign between British and Sikhs, has continued to remain shrouded in mystery. Bestowing Kashmir upon Gulab Singh was an act of British diplomacy. In retrospect the juxtaposition of chronological sequence of events would be profitable. The following sequence of events may be now examined for logical analysis of this situation.

* [See his book 'Ranjit Singh' published by S.Chand & Co. by arrangement with Oxford University Press, Bombay].

- a) Ahmed Shah Abdali annexed Kashmir in 1752. Lahore was also annexed.
- b) After the death of Ahmed Shah Abdali, there was internal revolt and chaos in Afghanistan.
- c) In 1790, Zaman Shah went back to Kabul to quell the revolt against Durrani dynasty;
- d) Lahore was occupied by Chet Singh and his Confederates who spearheaded the rise of Sukherehakia Sikhs.
- e) In 1799 Ranjit Singh captured Lahore. Zaman Shah accepted the seriousness of the situation and bestowed the title of Raja upon Gulab Singh on April 12, 1801.
- f) Within Eight years Ranjit Singh realised that Sikh rule could exist only, if he became an ally of the British in 1809. 1801 was the period of bitter struggle between French and English in Europe. The Napoleonic harrow was cutting vast swath of territory across Europe.
- g) In 1801, Shah Mahmood rose in revolt against Zaman Shah in Kabul.
- h) Abdullah Khan the brother of Atta Mohammad Khan the Governor of Kashmir reached Srinagar. Ranjit Singh allowed him to do so.
- i) In 1803, Shah Shuja Durrani, a scion of Ahmed Shah Abdali ascended the throne in Kabul.
- j) In 1807, he sent a punitive force to oust Abdullah Khan from Kashmir.
- k) In 1808, Shah Mahmood a Barakzai captured the throne of Kabul; and, thereafter a meeting between Shah Mahmood and Ranjit Singh took place at Rawalpindi. At this time, Shah Shuja escaped to Kashmir, and was taken a prisoner and immured in Hariparbat Fort.
- l) In December 1812 Ranjit Singh entered into an alliance with Shah Mahmood, who deputed his Prime-Minister Fateh Mohammad Khan to enlist the support

- of Ranjit Singh for re-annexing the Kashmir Province.
- m) On 1st December 1812, the joint forces of Shah Mahmood and Ranjit Singh invaded Kashmir. The Kashmir Governor Atta Mohammad Khan fled without any fight. Fateh Mohammad Khan appointed his brother Azim Khan as Governor of Kashmir.

It is important to notice, that Raja Gulab Singh was not associated with the December 1812 Campaign. It was Dewan Mohkan Chand, who led the Sikh Force in this Campaign for annexation of Kashmir Province.

- n) Ranjit Singh again invaded Kashmir in 1813-1814 Kharak Singh was made the overall Commander of the Sikh force. The reader may notice that even on this occasion Raja Gulab Singh was not associated with the Sikh force that invaded Kashmir. Instead outstanding Sikh Generals like:

- i. Hari Singh Nalwa;
- ii. Meet Singh Bharamia;
- iii. Jodh Singh Kalsia

Commanded the bulk of the Sikh army led the Kashmir campaign.. A question may be asked why was Gulab Singh not associated with the Sikh force that invaded Kashmir? The Afghan Forces under the leadership of Bapa Khan defeated this formidable Sikh force of thirty thousand men and more than three hundred guns at Hirpur. So Ranjit Singh entered into a Treaty with Azim Khan, and Sikh forces were allowed to return to Lahore. This Kashmir campaign was a failure.

- o) In 1815 Napoleon was decisively beaten in the battle of Waterloo, and, this change of fortune, induced the British to make plans for annexation of Afghanistan, leading to the First Afghan War in 1839 August. Most of the Afghan forces had to leave Kashmir and return to Kabul to meet the British menace. At this stage British promised assistance to Ranjit Singh, in case he intended

to invade Kashmir a third time, as Afghans were busy in Kabul.

- p) The Third invasion of Kashmir was undertaken in 1819 after enlisting a large number Gurkhas, who fled to India after the British ransacked Nepal in 1814. At this time Raj Kak Dhar, a relation of Pundit Birbal Dhar a Kashmiri noble went to Jammu, and discussed, the invasion with Gulab Singh, whose brother Dhyani Singh was the Prime-Minister of Ranjit Singh at Lahore.
- q) In 1819 due to turbulence in Afghanistan, Azim Khan the Governor of Kashmir with his choicest Afghan soldiers, went back to Kabul, appointing his younger brother Jabbar Khan as Governor of Kashmir.
- r) On 19th April 1819 the Sikh forces invaded Kashmir. A battle took place at village Hirpur near Shopian. Jabbar Khan was mortally wounded and the Afghans were decisively defeated. According to Mohammad Yousuf Saraf, the Sikh Army entered Srinagar on 4th July 1819. The most important feature of this Campaign is that Raja Gulab Singh and Raj Kak Dhar, were the leading light of this Sikh Campaign.
- s) In April 1814, the British Parliament passed the Charter Act, that allowed East India Company to exercise sovereign powers in India. It was after the Rule of East India Company was legitimized by the British Charter, that British decided to invade Nepal in November 1814.
- t) In December 1815, the Nepali Chieftains entered into treaty with the British ceded some territory and accepted to have a British Resident at Katmandu. In fact, Nepal surrendered the Province of Kumaon and Garhwal to the British.
- u) In March 1819 with the fall of Asirgarh, the Maratha Confederacy had ceased to exist in India. And with the consent of the British, Ranjit Singh allowed Apa Sahib, the Bhonsla Raja of Berar, to live as a prisoner in Punjab.

- v) It is after March 1819, with the approval of the British, that Ranjit Singh decided to invade Kashmir on 19th April 1819. What designs the British conceived when they encouraged Ranjit Singh to invade Kashmir, is a matter of further historical research. One thing is crystal clear, the British had deeprooted interest in Kashmir province.

I have given the chronologically concatenated sequence of events to spotlight, that the British diplomacy in India at that period was grounded upon the outcome of Battle of Waterloo in 1815 in France. In fact all these events in India have connection with British supremacy over France in Europe at that period. Lord Auckland invented the political myth that the British were being imperilled by Russian advance in Central Asia. The British did not have any misgivings. The Russian outpost in Central Asia was nearly one thousand miles away from the periphery of the British India. This is historically speaking unjustifiable that British entered into an alliance with Ranjit Singh so that a buffer State of Punjab be created between British India and Czarist Russia. According to British historians Anglo-Sikh War was imminent in 1809 itself. Then why in 1809 itself the British entered into an alliance with Ranjit Singh? Why was War between British and Sikhs a virtual possibility in 1809 itself? Who persuaded Ranjit Singh to take a U-turn and offer an alliance to the British? Soon after this alliance why did Ranjit Singh in 1811 decide to invade Kashmir Province? At whose bidding he sanctioned the second invasion of Kashmir in 1814, knowing fully well that the population of Kashmir Province was Ninety Seven percent Muslim? It was Zaman Shah of Afghanistan who conferred the sovereignty upon Ranjit Singh and made him a Raja. Then why within a short span of only eight years Ranjit Singh had become the bitterest enemy of the Zaman Shah, and wanted to wrest Kashmir province and North-West Frontier from the Afghans? The fate of British India was scripted on the battlefield of Europe while a gory war that raged between French under Napoleon and English un-

der the command of Duke of Wellington. The British knew that French were bound to invade Russia, so Russia would be an ally and not a foe to British in India. The British diplomacy of that period in India becomes explicable if we fathom the real reasons that dictated the British to enter into an alliance with Ranjit Singh, when actually and factually, they were at the brink of War with him in 1809 itself. In fact, now in retrospect it transpires, that the real aim of the British was to destroy the Muslim State of Afghanistan and thereafter occupy Persia. Alliance with Ranjit Singh, in 1809, enabled the British to enact the drama of the First Afghan War. This Policy was consistently followed by the British, after they decimated the Sikh Power in Punjab. Kashmir although a predominately Muslim Province, was sold to Raja Gulab Singh for a paltry sum of Rupees seventy-five Lakhs not with a view to create a buffer State between Czarist Russia, and British India as is commonly believed. But the real reason was otherwise. The *raison d'être* to legalise the colonisation of India by East India Company was dictated by two considerations, so far the British were concerned:

- (a) the Mughal Rule in India was teetering on the brink of a disaster at that time.
- (b) India was predominantly a Hindu State, whose ninety five percent population was Hindu;
- (c) The Hindu masses would collude with the British to supplant Mughal Rule in India. According to P.E. Roberts, since 1750 this feeling of Hindu masses, was explicit. In fact they colluded openly with the British.
- (d) After creating British India, the British would also create colonial states of Java, Indonesia, Burma. Thereafter they would destroy the Muslim States of Middle East in a systematic manner. This is the bedrock of British foreign policy even today. This policy has not underwent any change.

The Anglo-French Wars of that period to some extent, were

a result of competition between the two colonial Powers. According to P.E. Roberts [See his book: History of British India, third edition, Oxford University Press, London]:

"The third treaty was concluded, with the Amirs of Sindh, who promised to exclude the French from their territory. All these alliances were inoperative, for by 1810, France and Russia were at war again, and the French peril passed away. The armies that Napoleon had dreamed of marching through the East, were lost amidst Russian snows. The Indian Government indeed was able to turn from defensive diplomacy to offence war-fare. Successful expeditions were undertaken, not only against French possession in the East, but also against those of other nations forced into unwilling alliance with Napoleon.

"When Portugal passed under French control, Goa was occupied and in 1809, Macao, a Portuguese station in China, was seized, a proceeding which nearly plunged the Company into a war with the Chinese Empire. -----"

"In 1810, however, strong naval expeditions were sent against them by the Indian Government. Bourbon (restored in 1815) and Mauritius (permanently retained) were captured. From the Dutch, whose country now lay at the mercy of Europe, the Cape of Good Hope, had been finally taken in 1886. Amboyna and Spice Islands were conquered in 1810, and, in the following year Lord Minto, won the consent of the home government for an action on Java, the last Dutch, eastern possession. A formidable fleet of ninety sails, carrying 12000 troops under Sir Samuel Auchmuty as Commander in Chief, as-

sembled at Malacca in June."

"Lord Minto himself accompanied the expedition, nominally as a volunteer but really to organise, the civil administration after the conquest."

"Napoleon had spared no pains to have defences of the Island strengthened, and, had sent General Jansens, who had surrendered the Cape to English, to command the 17000 troops in Java, with the significant warning, that a "French does not allow himself to be taken a second time."

The English expedition arrived early in August and promptly occupied Batavia.

The main French army was lying behind strong entrenchments, and redoubts at Cornelis, eight miles distant. The position was brilliantly stormed by Colonel Gillespie, and the broken ranks of the enemy, were relentlessly pursued for ten miles. The French lost six thousand prisoners, mostly Europeans and 300 guns. They left 1500 dead within their Lines or along the route of their flight. The English had nine hundred put out of Action, including eighty five officers. General Jansens retired to the eastern part of the Island but was soon forced to capitulate. Thus Holland lost the whole of her Eastern Empire. The Directors had ordered that if the expedition, were successful, the Dutch fortifications were to be levelled and the troops withdrawn but Minto seeing it would be an inhuman act to abandon the Dutch colonists to the mercies of an exasperated native population, had the courage and independence to disregard these instructions. Having crushed the dangerous revolt of a native chief, he entrusted the government of Island to Sir Stamford Raffles whose administration forms a brilliant chapter in the history of British Colonization. In 1814 their eastern possessions, with the exception of Cape, were returned to the Dutch, Java being actually handed over in 1816. These notable achievements added military glory to the rule of Lord Minto,

who was created an Earl, and, sailed for England in 1813, to die within a few months of his return." Unquote. This quotation epitomises the objectives of British Policy in Asia.

The upshot of this lengthy discussion is to show that Ranjit Singh, at that particular period of Indian history, was the silliest ruler in India. His crassitude was so stupendous that he could not realise that British had set upon a course of colonization in Asia. They wanted his alliance only so that they could deal a death blow to Maratha Confederacy, consolidate their rule in the plains of India, and, finally give a coup grace to the last vestiges of Mughal rule in India. Thereafter they intended to decimate completely the Sikh rule in Punjab. Ranjit Singh was only a contraption to be manipulated by the British. Ranjit Singh could never understand long term British motives.

The British encouraged him to annex Kashmir and even offered to him military assistance. Yet the Sikhs, could not understand, the real motives of the British. The Sikh Governors who were asked to manage the Kashmir affairs were, in mortal fear that good governance in Kashmir, would induce British to wrest Kashmir from the Sikhs. The Sikh rule lasted in Kashmir for only twenty eight years, yet five governors were replaced in quick succession. In fact Ranjit Singh encouraged the misgovernance in Kashmir. Why? Vigne, in his book "Travels in Kashmir " provides the answer in these telling words:

"Ranjit assuredly well knew that the greater the prosperity of Kashmir, the stronger would be the inducement to invasion by East India Company. "Apres moi Le deluge", has been his motto: and most assuredly its ruin has been accelerated, not less by his rapacity, than by his political jealousy, which suggested to him, at any cost, the merciless removal of its wealth, and reckless havoc, which he has made in its resources - - - " unquote

Was Ranjit Singh apprehending an Anglo-Sikh War? If he

was scared that British would be induced to invade, Kashmir, why did he encourage a policy of misgovernance in Kashmir by his Kashmiri Governors? Why he deliberately provoked the entire Muslim population of Kashmir to turn hostile to the Sikh ruler. It was during this period that Kashmiri Muslim diaspora to Punjab commenced.

Ranjit Singh allowed his governors of Kashmir, to prohibit the Azan [Muslim call to prayer] and to indulge in a policy of rape, loot, pillage and plunder in the Valley of Kashmir. Why? Ranjit Singh had to encounter Muslim resistance in Poonch and Muzaffarabad from the Bombas and Khakha Rajas of that place? Zabardast Khan of Muzaffarabad was in league with Syed Ahmed Shaheed, as is proved to hilt by the letter that Syed Ahmed Shaeed addressed to Zabardast Khan dated 7th Rabi-ul-Awwal, 1239 Hijri. Syed Ahmad Shaheed had started his Jihad against the Sikhs and the British. He made village Balakote in Poonch as his base for military operations. Yet unlike Kashmir misgovernance Ranjit Singh did not follow the policy of rape, loot, plunder and pillage in Muzaffarabad or Poonch districts bordering Punjab. Why? No doubt, the rebels in Muzaffarabad and Poonch were publicly hanged but people of these areas were spared depredations by the Sikhs. Why? Saying of Azan was not proscribed in these districts? Why? These areas suffered utmost depredations not during Sikh rule but during Dogra Rule of Gulab Singh? However, this does not answer the question, why, misgovernance in Kashmir, was part of official Sikh Policy? Why?

Why has Vigne so emphatically asserted that "Apré moi Le deluge" was the motto of Ranjit Singh? Do we find any other historian alluding to the possibility of "political jealousy" of Ranjit Singh with British East India Company? Had Ranjit Singh chosen to follow at that time the path of alliance with Afghans, British history of India, and present history of Kashmir would have been different. Post-Meridian Decline of potty Sikh rule was evident to every one except politically purblind Ranjit Singh. The Visceral hatred of the Muslims, shared by British

and the Sikhs at that point of time, was going to provide the tail-race of fast paced political events that would turn the wheel of history in India, full circle, to the advantage of the British Raj.

[CHAPTER -II]

Reader is referred to Chapter 1st. of this Monograph to recall the most significant outlier query alluded to in the context of Sikh Rule in Punjab, that still retains its pericentric importance namely, the Sikhs hated the Hindu Rajputs from the core of their heart. Then how could Raja Gulab Singh and his two brothers secure an ascendancy in the Sikh Court of Maharaja Ranjit Singh? It was only in July 1799 Ranjit Singh was able to annex Lahore with great difficulty. He did not make Amritsar his Capital. Why? Ranjit Singh was facing a revolt from Bhangis Sikhs in Amritsar. We may recall that Amritsar was annexed by Ranjit Singh only five years after his first invasion of Kashmir in 1811. Now after the conquest of Amritsar he extended territory to Gurdaspur that was on the main route to Jammu province. In 1813 Shah Shuja was ousted by his brother in Kabul, and came to Punjab as an exile. At that time Fateh Khan was the Governor of Peshawar and loyal to the brother of Shah Shuja. In 1826 Syed Ahmad Brailvi declared Jihad against the Sikhs and the British. General Ventura was made the commander of the Sikh army at Attock. Syed Brailvi fought a bloody war with the British. At that time Sultan Mahmood Khan was the Governor of Peshawar. Syed Ahmad Shaheed was defeated but in this campaign according to Sir Lepel Griffin, Ranjit Singh admitted he had lost twelve thousand men and the financial cost exceeded sixty Lakh rupees. This was also the period when Ranjit Singh had developed illicit relations with a lady called Jindan, who also had some relationship with Jammu Rajas, Gulab Singh and Dhyani Singh. Ranjit Singh had eighteen wives, but Jindan was most influential. Jindan was also having illicit relationship with Raja Lal Singh. She was responsible for the ascendancy of Jammu Rajas in the Darbar of Ranjit Singh. In

1761 Ahmad Shah Abdali invaded India and crushed the Sikh revolt in a war fought near Sutlej. Twenty thousand Sikh soldiers were killed. At that point of time the forbears of Gulab Singh were the informers of the Afghans against the Sikhs. Ranjit Singh was born in 1780, and at the age of eleven succeeded to the headship of Sukarchakia misil in 1791. The Jammu Rajas rose to the prominence during the latter days of Ranjit Singh's rule. Ranjit Singh was totally paralysed. Dhyan Singh of Jammu with the help of Rani Jindan ran the Sikh Court. At that time Gulab Singh was of no consequence in the Lahore State. He became important after the death of Ranjit Singh. According to Sir Lepel Griffin "There are perhaps, no characters in Punjab history more repulsive than Rajas Dhyan Singh and Gulab Singh". Then why did British encourage them to obtain the rulership of Kashmir Province? According to historian P. E. Roberts the English were always afraid of Afghans invading North India. To quote his own words:

"The motive impelling Sir John Shore to this unwanted attitude was probably the recent presence at Lahore (1796) of the last invaders of India from the North-West Zamanshah of Kabul who aroused for a moment in Hindustan hopes and, fears, that he would repeat the career of his grand father Ahmad Shah Durrani. But he was recalled to deal with troubles in Afghanistan. The days of invasions by Asiatic conquerors from the mountains of the North-West were over". Unquote. [History of British India by P.E.Roberts, S.Chand Co. by arrangement with Oxford University Press, London]

This shows that events in Afghanistan dictated the British Policy towards Kashmir and Punjab. Once the fear of invasion from North-West was over, the British knew it would be easy for them to terminate the power of Maratha confederacy and thereafter to supplant Sikh rule in Punjab. Gulab Singh of Jammu, was, the one person, who during this turbulent period, was the closest collaborator of British in North India. The troubles in Afghanistan had completely queered the pitch for

Afghan Governor in Kashmir, who could not look to succour from Afghanistan. Taking advantage of the turn around in the circumstances of Afghan Rule in Kashmir, British encouraged Ranjit Singh to invade Kashmir first in 1811, then in 1814 and lastly in 1819. The British were interested in establishing Hindu rule in predominantly Muslim province of Kashmir whose borders were contiguous to Afghanistan. The real object of the British was to occupy Afghanistan and Iran so that they could become the masters of the Middle East. In the context of the circumstances that had emerged in Northern India at that period, the British were not having a pre-eminent position of domination in the Mughal Capital Delhi. The threat from Iran and Afghanistan had pushed them to the subliminal periphery of Indian Politics -Gulab Singh was rendering yeoman service to the British by creating dissensions amongst the Sikh notables of the Court of Ranjit Singh. The role played during the final Anglo-Sikh war has been summed up in terse terms by the then Governor General Lord Hardinge in his letter addressed to Secret Committee Overseas Dominion dated 14th of March 1846 quoted in Extenso by Mr. Mohammad Yusuf Saraf in his book "Kashmir Fight For Freedom" Volume I Page 191 Published by Feroze Sons, Lahore. The following excerpts from this epistle explains British Policy in India.

"It is not my intention to take possession of the whole of this country. Its occupation by us, would be on many accounts disadvantageous. It would bring us into collision with many powerful Chiefs, for whose coercion, a large military establishment at a great distance from our Provinces and military resources would be necessary. It would be more than double the extent of our present Frontier in countries assailable at every point and most difficult to defend, without any corresponding advantages, for such large additions of territory. How distant and conflicting

interests would be created, and, races of people with whom we have hitherto no intercourse would be brought under our rule, while, the territories excepting Kashmir, are comparatively unproductive, and would scarcely pay the expenses of occupation and Management". Unquote.

The Question arises that who were the powerful chiefs to which Lord Hardinge was making a reference? What type of conflicting interests would be created? And who were the races of people, with whom till then the British had no intercourse? How would the Expenses of occupation and Management by the British would become unconscionable? And what did Lord Hardinge mean, when he informed Lord Ellenborough, the then first Lord of Admiralty, that 'territories, excepting Kashmir' are comparatively unproductive? Lord Hardinge with design has employed highly nebulous expression in his missive.

Lord Hardinge in his above quoted letter further went on to say:

"On the other hand, the tract now ceded, includes the whole of HILL possessions of Raja Gulab Singh and the Jammu family. If possession by us enables us at once to march our sense of Gulab Singh's conduct during the late operations, by, rewarding him in the mode most in accordance with his desires, to show-forth to other chiefs of Asia, the benefits which accrue from an adherence to British interests, and to meet the expenses of campaign, which we declared our determination to exact, and, which, excepting by the cession of territory the Lahore Govt. is not in a condition to afford." Unquote. This letter calls for close and serious scrutiny.

The questions that strikes the mind are, that territory was being ceded to Gulab Singh, to show-forth to other chiefs of

Asia, the benefits of adherence to British interests. Who were those other chiefs of Asia, to whom Hardinge was making a reference in his letter? The second question that strikes the mind is what do the words "which we declared our determination to exact" in this letter connote. Does it mean that Gulab Singh had assured the British, that he would bear the entire cost of Cis- Sutlej Anglo- Sikh War? Was Gulab Singh a part of British conspiracy hatched to annex Punjab? Lord Hardinge further wrote to Lord Ellenborough the thoughts lurking in his mind. Said he:

"Gulab Singh was never minister of Lahore for administration of its affairs. Early in 1845, Jowahir Singh persuaded the Army to march against Jammu. Gulab Singh, despairing of being able to defend himself, threw himself into the hands of the Panchayats and was brought a prisoner to Lahore. He was there treated with great severity; and subsequently, when the Army offered him the Wazirship, he repeatedly declined the offer. When the invasion took place he remained at Jammu, and, took no part against us, but tendered his allegiance on condition of being in the possession of his own territories." Unquote.

In this contextual setting we notice that neither Sikh historian Khushwant Singh, nor any other Indian historian of the Sikh rule in Punjab, has discussed the question why in 1845 just one year before the Anglo-Sikh Cis-Sutlej war, the Sikhs annexed Jammu and brought Gulab Singh as a prisoner to Lahore? Why was Gulab Singh treated with great severity by the Sikh Court at Lahore? What were the charges against him? At whose bidding Gulab Singh was offered Wazirship by the Sikh Army? What was the role of Rani-Jindan? This remains the unexplored area of Punjab history.

The third important aspect of the matter is why British

historians produced false history, when they said that in 1846 the Casus bellie of Anglo Sikh War was that without any reason the Sikh Army crossed the Cis-Sutlej boundary and that led to the Anglo-Sikh War of 1846? On the contrary Lord Hardinge in his secret missive to Lord Ellenborough has said, "when invasion took place he (Gulab Singh) remained at Jammu and took no part against us, but tendered his allegiance', on condition of being confirmed in the position of his own territories". Thus Gulab Singh only wanted confirmation in position of his own territories? Why the British, wanted not only to confirm him in his own territories but ceded him also the Kashmir Province, and Hazara district? In this backdrop we have to appreciate the following excerpt from the letter written by Lord Hardinge to Secret Committee of East India Company, headed by Lord Ellenborough. Lord Hardinge wrote on 14th March 1846 in following terms; to his official superior Lord Ellenborough: [To quote his own words]

"Rajah Gulab Singh has engaged to pay the Crore of rupees demanded from Lahore State, on being put by us in possession of the territory ceded by the 4th Article of the draft Treaty, on such terms and conditions as we may approve. It is highly expedient that the trans-Beas portion of Kulu and Manali, with the more fertile district and strong position of the Nurpur, and, the celebrated Fort of Kangra - the key of Himalaya in native estimation, with its districts and dependencies, between Beas and Chukkee rivers, and their occupation by us, will be attended with little cost and great advantage. The Chukkee river in the Hills, will hereafter be our boundary to its source and thence a line drawn to the Ravee River, and along its course, and across the Chenab to the snowy ridge on the confines of Lahool. This line will be laid down

by officers sent for the purpose according to mutual agreement, and, will be accurately surveyed.

In consideration of the retention by us of the tract above described, a remission of twenty five lakhs from the Crore of Rupees, which Rajah Gulab Singh, would otherwise have paid, will be allowed, and the Rajah will pay the remaining seventy-five Lakhs of which fifty Lakhs are to be made good at once, upon the ratification of the Treaty and the remaining twenty-five Lakhs within six months from that date.

Of the remaining portion of the territory ceded by Article 4 of the draft Treaty, the greater part, with the exception of the Provinces of Kashmir and Hazara, is already in possession of Raja Gulab Singh, and, his family, for which he had been bound, hitherto to render military service to a small extent to the Lahore Govt. and to present annually a horse, with gold trappings, as a heriot to the State.

The conditions which may be stipulated with Raja Gulab Singh and the Treaty to which he may be admitted, will be reported in my next letter" unquote.

An analytical and dialectical appraisal of the letter of Lord Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough leads us to following critical conclusions:

[Conclusions to be drawn]

First, that British did not want to extend their Frontiers to the periphery of Tibet Region as that would put them on a collision course with the Chinese Empire. If an Indian Prince occupied Ladakh the Chinese may not be greatly disturbed. In February 1824 Lord Amherst declared war on Burma, inhabited by Tibetan-Chinese populace. British Plan to assail Burma from sea, by sending an armed flotilla up the Irrawady river to the Capital. Rangoon was occupied in May 1824. In December the ablest Burmese General Bandula, with sixty thousand men, retreated to Donabew some forty miles up the river. In April

1825 General Bandula of Burma, was defeated by the British. On February 24, 1826 Burmese signed Peace Treaty with British, and agreed to pay an indemnity of One Million Sterling. Soon after the defeat of Napoleon, the English had occupied Java, Indonesia, Malaysia; and some other Islands in Far East. In 1826, Second Burmese War eventuated. Lord Dollhouse breached his treaty with the Burmese, and send a frigate to Rangoon to demand compensation for imaginary wrongs. Rangoon was stormed on April 14, 1826. It was after the annihilation of Sikh Rule in Punjab in 1846, that lower Burma, was annexed by the British on December 20, 1852. So the English wanted a buffer State between their territory and Chinese Empire, including Tibet and India.

Second we notice that this inference is reinforced by the contents of the letter of Lord Hardinge to Lord Ellenborough. Lord Hardinge pointed out: "When invasion took place he (Gulab Singh) remained at Jammu and took no part against us, but tendered his allegiance on condition of being confirmed in the position of his own territories." In other words Maharaja Gulab Singh had never desired to obtain control of Hazara District and Kashmir Province. It was the British policy to compel him to undertake the governance of Hazara and Kashmir. In spite of this coercion Gulab Singh avoided to take responsibility for the Governance of Hazara and some other areas. These other areas now form part of Himachal Pradesh in State in India. The question arises why was Gulab Singh reluctant to possess these areas in his domain?

Third, the inference that, Gulab Singh never wanted to occupy Kashmir flows from the fact, that Gulab Singh was aware that population of Kashmir Province was ninety seven percent Muslim while the population of Jammu region was sixty seven percent Muslim. The Dogras were an insecure minority in J&K State. The Muslim population of Poonch, and Muzaffarabad was hostile to Dogras. Syed Ahmed Shaheed, had occupied Balakote and made it his base for operations

against the British and the Sikhs. He had addressed a communication to Sultan Zabardast Khan of Muzaffarabad, Sultan Najaf Khan of Kahori and Sultan Ahmed Khan on 7th. Rabi-ul-Awal, 1239 Hijri describing the Battle that took place between Mujahids and Sikh forces near the villages of Torroo and Hofi. This letter of Syed Ahmed Shaheed is still extant and is preserved in National Museum Karachi, under Exhibit No. N.M. 1967/349 and shows that Sikhs were under constant attack by Mujahids at that period. According to Mohd Yousuf Saraf, Zabardast Khan attacked Sikh garrisons in Baramulla, Handwara and certain parts of area adjoining Muzaffarabad. It was in 1837-1838 the Sikhs defeated Zabardast Khan on the outskirts of Uri. According to Encyclopaedia Britannica (1963) "[Jammu] the city was seat of Rajput dynasty. After conquest by Sikhs, it formed part of Ranjit Singh's dominions. After his death, it was acquired by Gulab Singh, as the nucleus of his dominions to which British added Kashmir in 1846." Unquote. Thus this shows that Gulab Singh was never an independent Raja of Jammu. Jammu was part of Sikh dominion. That is why Lord Hardinge in his letter of 14th March 1846 pointed out to Lord Ellenborough that Gulab Singh wanted to be confirmed in its position in Jammu and Ladakh region only. He was not interested in Kashmir. Comprehending their real character of British motives, is always an endeavour for any Scholar of Indian history to make some sense out of a rigmarole. According to P.E. Roberts by 1750, 'The British had realised that the Hindu population were interested in complete termination of Mughal Rule in India. After 1815 when Napoleon was decisively defeated at the Battle of Waterloo, the British set off on a course of colonization of Asia. By 1845, they were able to subdue Java, Indonesia, Malaysia, and some regions of Burma. Their estimation was Japan was no threat to their interests in Far-East, as Czarist Russia, would be in position to contain Japan. Japan, on the other hand due to the emergence of these circumstance was embroiled in the frenzy of Asian nationalism. They realised that the Hindu population of India, would willingly

collude with the British. The British had made India, a base for colonization of the Far East Asia. The reader can appreciate that in these circumstances the Japanese dislike for Indians was natural. Even in 1916 when Rabindranath Tagore, the Indian poet visited Japan he was not welcome. His poetry "was derided as the song of a ruined country." He was treated as a representative of a colonized and defeated land. However, in 1845, the Japanese were concerned about the Colonisation by the British of the Far East. Within a couple of decades the Japanese Nationalism would direct them on a course of Pan Asia policy, leading to invasion of China and war with Czarist Russia, culminating in decisive defeat of Russia. However, in 1845, this Asian situation was not envisaged by the British, in India. The British were too self centred. However some facts when viewed in retrospect show, that British were apprehending a Muslim revolt, since 1803 when they obtained a position of pre-dominance in Delhi. They realised Mughal Emperor, was, hoping against hope, that Iran would interfere in Indian affairs, and, re-institute Mughal Rule in India. For interfering in Indian Affairs, Iran had to first intervene in Afghanistan. To pre-empt the events occurring in this behalf, the British in 1851 went to war with Iran, They forced Iran to sign a treaty that stipulated that Iran would not interfere in Afghan affairs. In pursuance to this Policy, the British, struck an understanding with the ruler of Afghanistan Dost Mohammad Khan, that he would remain neutral, and, would not interfere in Indian affairs. In 1857, as anticipated by the British, Muslim insurrection against the British broke out in India, Dost-Mohd Khan remained neutral, and, with the help of Sikhs and Dogras the British within a span of four months were able to quell Indian Mutiny, leading to annihilation of Muslim Rule in India.

It is apparent that as the British, had fully anticipated the course of events taking place in India since the death of Ranjit Singh in 1837. With a view to actualize their plans, they had entered into a conspiracy with Raja Gulab Singh to bring about the end of Sikh Rule in Punjab. Gulab Singh only wanted to be

confirmed his position he was holding in Jammu and Ladakh but British forced him to accept the rulership of Kashmir provinces an additional burden against his own volition. They never wanted a strong rule in Kashmir. They had their own axe to grind.

British political calculations were grounded on the verity that Gulab Singh represented a minority Hindu Dogra community of Jammu region. As a Hindu ruler of a region with vast Muslim population, his rule would suffer from intense feelings of insecurity. Article 4 of the Treaty of 16th March, 1846 called Treaty of Amritsar provides "the limits of the territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh, shall not be at any time changed without the concurrence of the British Government" and Article 9 provided that the British Govt. will give its aid to Maharaja Gulab Singh, in protection of his territories from external enemies." The only external enemy that could invade Kashmir at that time was Afghanistan. This encouraged Gulab Singh to administer Kashmir as part of his Hindu Raj. In 1857 Gulab Singh became sick and died in August 1859. In 1860 just one year after the death of Gulab Singh, George Buhler was appointed as Political Officer [Resident] for monitoring Kashmir affairs. When I say that British forced Maharaja Gulab Singh to accept the rulership of Kashmir I am not drawing upon my imagination. My conclusions have historical support. In 1867 Robert Thorpe wrote in extremely extensively agonizing terms to quote his own words: [Robert Thorpe was the son of British father and Kashmiri mother. His book "Kashmir Misgovernance" is very popular in Kashmir]

"Let us leave the scene of death. But oh British reader, forget not, that these and other frightful miseries are produced by a Govt. whose chief is a feudatory of the British Crown, by a Government, which derives its permanence from protection of British rule; by a Government which the British power forced upon the people of Kash-

mir" -----unquote.

The British policy was that after the death of Gulab Singh his son, Ranbir Singh, should continue to rule Jammu & Kashmir, as a Hindu State. British wanted that political instability should continue in Kashmir, giving them an opportunity to be the Proxy rulers of Kashmir. No other rational explanation of British Policies is offered by any British historian. Lt. Colonel Torrens who visited the Valley in 1859, noted, that:

"Kashmir is literally overrun by Hindu Faqueers, detested by the people they pray upon, but supported and encouraged by the Government and their numbers are rapidly increasing - - - This state of neglect and dilapidation is visible in all Mohammedan buildings in the country; while on every side Hindu temples are being erected". Unquote Was East India Company aware about the policy of the Viceroy with regard to Kashmir?

The question that baffles the mind is why the British at that critical period encouraged Hindu Raj in a Muslim dominated region? Any student of British history would discover that the basis of British policy in India was grounded upon the reality, that India was populated by majority of people belonging to Hindu religion. Muslims only constituted nine percent of the population out of which five percents were converts from the lower strata of Hindu society and remaining two percent were the product of miscegenation by the Muslim invaders of India.. British were certainly aware about the demographic factor in Indian Polity. British also realised that Hindu majority, regarded Muslims as usurpers of their territory, and were hostile to Muslims as a community. British also realised that, soon after the death of Aurangzeb the Mughal rule in India was in decline. The rise of Sikh and Maratha power in India, signalled a sea-change in the political fortune of India.

Chapter II

The British also realised by 1750, that the majority of Hindu masses would prefer to collude with the British, to overthrow the last vestiges of Mughal rule in India

The Hindu-majority in India, realised that Mughal rule in India, could only survive if it got succour from Afghanistan and Iran. British alone could stymie this succour to Mughal rule in India.

The Indian Hindu majority also realised that Britain had become a Naval Power and, could contain the might of Iran and Afghanistan. They alone could prevent them from providing any succour to the Mughal rule in Delhi, that was teetering on its last legs. The majority of the rulers of princely States in India were Hindus. The conspectus of these ground realities shaped the British thinking in a definite orientation. The British formulated their Policy towards Indian Princely states, keeping in view these ground realities existing in India.

Till 1813, they adopted a policy of neutrality towards princely States ruled by Hindu Rajas. This period was utilized to subdue princely States ruled by Muslim Nawabs. The Peace of Aix-La-Chapelle in 1748, according to P.E. Roberts ended the first round of Anglo-French Conflict. Thereafter the conflict between the French and English erupted in Southern India. For twenty long years the British and the French confronted each other in Southern India. The French were ultimately ousted from India in a systematic way destroyed Siraj ud Daula of Bengal. P.E. Roberts the British historian makes these telling remarks:

"These questions were, however, but the occasion and pretexts for the out break of War. The general causes lay deeper and were closely connected with the political and economic condition of Bengal. The revolution of 1756-1757 was not primarily and solely the conquest of an Indian province by a European trading settlement. It was rather"

- a) the overthrow of a Foreign [Mohammedan] government by the
- b) Trading and Financial Classes;
- c) Native Hindus and British,

both the latter gained commercially, though the British took the predominant part in the actual events, and alone succeeded to the political sovereignty. The fall of Mohammedan Power was precipitated by its internal dissensions." Unquote.

At Page 132 of his Book History of British India, 3rd Edition P. E. Roberts makes the following significant comment:

"It was noticed about 1750, that the Hindus, were less tolerant than they had once been of the rule of Mohammedan minority, and were:

- (a) Casting about for some opportunity;
- (b) For freeing themselves from the (Muslim) yoke." Unquote.

It was Omichand, a Sikh financier, who encouraged the British to enter into a conspiracy with Mir Jaffar, the brother-in-law of Ali Vardi Khan for decisively defeating Siraj ud Daula on the battlefield. This shows that not only Hindus but Sikh oligarchs, also wanted the British should gain dominance in India, and, end the Muslim rule, that now was dubbed as a "minority ruling a majority in India." The British chose 1756-1757 as the opportune period for decimating the rule of Siraj ud daula in Bengal because the North India at that time was witnessing an invasion by Ahmad Shah Durrani, who in fact ravaged Delhi in January 1757. Siraj-ud -daula of Bengal was defeated on June 23, 1757 on the battle field of Plassey. Mir Kasim the son of Mir Jaffar, was militarily defeated by the British at the battle of Buxar in 1764. Robert Clive left India in January 1767. At this time the Marathas wanted to gain territory by entering into an alliance with the titular Mughal Emperor and offered to place him on throne. However, British utilized the rulers of Awadh and Rohilkhand to enter into an

alliance that would frustrate the Maratha Power; leading to the Rohilla war. Thereafter the British slowly gained predominant position in Northern India. So the British Policy from 1813 to 1857, was to treat Indian States as subservient to British Power, granting them autonomy so far internal rule was concerned but Foreign Affairs of these Princely States, were to be conducted by the British Power.

The British also evolved the rule that in case of misgovernance, the British could depose the ruler, appoint some one of their choice or take the administration into their own hands. The Princely States were the Subordinate Union crafted by the British. The following States were annexed by the British under the doctrine of lapse:

- (a) In 1848 British obtained Satara,
- (b) In 1849 the States of Jaitpur and Sambalpur;
- (c) In 1850, Baghat State was incorporated into British territory.
- (d) In 1852, Udaipur was annexed
- (e) In 1853, Jhansi was annexed by the British.
- (f) In 1854, Nagpur was absorbed into British territory.

Perceptive reader would discern that this Doctrine of Lapse was aggressively executed into action, only after the British had terminated the Maratha Confederacy and annihilated the Power of Sikhs in Punjab. The defeat of the Maratha Confederacy was regarded as the grandest strategical operation ever undertaken in India. The doctrine of lapse was, in fact, the Policy of annexation; in pursuance to which the province of Sindh was also annexed, and, reason given was that Raja Ranjit Singh of Punjab was during the years 1834 to 1836 contemplating the conquest of Sindh. The truth is that during these years the Sikh Court was in disarray, Raja Ranjit Singh was crippled by paralysis, and had become an alcoholic, whose thinking was totally impaired. Dogra brothers, had risen to ascendancy and were owing allegiance to the British. Even the

conqueror of Ladakh Sardar Zorawar Singh had publicly converted to Christianity. So why did British, contrary to their Policy of annexation create the State of J&K in 1846, and forced Gulab Singh Dogra to accept the rulership of Kashmir Province? One of the reasons was that

British wanted to avoid confrontation with the Chinese Empire. The domestic compulsion was that the British wanted Hindu Raj in a Muslim dominated region, which until 1819 was part of greater Afghanistan. After this the annexation of Sindh followed. However, since Lord Wellesley's treaty of 1803, Oudh had been a protected feudatory State. In 1803 British obtained a pre-eminent position in Delhi itself although Mughal Emperor was allowed to continue as a titular sovereign of India. In 1856 Lord Canning assumed the office of Governor-General of India. He received intelligence reports that Bahadur Shah Zaffar, the decrepit old man of eighty-one years age, was making a last ditch effort to seek the help of Iran, Afghanistan and other Muslim Nobels in India to launch insurrection against British rule in India. Some Hindu princes, who had lost their State to the British due to the execution of the Policy of Lapse by Marquis of Dalhousie, were expected to join this massive Muslim insurrection against the British Rule in India. Bahadur Shah Zaffar, in his missives to Muslim nobles characterised this insurrection, as Jihad, against British. So to pre-empt this insurrection Lord Canning, directed that a force be sent to Persian Gulf in 1856. The British force captured the strategically located town of Bushir. In consequential battles the Iranians were defeated. In May 1856 the Persians accepted defeat and agreed to evacuate Herat in Afghanistan. At about this time Sir John Lawrence signed a treaty of peace with Dost Mohd Khan of Afghanistan. In fact, Sir James Outram, had come to the conclusion that conspiracy to overthrow British rule, was imbued with the objective of Jihad against the British; as there was social and political discontent amongst the Muslim masses in India. We should not forget that British decided to colonise India, only after 1750 or thereabouts when they realised that

the Hindu masses in India wanted to get rid of the Mughal rule. According to historian P. E. Roberts, the fabric of British Power was built over the "ashes of warring factions and race enmities". The expression race-enmities provides a key to the understanding of British Policy towards Muslims. The British assured the Hindu masses that they would rid them of Mughal rule in India, thereafter the entire infrastructure of the British administration would be passed over to High caste-Hindus, who would, in fact, rule India. The corollary to this Policy, was, open suppression of the Muslims in India. Molvi Ahmadullah Shah came to Delhi in 1855 he openly preached Jihad against the British. He enlisted volunteers and established secret societies for this purpose. According to Professor M. Mujeeb "he lost his life at Purvayan, where he went to negotiate with the Raja." Bakhut Khan openly collected troops against the British at Shahjanpur and mobilised the ordinary masses against the British and took an active role during the mutiny of 1857. According to Professor M. Mujeeb:

"After the suppression of the movement of 1857-58, when the British had openly declared their determination to destroy all those elements in the Muslim population, which could serve as the nucleus of opposition, there was no other way of recovery except by accepting British Rule."--- Unquote [See M. Mujeeb "The Indian Muslim"]

In 1857, Dost Mohd Khan entered into a treaty or memo of understanding with the Major Lumsden and according to Encyclopaedia Britannica: (1963). The attitude of Dost Mohd Khan was one of Strict neutrality.

"He declined to listen to those, who instigated him to aid the rebels, and remained faithful to his alliance". --- Unquote. In this backdrop of facts Indian Mutiny of 1857 was bound to fail.

The upshot of this discussion is to demonstrate, that British were fully aware about the Muslim insurrection going to

erupt in 1857. They had secured the allegiance of Sikh troops and Dogras and other Hindu nobles to quell the insurrection of the Muslims in 1857, and rid India of the Mughal Rule. In this scenario we notice that British carved out the State of J&K and forced Gulab Singh to accept the rulership of the Province of Kashmir. Gulab Singh was physically disabled in 1857. His son Ranbir Singh personally went to Delhi alongwith a contingent of Dogra troops to quell Indian mutiny of 1857. If we flip through the pages of British history we discern, new insights about the dramatization of the British policy in India. We discover an ideological schizophrenia guided the British administration. Their highly circumstantial policy was dictated by the objective of colonization of India. The strategic aims of this British policy in India of 1857-1888 were based upon following objectives:

- (a) total disregard of seventy percent of the low caste Hindu population that was marginalized and lived below poverty line constituting the dregs of society,
- (b) openly colluding with the remaining thirty percent of the Hindu population that constituted the bulk of the Indian trading classes; the high caste Hindus.
- (c) overt suppression of the Muslims in India that constituted only ten percent of the Indian population;
- (d) a systematic policy of non-development of Muslim dominated areas of North Western Province, Sindh and Baluchistan and East Bengal.
- (e) total exclusion of Muslims from educational institutions and infra-structure of the Indian administration and,
- (f) After 1868, some Muslim nobles and Jagirdars were reduced to the level of connectionists who would support the British Raj. In this behalf they utilised the services of Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817-1898). According to Professor Mujeeb, "The attitude of the Muslims towards the British government changed, not so much because of any developments in India, but because of events

outside."--Unquote. [See his book Indian Muslims] Mujeeb is referring to the events that led to the abolition of Caliphate, commencing with the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, and ending with the Treaty of Sevres in June 1920; and ultimate abolition of Caliphate on March 3, 1924.

In pursuance of the British Policy of suppression of the Muslims, Gulab Singh, accepted the rulership of this State. Gulab Singh died in 1859. His son Ranbir Singh ascended to the throne. Ranbir Singh had taken an active part in quelling alongwith British troops the Muslim insurrection of 1857, called Indian Mutiny.

In 1857 some sixty thousand Muslims were hanged publicly. For his services to the British in quelling the Muslim insurrection of 1857, the Queen Empress in 1862 conferred on Ranbir Singh the honorific title of the Most Exalted Star of India. A personal letter of appreciation was also sent by the Queen to Ranbir Singh. It should be noticed that Governor-General of India knew that Ranbir Singh was the most-hated man in Muslim Kashmir, and in 1860 A.D an abortive attempt on his life was made by some Muslims who were later hanged by Ranbir Singh. Yet the British not only conferred upon him honorific titles and Khillats, but encouraged him to oppress Muslim masses in Kashmir. It was part of British diplomacy in Northern India at that period of time.

Ranbir Singh's policies were meant to establish a Hindu Raj in a Muslim dominated area of Kashmir to establish a Hindu Raj. As a corollary to this policy, they also allowed a weak Knead Muslim rule of Nizam in Hyderabad. The difference between the two rulers Ranbir Singh and Nizam was apparent. Nizam was just a titular ruler. On the contrary Ranbir Singh was encouraged to suppress the Muslims in Kashmir by adopting an aggressive policy. As a consequence the Valley was so impoverished that thousands of Kashmiri Muslims were dying from scarcity of food. Taxation was uncon-

scionable. Punishments were cruel and inhuman. *Begar* was part of State policy; trade and commerce had come to stand still. The whole data about the oppression of the Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir State was obtained by Lt. Colonel Thorpe, and published in some London dailies, in 1867. Thorpe's writings and the latter archival records pertaining to the rule of Ranbir Singh reveal that:

- (a) Ranbir Singh adopted a policy of heavy taxation towards Kashmiri Muslims;
- (b) Exclusion of Kashmiri Muslims from the infrastructure of his administration;
- (c) Destruction of Kashmiri Muslim trade of Kashmiri handicrafts and Shawls, especially to India and Central Asia;
- (d) A deliberate policy of exclusion of Kashmiri Muslims from educational institutions;
- (e) Encouraging Shia-Sunni discord with riots that erupted in 1837;
- (f) Non-development Policy of Muslim Kashmir illustrated by the fact that in the year 1871 out of an income from Kashmir Valley of Rs. 66,86,444 only Forty Six thousands and odd could be spared for roads and Public buildings. I have taken this data from the book of M.Y. Saraf 'Kashmir's Fight for Freedom' Published by Feroze Sons, Lahore.
- (g) Ranbir Singh connived at the migration of Kashmiri Muslims to other parts of India, especially Punjab; although during the autumn 1877 Famine, he prevented emigration, so that Muslims in Punjab may not be provoked.
- (h) Ranbir Singh adopted a Policy that Muslims who had migrated to Punjab, should not be allowed to resettle again in Jammu & Kashmir State. At that period nearly one Lakh and Eleven thousand and odd families, ac-

cording to a modest estimate migrated to Punjab. A process of miscegenation and religious affinity and correspondence, with Punjabi Muslims enabled them to mesh up with Punjabi culture and life. It is an irony of history that in posterity of Dogra rule, this Kashmiri diaspora would prove a horrible blight for Dogra rule in Kashmir. However, by 1878 there was a visible paradigm shift in the British policy. The new demarche due to events in Asia made British realise that for securing the safety of British India, they would have to conciliate the Indian Muslims. Events outside India according to Professor M. Mujeeb [See his book Indian Muslims] had also impacted the general thinking of Indian Muslims. Events in Asia compelled British to rethink their policy towards Muslims in India.

British who had turned a blind eye to Dogra misgovernance in Kashmir, now took a *volte-face* and wanted to show that they were really interested in the weal and welfare of the Muslims of Kashmir. Pursuant to this policy Lord Rippon in 1884, wrote to Secretary of State for India in 1884: [to quote his own words]

"The British did not take the action earlier, conceiving that a favourable opportunity would present itself on the occurrence of a fresh succession -- an event which seemed unlikely to be long postponed. When that event takes place, we consider it will be our duty to impress upon Cashmere government it is obligation to its own people, and, see the reforms which are so urgently needed are no longer postponed." Unquote.

In fact Dogra rulers also realised that there was a sea-change in British Policy towards Muslims in India. They wanted to adjust with this new political shift of the British demarche in India. In 1882 Ranbir Singh to please the British Resident, ap-

pointed a State Council under the Presidentship of one Dewan Badrinath the Chief Justice of Kashmir. Three Kashmiri speaking Muslims were also appointed its members. However, Ranbir Singh died on 12th September 1885.

[CHAPTER - III]

Partap Singh the eldest son of Ranbir Singh, ascended the throne in Kashmir on 12th. September 1885. His sibling rivalry with his own brother Amar Singh was talk of the town. The British had full intelligence about happenings in Kashmir. British policy in India was in sync with events that were slowly enentuating in Asia. They were avoiding to confront Czarist Russia in the Northern areas of J&K State. Czarist Russia occupied Chinket in Central Asia in 1864. Tashkent was taken over by Czarist Russia in 1865. Khiva was incorporated into Russia in 1873. It was decided that Prince of Wales should visit Jammu in 1875. He stayed in Jammu for three days. Why Prince of Wales personally visited Jammu in 1875? The answer is clear. The Dogras with the help of the British crushed the resistance movement in Hunza and in 1867, the people of Yasin were subdued. Now the borders of the Russian State were contiguous with the borders of the Jammu and Kashmir State. A book written by Robert Thorpe about Dogra misgovernance was already published in London in 1870. The book had created furore in London. What transpired between Ranbir Singh and Prince of Wales in 1875 is not recorded in any Indian chronicle. In 1878 second Afghan war broke out, and according to the author of 'Inside Kashmir' Dogras participated in the war on the British side. British realised that Czarist Russia was amassing its troops on the northern frontiers of Afghanistan. The annexation of Taskant in 1865 and incorporation of Samarkand and Bukhara in 1868 by Russia sent shock waves through out British India. Sir John Lawrence advocated that British government in India should enter into treaty with Russia so that a confrontation between British Empire and Russian Empire is avoided. The policy of the British was to allow Russia to de-

stroy Muslim Khanates in Central Asia, what they were afraid of was Russia's quest for warm water port. Otherwise when Russia occupied the Khanates of Central Asia, the British were jubilant as is evidenced by the euphoric remarks of Sir Herbert Edwards who called it "a gain of mankind". In 1866 a commercial crisis had gripped India due to American Civil war. In 1863, British had fought a bitter war against Wahabis, so British realised they had to placate Muslims in India, and, they had to guarantee the inviolability of Afghanistan as a buffer State. In pursuance to this policy the Governor General of India recognised Sher Ali as a legitimate ruler who after terrible dynastic wars had assumed the rulership of Afghanistan. In 1868 Sir John Lawrence the Governor General of India made present of arms to Sher Ali and presented him a gift of sixty thousand pounds to placate him. This was essential because Wahabism was on rise in the tribal areas of North Eastern province of India. The war with Wahabis in 1863 convinced the British that they would have to conciliate with the Muslims in India and wean them away from Wahabism. In 1874, Disraeli became Prime Minister in England. He had misgivings about Russians and also doubted if Afghanistan would remain neutral in case of a wider confrontation with Wahabis. In this backdrop of facts Prince of Wales visited Jammu. One thing was apparent that British henceforth were going to interfere with the Dogra governance of Kashmir province to placate Kashmiri Muslims. Outside events had influenced the British attitude towards Indian Muslim. The events in Afghanistan, had a direct impact upon British Kashmir policy. The reader should notice that the events in Afghanistan and the Czarist expansion in Central Asia brought Kashmir to centre-stage of British diplomacy in India. Lord Rippon in 1881, When Ranbir Singh was still alive, personally paid a visit to the city of Srinagar. He gathered first hand information about Kashmir affairs. On his return from Kashmir, he wrote to Secretary of State for India:

"Any disturbance which continued misgovernment might create in Kashmir would be actu-

ally felt on the frontiers of Afghanistan; the connection of Kashmir and its dependent Chiefships would in all probability, be severed and grave political complications might easily arise." Unquote.

This missive is the key to the understanding of the British policy towards Kashmir. Mark his words "the connection of Kashmir and its dependent Chiefships would in all probability be severed". The question arises with whom the connection would be severed? Of course with the British India. In 1837, Syed Ahmad Shaheed had made Poonch in J&K State as a base for his war against Sikhs and British. In 1863, the Wahabis on the Frontiers of Afghanistan had fought a bitter war with the British. Did the British apprehend the Wahabis would make Kashmir Province a base for their Jihad against the British? To which dependent Chiefship was Lord Rippon alluding? Were the British thinking of annexing the J&K State, within British India? What did Lord Rippon, mean when he said, "grave political complications might easily arise" He used the expression grave political complications in his missive. What did he mean by using these adjectival expressions? Lord Kimbley's reply to Viceroy provides the key to the question. He wrote: "the intervention of British government on behalf of Mohammedan population, has not already been for long delayed." Unquote. This policy of the British was founded on two considerations. British would politically organise the Hindus, so that in India the infra-structure of the British administration continues to remain in the hands of Hindus while British would intervene to remedy injustice to the Muslim living in the plains of India who constituted only three percent of the Muslim population in India. They also decided to disregard the remaining seven percent Muslim population located in Sindh, Baluchistan and N.W.F.P and some parts of Punjab adjoining N.W.F.P State. This was the core of their policy of Divide and Rule. In pursuance of this policy the Viceroy on 14th. September 1885 sent a letter to Maharaja Partap Singh, then a young man of thirty

six pointing out the dire-need of introducing reforms in its interests of good government. He was directed to accept officially the British Resident. Sir Oliver St. John was appointed the first Resident. He was replaced by Mr. Plowden. Who had a short stay in Srinagar then an army man Col. R. Parry Nisbet was appointed as Resident. The selection of the year 1885 by Viceroy for bringing about these changes in Kashmir Administration of Maharaja Partap Singh is very intriguing. It is interesting to note that in 1885, an Englishman organised the Hindus to form Indian National Congress for making radical political demands from the British government in a constitutional manner. The first session of Indian National Congress was held at Bombay, and, the delegates were all Hindus and one Bohra Mussalman who represented to be an unofficial body of men with a look forward policy. Lord Lytton made a terse remark that Indian National Congress to quote his own words: "really represent nothing but socially anomaly of their own position." The social anomaly was the adoption of title Indian National Congress while majorities of its delegates were English speaking Hindu gentlemen. According to P.E Roberts at that period of time "for a long time its activities were looked upon with disfavour by the greater part of the Mohammedan community and ruling chiefs." Unquote. This is the most important crucial fact for understanding the collusion between the British and the Hindus. Lord Dufferin, realised that congress should be institutionalised, allowed freedom of press, so that a real divide between Muslim and Hindus is created. Lord Dufferin openly stated that "he would feel it a relief, if in settling administrative question, he could rely to a greater extent than at present, upon the experience and Counsels of Indian Co.-adjutors. In 1886 itself he created a Legislative Council in United Province of 'Agra and Oudh'. Freedom of Press in India led to the establishment of Amrita Bazar Patrika that voiced only the concerns of the Hindu trading classes. At this stage, Mr. H.N.Durand Foreign Secretary of Govt. of India wanted the annexation of the J&K State or its Northern Areas by the

British. This was only a ploy. A deliberate leak of this information was given to Amrita Bazar Patrika of Calcutta. It with the blessings of the British that this paper published the secret note in one of its publications. In reality British had no design to annex Jammu & Kashmir state. Their main purpose was to inflame Hindu Public opinion against Muslims and in favour of the Dogra ruler in India. Col. R. Parry Nisbet was in league with the younger brother of Partap Singh namely, Amar Singh, who was promised the rulership of Jammu & Kashmir state. Col. Parry Nisbet in collusion with Amar Singh claimed that he was in possession of certain letters written by Partap Singh to Russians. Rivalry between Partap Singh and Amar Singh was the talk of the town. Maharaj Partap Singh wrote a lengthy missive to Viceroy quoted in extenso, by Mr. M.Y. Saraf in his book "Kashmir's Fight for Freedom" Vol. I page 308 explaining his position and pleading innocence. Maharaja's letter was disregarded by the Viceroy and in March 1889 Maharaja Partap Singh was deposed and a Regency Council consisting of five members with Amar Singh as President was instituted. Amrita Bazar Patrika published a number of articles showing how the British were going to undermine a Hindu ruled state in India. Amrita Bazar Patrika was the voice of Indian National Congress. The British had created this ploy to inflame Hindu public opinion. They knew the backlash would come from the Kashmiri Diaspora settled in Punjab in favour of Kashmiri Muslims. Otherwise they again appointed Maharaja Partap Singh as Chairman of the Regency Council in 1891 and Amar Singh the father of Maharaja Hari Singh became its Vice-President. In 1896, Maharaja Partap Singh was controlling this Regency Council in a very effective manner. That this was a British political drama enacted in Kashmir finds substantiation from the fact that influential member of parliament in House of Commons. William Digby and Mr. Bradlaugh raised a storm of protest against any political move to annex Kashmir. The articles written by William Digby were also published in a book titled "Condemned Unheard". That this was British drama of high

magnitude is clear from the circumstantial evidence of that period. The year 1905 was chosen by Viceroy:

- (a) to partition Bengal and
- (b) to restore rulership to Maharaj Partap Singh.

Lord Curzon had a definite political purpose to achieve. A special Durbar was held at Jammu in 1905 and abolition of Regency Council was publicly announced. Three questions go a begging, why was Partap Singh again made President of Regency Council in 1891, why were the rules of this Regency Council amended in 1896 and full powers restored to Maharaj Partap Singh as President of Regency Council? At whose bidding William Digby and Mr. Bradlaugh advocated the cause of Maharaj Partap Singh in British House of Commons? If the reason was misgovernance by Partap Singh towards his Muslim subjects, why, no member of British parliament refuted the statements of William Digby and Mr. Bradlaugh? What advice was tendered by the Secretary of State for India to the British prime Minister of that period? The partition of Bengal was not a spontaneous event. The scheme was published in December 1903. The Indian Press condemned it violently. The articles published in:

- (a) Amrita Bazar Patrika
- (b) Charu Mihir
- (c) Sanjivani
- (d) Basumati
- (e) Dacca Prakash

(f) Jyoti, all Hindu press, were openly incendiary.

On 18th February, 1904 Curzon went to Dacca, and, explained the British Policy in these words:

"When a proposal is put forward which would make Dacca the Centre, and possibly the capital of a new and self sufficing administration which must give the people of those districts by reason of their numerical strength and their su-

perior culture which would invest the Moham-medans in Eastern Bengal with a unity which they have not enjoyed since the days of old Mussalman Viceroys and Kings, which must develop local interests and trade to a degree, that is impossible so long as you remain appendage of another administration. Can it be, that the people of these districts are to be advised by their leaders to sacrifice all these great advantages from fear? Do you mean to be so blind to your future as to repudiate the offer?" Unquote [Excerpted from Tarachands "History of Freedom Movement in India"]. Curzons remarks to Brodrick, Secretary of State in London is gravid with meaning:

"Calcutta is the centre from which the Congress party is manipulated throughout the whole of Bengal and indeed the whole of India." Unquote.

Amrita Bazar Patrika the voice of Congress party had advocated vehemently against the deposition of Maharaj Partap Singh, ignoring the interests of Kashmiri Muslims. Now it was advocating against partition of Bengal which would have economically ameliorated the plight of East Bengal Muslims. Curzon in East Bengal wanted sincerely to provide economic empowerment to the Muslims of East Bengal in 1905. Then why did he re-induct Maharaj Partap Singh in Kashmir (Contrary to the social economic and political interests of Kashmiri Muslims? This is a million dollar question. According to Dr. Tarachands partition of Bengal was effected "because the British rulers were alarmed at the growth of national solidarity in India and were anxious to thwart it." I entirely disagree with this viewpoint. I am of the view the rise of Pan-Islamic feelings in Asia that had also impacted Indian Muslims which caused apprehension in the mind of the British that Muslims in India

would resort to armed struggle against the British for creation of a Muslim homeland. So conciliation of Muslims became imperative. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan was encouraged to induce Muslims to get Western education, so that they could perceive the benefits of accepting the legitimacy of British Raj. Pan-Islamism could reach India only via Afghanistan NWFP and Kashmir. This menace of pan-Islamism scared British who wanted to Build bridges of understanding with Indian Muslims. Yet rulership was restored back to Partap Singh in 1905 itself, but this policy is to be understood in the light of the fact that British Raj itself at that period had developed a sense of insecurity and had no definite policy on Kashmir. They felt that status quo in Kashmir was the expedient. Otherwise one cannot explain the oxymoron expression in British policy articulated by the Viceroy of India. On 1st December 1891 Col. Durrand was directed to attack the Fort at Chalt in Gilgit and it was during this period, that Hunza and Nagar were annexed. In 1892 Doctor Robertson went to Chillas and captured it. Muslim nationalism was now on the rise. In 1890 the entire Kashmir Province was in a grip of famine, to placate, Muslims in India, especially Punjab who at his period began to support Kashmiri Muslims in their fight against Dogra Rulers Mr. A. Wingate was asked to undertake settlement of land in Kashmir province. In 1889, Sir Walter Lawrence, the author of "The Valley of Kashmir" was asked to complete the task of Land reforms. In 1893 onwards Don Biscoe, a Christian missionary was encouraged to open an English Medium School in Srinagar. This British policy was an extension of the policy of conciliation of Muslims being followed in plains of India. The obvious contradiction was that even at this stage the Muslims in Baluchistan, NWFP and Sindh were totally disregarded by the British. This scenario can be understood by taking into reckoning the feelings of Pan-Islamism that were getting radicated in the India Muslims. British realised that Jamual-ul-Din Afghani (1837-1897) was the chief proponent of this view -point, British realised that if Jamal-ud-Din Afghani roused the Muslim

awakening for their own identity and the Muslims in India would rise in another armed rebellion. Dr. Tarachand the noted Indian historian has emphasised the influence Afghani amongst Muslims in India at that period of time.

Jamal Ud-Din Afghani was a restless fiery spirit. He moved from country to country, igniting the ambitions and passions of the Muslims. He reminded them that if Islamic civilisation has fallen upon evil times and was succumbing to the assault of the West it was due to the weakness of the Muslim peoples and governments. The remedy he pointed out was revival of religion and re-assertion of political power for the two were indissolubly linked together. His activities had tremendous effect upon Islamic Countries. His Pan-Islamism inspired the Pan-Arab movement. His exhortations led to the constitutional agitation in Iran. His criticism of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan persuaded the Ulema in India to work for independence in Co-operation with Indian National Congress. Afghani give a clarion call for Muslim resurgence, and crystallised the Muslim mind in anti-western stance, by pointing out that the principal enemy of Islam, was Europe in general and Great Britain in particular.

His pupil Sheikh Mohammad Abduh (1849-1905) sometimes Rector of the University of Al-Azhar, Cairo, spread the mission of his master through teaching. Numerous scholars both inside Al Azhar and out side became his pupil.....Among his disciples was the eminent writer and journalist Mohd Rashid Riddha (1865-1935) well known editor of al-Manar of Cairo. He was a Pan-Islamist who wrote a comprehensive treatise on Caliphate which, laid stress upon the theory, that Islam comprehends spiritualities as well as, temporalities". (See Tarachand: History of Freedom Movement in India). Realising that feelings of Pan-Islamism were getting rooted in Muslim ethos and culture in Egypt and Iran the British really were concerned that this Pan-Islamism should not reach Kashmir-Via Afghanistan. Some correspondence between Viceroy in

India and Secretary of State in 1884 points in that direction, Jamal-ul-Din Afghani died in 1897. British soon after his death realised they had to re-orientate their policies towards Indian Muslims and towards Kashmir Raj. The main plank of the British policy was grounded upon following considerations:

- a) India is to be ruled the policy of Divide and Rule and this policy should be strictly adhered to by the British Govt.
- b) British government should conciliate with the Muslims living in the plains of U.P and Bihar, whose territory is not contiguous with Afghanistan.
- c) As Jamal-ud-din Afghani's influence was at that period evident in Egypt and Iran, the British government should totally disregard the Muslim dominated provinces of Baluchistan, Sindh and NWFP, and, a policy of non-development of these areas should be pursued as a desired objective.
- d) To consolidate Muslim awakening as a separate community in India Bengal, should be partitioned, so that the Hindus in India would be provoked to launch a violent agitation against the existence of Muslim Bengal, leading to a permanent divide between the Muslim community and Hindu community.

Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, was the best, Contraption to be manipulated by the British, as "the identities and differences between Hindus and Muslims has existed for hundred of years". The British realised that Ulemas who had exhorted Muslims in India to support the 1857 Muslims rebellion against British had established the Deoband school of thought. They supported the Indian National Congress. It is quite evident that British crafted Indian National Congress in 1885, because they knew that feelings of pan-Islamism sweeping Egypt and Iran, would rouse feelings of Muslim nationalism in India. So they never wanted at that stage that Muslims should organise a party of their own. They crafted the Indian National Congress with the

complicity of Hindu trading classes to encourage the Muslims Ulemas to prefer to join Indian National Congress to oppose British Rule in India. This ploy succeeded exceeding well in India. An immediate Muslim armed struggle was obviated. Indian National Congress was crafted by British in 1885. Deoband ulema supported it. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan in 1885 openly declared that no Muslim worth his name should join the Indian National Congress as it was a representative of Hindu interests. These Deoband Ulemas issued a Fatwa against Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Anglo Oriental Association, and patriotic Association. In 1883 Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan was openly collaborating with the British. He was allowed to form M.A.O College in Aligarh. He in 1883 made a speech in Viceroy's Council, condemning representative institutions as they would be adverse to the Muslim interests. Hindu historians have expressed severe animadversion against the policies of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. His influence was widespread in Northern provinces including Punjab. According to Dr. Tarachand "those who listened to (Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan) him were mainly members of the Landowning class and their scions who had received English education. They belonged mainly to the northern provinces. But as the Zamindari (Landlord) system did not prevail in Western India and Southern Provinces, the Muslim upper class in that region did not accept Sir Sayyids leadership. I may hasten to add that Sir Sayyid leadership was also not visible in those regions of Punjab that were contiguous to the N.W.F.P. However the regions of Punjab contiguous to the state of Kashmir, were greatly influenced by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan.

Keeping these realities of the situation in view the British directed Sir Walter Lawrence to under take the settlement of land in Kashmir so that a proper landowning class and a class of land cultivators is created. Their rights defined by statute. To create rights consciousness amongst the people Don Biscoe a missionary was entrusted with the job of spreading education amongst Kashmiri Muslims. In this manner the insecurity of the Dogra rulers in Kashmir was perpetuated. The Kashmiri

diaspora settled in Punjab yearned for return to Jammu & Kashmir state. The Dogra rulers were terribly scared, so they opposed this demand in a brazen faced manner. Instead of reaching some correspondence with the Kashmiri Muslims diaspora in Punjab, the Dogras were determined to thwart their yearnings.

This diaspora became the strongest supporters of Kashmiri Muslim aspirations, in their struggle for their rights. In this context, while Bengal was partitioned in 1905 Dogra rule was also reinstituted in 1905 as a part of a grand British policy. Lord Curzon held a special Darbar in Jammu in 1905, and, proclaimed that Regency Council was dissolved and sovereignty restored back to Maharaja Partap Singh. However it was made clear that advice of the Resident would be sought by Maharaja on two Counts:

- a) In the matter of appointment of Prime- Minister and other council of Ministers.
- b) In the matter of preparation of budget for the state.

The period from 1805 to 1924 is a watershed event in the history of Indian Muslims. During this period the philosophical background was, created for Muslim thought and politics of the seven crore Muslims in India. Muslim thought was best articulated by the Ismaili religious head, Aga Khan who propounded the theory of separate Muslim Nationality. The concept of Islamic State was articulated by Chowdhry Afzal Haq. Caliphate was to be restored to its pristine glory was the kernel of the formulations of Azad Subhani. One gets the key to the Muslim thinking in India by examining the view of Aga Khan in his published memoirs. Aga Khan wrote with great elan: "Lord Minto's acceptance of our demands was the foundation of all future constitutional proposals made for India by successive British governments and its final inevitable consequence of the partition of India and emergence of Pakistan". Unquote. The Resident in Kashmir was in touch with the Viceroy and has to pursue the same policy in J&K State. His atti-

tude towards the Partap Singh government was shaped in conformity with the policies of Lord Minto in India. Mir Waiz of Kashmir was allowed to propagate the Ahil Hadis tenets emphasising puritan Islam. His influence was largely prevalent in the city of Srinagar. His preachings widened the Shia-Sunni divided in the City of Srinagar, but it created a thinking that Muslims were an ethnic group separate from the Sikhs and Kashmiri Pundits. He was also allowed to run a school exclusively for Muslim education. Mir Waiz could follow his pursuits only with the tacit approval of the Resident. In 1905 Partap Singh was reinstituted as Maharaja and in 1916, an agitation was launched by Muslim organisations in India against the oppression of Muslims by Maharaja. Mr Mohd Yousuf Saraf has described in detail the aftermath of this Kashmir specific agitation, compelling Govt. of India to depute its Commissioner Secretary Mr. Sharp for on the spot study in Kashmir.

To quote an excerpt from "Kashmiri Fight for Freedom" by M.Y Saraf would be really profitable. According to Saraf to quote his own words:

"As a result of the agitation conducted by Muslim organisation particularly in the Punjab, the Govt. of India deputed in 1916 its Educational Commissioner Mr. Sharp for on the spot detailed study of the situation and to make necessary recommendations to the State Government.

According to his report the number of Primary Schools in the entire State was hardly 311, which included 36 aided School. The number of Arabic teachers was 80. There were on 37 Middle Schools, while the number of Girls school was only 16.

The amount provided in the budget during that year for grant of scholarship to Muslim students was Rs 3200/- while for girl students it was Rupees 245. Mr Sharp recommended that the number of Primary Schools should reach at least the level of 1100, within ten years so that every village with a popu-

lation of at least 500 could have a primary School, by 1926,..... In the wake of Sharp report, the Muslims of India, reacted very emphatically against the tyranny and exploitation to which the Kashmiri Muslims has been subjected. The matter was raised in the All India Muslim Educational Conference in 1918, and a strong resolution adopted.

It was followed by a mission headed by Nawab Sir Muhammad Muzammellah Khan. It marked the beginning of the massive support of the Muslims of the Sub -Continent for the case of Kashmiri Muslims". Unquote.

The year 1916 is important as the Maharaja was under pressure from the British to ameliorate the educational prospects of Kashmiri Muslim. In the schools run in the state in 1916, at least ninety percent of the alumni were Kashmir Pundits who were manning the infra-structure of Dogra administration in Kashmir province. In 1916 itself most probably at the behest of the Resident one General Summender Khan applied to Maharaja Partap Singh to set up a Muslim Association that would assure to the Maharaja that it would function in Jammu on a non- political basis. For Four long years the matter was kept pending and it was in the year 1921 that this permission was granted. The most important consequence of this demarche was the Ulemas from India especially Punjab began to address the congregations in Jammu. Immediate upshot was that Punjab Muslim press, like Siyasat, Muslim Outlook, Zamindar and Inquilab published data showing that Muslims were excluded from services under Dogra administration. The year 1921- 1922 have tremendous importance. Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal was representing the voice of Muslim nationalism in India. In Anjuman Himayat ul Islam he was advocating the cause of the oppression of Kashmiri Muslim by Dogra administration. Iqbal was clearly of the view that Muslim Umma had a distinct identity and should reassert for its rights in India. For him Kashmiri oppression became a part of the oppression suffered by Muslim in India. He was advocating the concept of Muslim

nationhood. The Jewish lobby denied him Nobel prize that was Awarded to Rabindra Nath Tagore, who was lauded by the British but openly despised by Japanese and other Asians who characterised him as the "voice of a ruined nation". Poet Iqbal's Poem *Israri khudi*, was translated by professor Nicholson in English in 1920, and he was conferred Knighthood in 1922. In 1921, he visited Kashmir the land of his ancestors, and wrote his famous poem *Saqi- Nama* in Nishat Bagh Srinagar. He had gained first hand knowledge about the plight of Kashmiri ethnic Muslims in 1921 Sadat Ali Khan a contemporary of Iqbal in his book: "Mulfoozat Iqbal" mentions the fact that after his return from Kashmir Dr. Iqbal was convinced that political struggle in Kashmir was imminent and would be unleashed immediately. Iqbal had prophetic vision. The British seeing Iqbals popularity amongst Indian Muslims for advocating the ideas of Pan- Islamism, now wanted to detract his reputation. Cantwell Smith. W in his book "Islam in Modern History page 44 note made following derogatory remarks about Iqbal:

"He is the Sufi who attacked Sufism and perhaps the liberal who attacked liberalism. The historical consequences of his impact seems on the whole to have served to weaken liberalism among Indian Muslims and apologetic dynamism." Unquote.

British policy in Kashmir was now apparent. They would strive to build "liberalism among Kashmiri Muslims," and with that view wanted to help the Muslim aspirations in Kashmir. The theory of promoting liberal Islam in Kashmir was formulated when the British found that it was Amrita Bazar Patrika, the voice of the Indian National Congress that championed the cause of restoration of Hindu Raj in a Muslim dominated state. The Amrita Bazar Patrika openly advocated, that Maharaj had the support of the Jammu Dogras who were a minority segment of the population of Kashmir. This policy is explicitly expressed in the issue of Amrita Bazar Patrika dated 30th. Janu-

ary, 1890. If one examines the Secret File Foreign [Secret E] pros. February 1889/nos-183-286, we find that the British formulated a policy that Bengalis should be excluded from Kashmir administration and slowly and imperceptibly replaced by Punjabi Hindus. In 1910 it was decided that Kashmir should be linked with those areas of Punjab that had predominant Muslim population. So Jehlum Valley Road was constructed. One fact that deserves mention, that Partap Singh, had developed close connection with Indian National Congress, who supported Hindu Raj in a Muslim state. In pursuance to this policy Maharaj Partap Singh as chairman of the Regency Council sanctioned and approved the formation of Dogra Saba in 1803. This Sabah latter on in 1929 openly became a part of the Indian National Congress and called itself the Congress Committee of Jammu & Kashmir state. In accordance with the policy of the Indian National Congress the Sabah openly advocated that those Muslims who had migrated to Punjab should not be allowed to return to Kashmir. These events have to be appreciated in the light of the fact that Sir Walter Lawrence the author of "Valley of Kashmir", in 1890, itself pointed out that there was rise in Wahabism in Srinagar city [See page 285 of his book]. British were scared of Wahabism.

The British realised that Kashmir was not an isolated princely state. They had to placate the Muslims in India as well as the Muslims in Jammu & Kashmir state. In 1905 Partap Singh was restored with full powers by the British. Just three years after the restoration of Partap Singh to his Gaddi, in 1908, the Director-General of Archeological Department of India on 15th. October 1908 wrote a secret note to the Darbar that Muslim shrines should be protected. In 1910 the state organised a full fledged department of Archeology. On 14th. September 1916 Mohd. Din Fauq, Editor of Kashmir Magazine Lahore demanded the restoration of famous Pather Masjid in Mohalla Fateh Kadal in city of Srinagar. The English administration had anticipated that this was bound to happen so Resident encouraged Maharaja to confer the title of Mirwaiz on the Chief

Preacher of Jamia-Masjid in 1901. In this behalf letter from Governor of Kashmir to the Vice-president of State Regency Council 11th. March OER, 1898 File No. 52/L-11 JKA provides deep insight. Moulvi Rasul Shah was considered as "a single most useful figure capable of exercising a large influence over the Muslims of Srinagar." In 1899 that is two years before the title of Mir Waiz was conferred on Molvi Rasul Shah, he was encouraged to establish Anjuman Nasrat ul Islam and in 1905, when full powers of Maharaja were restored in a Darbar in Jammu, Rasul shah was allowed to run Islamia High School in Srinagar. These are not mere coincidences but part of a definite policy. In this backdrop the issue of restoration of Pather Masjid to Muslims assumed significance. On 14th. June 1918, just when first great war in Europe was dying out, the Honorary Secretary of Kashmir Muslim Conference, central standing committee Lahore wrote a letter to Darbar, for restoration of Pather Masjid to Kashmiri Muslims. British also realised that under the influence of Congress the Maharaja was not happy with the formation of Anjuman Nasrat ul Islam although he was patronising that Anjumun under compulsion from British Resident. A perusal of secret file showing list of Hindu societies dated 31st. December 1918 OER, Political Department, 1919 File No. 312/7-C. JKA shows that twenty societies representing Hindu and Rajput interests were allowed to run in Jammu & Kashmir State, and Kashmiri Pundits, were advocating that the state subject should be defined in such a manner so that near about one lakh families that had migrated to Punjab should not be allowed resettlement in the Jammu & Kashmir state. In pursuance of this policy Maharaja was asked to maintain links with those areas of Punjab that had sizeable Hindu-Sikh population. As such in 1922, Banihal cart road was built. British now were determined that Wahabism should be checked in city of Srinagar. At the behest of the Resident Maharaj for the first time, after 1829, when first Shia-Sunni riots were encouraged to be enacted, allowed the Shias to take out Mohurram processions in the city of Srinagar, in the year 1922. One can

discover the British influence, and, telegram from Arwat Shiah to Maharaja dated 29th August, 1922, [General Department 1922, file No. 719/P-5 JKA confirms this theory]. In 1807-1808, Shuddi movement was at its peak. The Punjabi Hindus realised that British policy was to placate Kashmiri Muslims so that a version of Liberal Muslims could be instituted in Jammu & Kashmir State. In 1910 a group of Punjabi Hindus wrote a letter to Maharaja that their lives were in great peril and Kashmiri Muslims would literally pillage them as a class. This letter is dated 18th. September 1910. Maharaja Partap Singh after receiving this letter wrote a confidential memo to Chief Minister highlighting this view point. [See OER Political Department 1910, file No. 258 JKA]. Mir Waiz did not respond to the Shuddi Movement then, but in 1923 on Jummat-ul-vida day Mir Waiz in a public gathering of 20,000 Muslims in Jamia Masjid pointed out to the Muslims the danger from Shuddhi movement. The chronology of events is of critical importance, because at this stage the role of Kashmir Pundits is also of critical importance. In 1922 itself the Kashmiri Pundit Hindu Community decided to draw a wedge between Punjabis and Kashmiris, and a vigorous hate Punjabi Campaign was commenced. The British Resident in Kashmir. Mr. Windham was not oblivious about the happenings in the city of Kashmir. Pundits issued posters that all Kashmiris should boycott the Bioscope Company show because the bulk of the performers were Punjabis. Windham has recorded these events in his letter of 16th. August 1922. The purport of this campaign was to prevent Kashmiri Muslim who had migrated to Punjab from settlement in Kashmir, on the specious plea that these Punjabis would appropriate jobs in the Dogra administration depriving Kashmiri speaking people of their quota. The stage was set for the events of 1924. Kashmiri Pundits were in close touch with the eminent Pundit families in Punjab and Allahabad. They knew that in 1922-1923 the Khilafat movement had failed, and Muslim frustration would find vent, most probably, in Kashmir as Punjabi Muslim by now were openly campaigning against the Dogra

rule in Kashmir.

This back drop provided impetus to the British to enact a new policy in Kashmir. This policy was characterised by an element of duality. British encouraged Maharaja to have an empathy with Indian National Congress that represented the interests of Liberal Muslims in India. They also empathised with Kashmiri Muslims so, that in future, if rebellion by Kashmiri Muslims eventuated the leadership of the Kashmiri Muslims would be guided by All India National Congress. In 1924 in Silk Factory, Srinagar strike was engineered against low wages being paid to Muslim labourers. For the first time a procession was taken out in July 1924 by these labourers through the streets of Srinagar. Dogra soldiers with fixed bayonets charged the processionists, several people were injured. The entire incident had reverberations in neighbouring Punjab. It is a strange coincidence that soon thereafter Lord Reading the Viceroy of India decided to visit Srinagar. At that very time a Shia lawyer from Lukhnow Agha Haider visited Kashmir. Saad-ud-Din Shawl a prominent trader known to Resident contacted him in his houseboat in Naseem Bagh. He drafted a charter of demands for Muslims of Kashmir, that was typed by one Mr. Maqbool Pundit, a clerk in the office of Resident. Agha Haider on his return from Kashmir was rewarded for his services and was appointed a Judge of the Lahore High Court disregarding Dr. Sir Mohd Iqbal for this post. On 14th. October 1924, Lord Reading the Viceroy of India visited Srinagar. He stayed in Srinagar for fourteen days. During these period the Memorandum drafted by Mr. Agha Haider was presented to the Viceroy. It listed seventeen demands, but demand No. 17 is full of deep significance. Demand No. 17 explicitly said:

"Since the rights of Muslims are insecure and are trampled under local authorities the Resident of Kashmir be made answerable for their plight."

Unquote

This charter of demand was presented by

- (a) Khaja Saad-ud-din Shawl, a prominent trader with access to Residency
- (b) Khaja Hasan Shah Naqashbandi, a Jagirdar of Maharaja, whose son was a Tehsildar in Revenue department
- (c) Hassan Shah Jalali, A Ziladar of Jaddibal
- (d) Molvi Ahamdullah and
- (e) Mir Waiz Hamdani
- (f) Mufti Sharifuddin, the cleric who later assumed the title of Mufti Azim.

The real importance of this event is that Maharaja Partap Singh did not severely punish these memorialists who had complained against his misrule. The question is why Maharaja restrained himself in such a bizarre manner? One explanation is that he did not want to offend the British Resident who was leaning towards these memorialists. Only very mild and nominal punishment was imposed upon them. The committee set up by Viceroy completely exonerated Maharaj Partap Singh of any misrule. Saad ud Din Shawl was externed from state as the British wanted him to cultivate important contacts in Punjab. He stayed during his exile in Lahore. The question arises why did the British choose the year 1924 for their new demarche in Kashmir? Lord Harding visited Kashmir in October 1924. Why? Viceroy had other important business in New Delhi, and October was the period of Autumn in Kashmir not a very attractive season.

The reason is obvious. By 1924 the Khilafat Movement was dead. The Muslim League, had lost its appeal to the Muslims in India. The men who envisioned the emergence of Muslims as a political force were side lined. Muslim League was suffering from trauma of internal dissensions. The following pillars of Indian Muslim League, namely

- (a) Mohd. Ali Jinnah
- (b) Wazir Hasan

- (c) Raja Mahmudabad
- (d) Fazli Hussain
- (e) Mohd. Shafi

were totally marginalised in the mainstream Indian politics.

The British knew that in Kashmir the political field was open to the Indian National Congress. In future the Kashmiri Muslim leadership would work in tandem with Indian National Congress. It is only after 1924 the Jamait-ul-Ulema Hind could play any active role in mobilising the religious elements in favour of Congress. It would be easy for British to encourage those Muslim elements, who, according to them represented moderate, enlightened Islam in Kashmir, to side with Indian National Congress. Some events may be noticed following the visit of Lord Reading to Kashmir. Maharaj Partap Singh died in 1925. Hari Singh a young man of thirty years of age, and nephew of Partap Singh ascended to the Gaddi, as Maharaj. His darbar was having close and intimate connections with Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru a leading light of the Indian National Congress and a close friend of Moti Lal Nehru who dominated the Indian National Congress. In 1927 at the behest of Kashmir Pundits the new Maharaja passed the state subject law. According to Ex-Chief Justice of Jammu & Kashmir High Court Sir Burjore Dalal, the state subject law passed by Maharaj Hari Singh had only one teleological purpose to achieve, that was to prevent the Kashmiri Muslim diaspora in Punjab and India from resettlement in Kashmir [See Dalal Report of 1931 published by Govt. of Jammu & Kashmir] The Kashmiri Pundits skilfully manipulated the Muslim opinion in Kashmir on the state subject laws on the specious plea that the local Kashmiri Muslim population would lose its share of quota in state services if this Kashmiri Muslim diaspora was allowed to get resettled in Kashmir province. By now hate Punjabi campaign was fully institutionalised in Kashmir province with the complicity of the British Resident. In 1928 Moti Lal Nehru report

was promulgated in India and it deliberately widened the gap between Indian Muslim League and the Indian national Congress on the question of reservation of seats for Muslims in the legislature of Indian provinces. The effect of Moti Lal Nehru report would perpetuate the under representation of Muslims in Indian legislature. Moti Lal Nehru Report of 1928 had one direct consequence. In 1929 [Moti Mar Alam Islami] invited Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal from India to preside over its annual session in Egypt. It is of great significance that Maulana Azad who was the most important Muslim cleric in Indian National Congress was totally disregarded by this Islamic Organisation having profound influence in West-Asia. It was in the year 1927, that Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal had actively joined the political field in India. Congress and the British at that period branded him as a revivalist. In 1930, that is a watershed year Iqbal was invited by All India Muslim League to preside over its annual session in Allahabad. It was at this session that Iqbal laid bare an apercu of an autonomous Muslim region comprising Muslim states of North-West India namely, Sindh, Baluchistan, NWFP and Punjab. Iqbal was sharing his vision not with Ulemas in India but with an Isamili Shia (an insignificant minority amongst Muslim India) Mr M.A. Jinnah. Mr. M.A. Jinnah in his forward to the "Letters of Iqbal" wrote:

"His views were substantially in consonance with my own and had finally led me to the same conclusion as a result of careful examination and study of the constitutional problems facing India and found expression in due course in the united will of Muslim India, as, adumbrated in the Lahore resolution of the All India Muslim League, popularly known as the Pakistan Resolution passed on 23rd. March 1940." Unquote. This was written by Mr. M.A. Jinnah in 1943 in his foreword to the book "Letters of Jinnah," published by Sheikh Mohd. Ashraf, Lahore 1943.

In this backdrop we have to appreciate, that most probably at the indirect behest of the Resident. Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, in 1930 sought the advice of Gandhi, regarding the role Kashmiri Pundit Community, should play in view of the new political awakening amongst Kashmiri Muslims." Most officers of Residents office were Pundits.

Henceforth Pundit Prem Nath Bazaz, the Kashmiri activist, maintained direct touch with leaders of the Indian National Congress. This scenario provided a prelude to the events that eventuated in 1931 in Kashmir. However the chronological juxtaposition of events and circumstances in the foregoing narrative, would suffer from an obvious short coming if the real teleological purpose of Congress politics in Kashmir is not understood in its real perspective. The core aim of the tacit British-Congress complicity was that if the imminent Kashmiri Muslim insurrection erupted in Kashmir these two political powers should be able to shape the hysteron and proteron of Kashmiri nationalism on the basis of the strategic parameters of the Kashmiri ethnicity and not religion. The British realised that Mr. M.A. Jinnah then in dire straits and not only rejected Moti Lal Nehru report of 1928 but characterised it as a Hindu Document. The expression "Hindu Document" scared the British as well as the Congress. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru had stood up in the Imperial legislature, and detracted Jinnah as "a spoilt child of the Indian politics." "Hindu Document" in plain terms meant that:

- (a) The secularism of the All India National Congress was moonshine
- (b) Congress was anti Muslim, so far the political rights of the Muslim community are concerned.
- (c) Congress instead of granting political rights to Muslims would like to perpetuate their minority status in one India, if ever India became independent.

This was prelude to the formation of Pakistan. Moti Lal Nehru Report was the joint endeavour of Moti Lal and his son

Jawahar Lal Nehru. Jinnah's characterising Moti Lal Nehru Report as a Hindu document, meant also that Moti Lal and Jawahar Lal Nahru, were openly catering to Hindu interests in India, and, at heart were not secularists.

[CHAPTER - IV]

The Political Scenario of 1930, was going to be the determinant of political struggle in Jammu and Kashmir State. Some facts require reiteration. Jinnah had become the betenoire of English administration. He was, the one person, whom British would never be able to manipulate. He was simply unbribable. British realised Jinnah was the stubborn Advocate of Muslim community in India. He resigned from Central Legislative Council, in 1919 in protest against Rowlette's Bill. His letter of resignation sent to Lord Chelmsford was condemnatory in tone. He said:

"I, therefore, as protest against the passing of the Bill and the manner in which it was passed tender my resignation - - - - - in my opinion, a Government that passes or sanctions such a law in times of peace forfeits its claim to be called a civilized Government - - - - "Unquote.

His anti-British sentiment found full expression in his letter to Mr. M.K. Gandhi in 1920. Jinnah wrote:

"If by new life, you mean your methods and your programmes, I am afraid, I cannot accept them, for I am fully convinced, that it must lead to disaster. But the actual life that has opened up before the country is that we are faced with a Government, that pays no heed to the grievances, feelings and sentiments of the People - - - but I for one am convinced that the present policy of the Government, is the primary cause of it - - -" unquote. Since 1920 the entire Congress party has launched an organised systematic and de-

liberate campaign of vilification against Jinnah. Hindus hated Jinnah from their guts because he was incorruptible.

The Congress Press detracted Jinnah as a stooge of the British though in 1922, Jinnah declined Knighthood that British Crown wanted to confer on him. His only fault was that he could not forget the political importance of his Islamic identity. In 1928, he denounced "Nehru Report" as a [Hindu document]. The same year, he organized the boycott of Simon Commission. In 1929, Jinnah in All Parties Muslim Conference advocated that India should have a federal system, with residuary powers in Constituent State; and separate Muslim electorates. The British considered these demands as secessionist in character. In this backdrop of events, Jinnah found that he was marginalized; although, the British invited him to attend the Round-table Conference, in London. On 4th. October 1930, Jinnah, left India for London. He stayed in exile in London for four long years that is till 1934. In 1930 the British Policy in India underwent a new demarche. On May 18, 1930, in Waziristan, Mullah Haji Turangzai declared Jihad against British. In Tochi Valley British used Air Force to bomb the rebellious crowd. The British encouraged Gandhi to win over to the side of the Congress, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, who at that period at the behest of congress started his Khudai Khidmatgar Movement in Peshawar. According to the British Viceroy, now, blatant dangers lurked on the Frontier. Wedgwood Ben, had become the Secretary of State for India. Lord Reading was an orthodox Jew, who greatly influenced him. In 1930 the United States and England were in the grip of great economic depression. In these circumstances, the Secretary of State for India, outlined the new British thinking in his letter dated 20th June, 1930. This document is the most critical document, because it not only outlined the British Policy in India, it was also going to impact the Policy of British Resident in Kashmir. Wedgwood Ben, wrote to Viceroy of India, in a highly poignant, intensive, and telling expression, [to quote his own words]

"We recognize that we have a duty to minorities, but the trusteeship must not be exploited in any way against the interests of the majority. This is to say, while we cannot go away and tell the minorities to make the best terms, they can with a powerful majority, we do not intend, on the other hand to and deprive the majority of its rights, relying ourselves upon the support of one or more minorities. To put in another way,:

- (a) although we recognize the value of the support of the minorities,
- (b) We will resist the temptation to co-erce or bribe them,
- (c) To give that support at the expense of what the majority ought to have": Unquote.

Needless to mention that by majority Wedgwood Ben, meant the Hindu population in India.

Every word of this invaluable document is gravid with great signification. In other words, after the total devastation of Ottoman Khilafat, and, keeping in view, the Jewish interests in Asia and to consolidate the appropriation of Arab countries by the British and Europeans, it was imperative for the British to support Hindus against Muslims. It was quite logical that now the British would also engineer Muslim insurrection in Kashmir against Dogra rule in such a subtle manner, so that Kashmir Muslim Leadership, would be driven toward Congress, and not lean on Muslim League. There was a tacit complicity between British and the Congress and in pursuance to the objectives of the Anglo-American policy, well entrenched at that period, the real focus of Indian National Congress British-US policies was to carve out the State of Israel. Congress was in league with the British on this question. Its relevance to Indian politics will be explained at a latter stage in this monograph. Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan at that time was lionized by the Congress as Loin of Frontier. His nickname was Frontier Gandhi. The same policy of winning over the Kashmiri Muslims to the

side of the Congress, was to be executed with great finesse in Kashmir. On November 12, 1930 Round Table Conference was held in London. Hari Singh, the Maharaja of Kashmir was one of the prominent participants. Jinnah had made it clear as member of federal substructure committee of the Round Table Conference, that "no Constitution would work, unless it embodied provisions, which gave a sense of security to the Muslims - Hari Singh's remarks at round table Conference, show they were more to please the Indian National Congress. Hari Singh knew that majority of Muslim India, at that period was "within Congress". Lord Wellington was sworn in as Viceroy on April 18, 1931. He also hated Jinnah from his guts - The Kashmir Resident knew which way the wind was blowing. He could feel the pulse of the time. A question has been asked, why there was Pendulum swing in the Policy of the British towards Muslims? How do we explain the tone of Wedgwood Ben's letter of 20th June 1930, to the Viceroy of India? What did Hedgewood Ben mean to say when he said, and used such expressions in his missive, as:

"to give that support at the expense of what the majority ought to have? The enucleation of British policy is an arduous task. Some blatant extrinsic factors were impacting upon British Indian Policy due to revolutionary changes that had occurred in Europe and Russia. Some of them may be noticed as under:

- (1) Europe, US and U.K. were afflicted with great economic depression. The consequence was obvious. Hitler rose to Power in Germany in 1930. He represented Nazi nationalism that was built upon the ashes of anti-semitism.
- (2) At this period the Britain and U.S were controlled and largely under the influence of a Jewish pro-active lobby;
- (3) Hitler considered Jews responsible for the backwardness of German orthodox Christians.
- (4) Hitler embarked upon a policy of explicit persecution

of Jews His zeal shows he was a psychopath to the core, in his hatred towards the Jews.

- (5) Jewish migration from Germany commenced at a feverish Pace in 1930 itself.
- (6) 1930, was also the beginning of the Age of Science, of the spread of popular education in Europe, of great and rapid advances in Applied Science, especially the beginning of new Age of steel, of the spread of automobiles and aeroplanes, of the beginning of Age of oil and electricity, that would put both Germany and USSR on a military industrial expansion course in Europe. This was something inevitable.
- (7) At that time the Anglo-German Naval Race, was also at its peak. Both countries were now scrambling for military preparedness; as they were now on a collision course.
- (8) In this European scenario in 1930, a policy was formulated by orthodox Christian leaders that Jewish migrants from Germany should be settled in Palestine;
- (9) The concept of carving out Jewish State in Palestine, was now to be actualized. It was a foregone conclusion that Muslims in India would have sympathy with dislocated Arabs in Palestine. Already Land riots in Palestine between Jews and Arab Muslims had assumed furious proportions at that time, and, attracted the attention of Muslims in India.
- (10) Keeping in view these facts a policy was devised that British Government should henceforth develop a deep League with the trading Hindu classes in India, politically represented by All India National Congress.
- (11) A deep tacit conspiracy between Congress Leadership and the Jews who influenced the thinking in U. S. and U.K. had begun in a clandestine manner; so far the affairs of India were concerned, and British encouraged

this tacit complicity between the two, i.e., the Jews and Hindu leaders of Indian Congress.

(12) The rise of Soviet Russia and, the Communist challenge in China, especially, directed by Stalin, and the break-out of a large Civil War in Central China in July 1930, had put the English on the horns of a dilemma. English realised that the Chinese revolution at that period was transforming into a social revolution to be led by Mao- Tse-Tung. So British policy in Kashmir was dictated by another imperative, to force Hari Singh to lease out to the British, the northern area of Gilgit so that they could check Russian influence in that area, that was bound to proliferate.

(13) The role of Gandhi is also full of signification. At that time due to the exploitation of Muslim weavers by Hindu textile owners in Kanpur, led to large scale rioting; a Campaign of reconversion of Muslims to Hinduism was commenced.. In the words of Burton Stein:

" The Congress leaders and even Gandhi, himself did not explicitly repudiate such inflammatory religious campaigns, and often maintained close personal relations with their leaders, was not lost on Muslims." Unquote.

This shows the real character of Mr. Gandhi, who was skin deep imbued with feelings of Hindu revivalist culture; the entire movement was backed up by propertied high caste Hindus. To achieve this aim the entire Marwari capitalists and prominent Industrialists led by Mr. G.D. Birla were heavily financing Indian National Congress. Mr. G.D. Birla was one of the prominent participants in the Round Table Conference held in London in 1930.

(14) The British Irrigation Policy in Punjab, had rekindled hostility between Hindus and Muslims in Punjab, and the British realised that this would also impact Muslim nationalism in Kashmir. They had a deep understand-

ing of the Kashmiri Muslim psyche and Kashmir's history of oppression during Afghan, dogra rule. The Kashmiris associated Dogras with Punjabis, and hated both.

In this factual context, we have to comprehend, the contrived machinations of British Resident in Kashmir. He was monitoring the anti-dogra situation developing in Srinagar town in 1930 and his intelligencers were the Kashmiri Pundit employees in Residency. Prem Nath Bazaz, a Kashmiri Pundit leader got an inkling of British thinking from these residency employees. Immediately he was in touch with Congress Leadership in Allahabad. Even today Allahabad and Lucknow, have sizeable population of migrant Kashmiri Pundit families of great eminence. Now a summary of some events that eventuated in 1930 in Kashmir may be indicated:

- (a) On 12th April, 1930, Sheikh Abdullah and some other Kashmiri youths completed their post-Graduate studies and returned back to Srinagar;
- (b) A Reading Room Party was established, although, no non-political Organization could be constituted in the State; by these unemployed educated youth, without permission from Dogra Raj.
- (c) The Reading Room Party elected Sheikh Abdullah as Secretary. The Reading Room Party was set up most probably at the behest of Congress, as Maulana Azad who had encouraged the formation of Ahrar Party, in Punjab was, the first to welcome it. According to Kashmiri historian Mohd Yusuf Saraf, Maulana Azad called it "Cornerstone of a bright Future for the State."
- (d) The Christian Bengali Prime Minister Sir Albion Bannerjee had resigned in 1929, against Dogra oppression of Kashmiri-Muslims. Now another Bengali Sir N.L. Bannerjee was in touch with Kashmiri Reading Room Party. He was Editor of "Indian States in London" and published data in his journal in London showing op-

pression of Kashmiri Muslims. The most significant fact is Maharaja watched these developments with a sense of helplessness, as Reading room Party had a green signal from the British Resident.

- (e) The Maharaja could ban the entry of papers like "Muslim Outlook" and "Siyasat" from Punjab but the administration could not take any action against the Reading Room Party, although it supplied data to the editor of "Indian States" in London.
- (f) In Jammu, the Jammu Muslims had also formed Muslim Association. Sir N.L. Bannerjee from London avoided to have any connections with this Association. This speaks volumes. Even Maulana Azad of national congress refused to take notice of this Jammu Association. Why? The paper Indian States in London also collected data about Muslim under-representation in Service in the State. Such data was also Published by Muslim Outlook and Siyasat in Lahore. However the entry of these two papers was banned in the state, but not the entry of the paper "Indian States".
- (g) In 1930, Civil Service Recruitment Board Regulations were promulgated which, aimed at preventing entry of Muslims in Civil Service of the J&K State. The question arises why?
- (h) Reading Room Party was allowed by Administration to present a Representation to a Committee of Cabinet headed by Mr. Wakefield. This privilege was not granted to young Men " Muslim Association of Jammu by Wakefield in 1930, Why? Mr. Wakefield was very close to British Resident in Srinagar.
- (i) Reading Room Party, that was constituted without permission from Maharaja, was allowed to publish the correspondence on the issue of Service Recruitment Board Rules. The Dogra Administration did not take any action against Reading Room Party. The million dollar

question is why, why, why?

- j) According to Kashmiri Historian Mohammad Yusuf Saraf, the Reading Room Party had to quote his own words, nothing to do with "Youngmen" Muslim Association functioning in Jammu. Sheikh Abdullah contacted Sir N.L. Bannerjee in London, got laudation from Maulana Azad, but avoided to contact, Youngmen's Muslim Association in Jammu. Why? who was guiding Sheikh Abdullah in his politics?
- (k) According to Mr. Prem Nath Bazaz, Sheikh Abdullah in 1930, when Maharaja Hari Singh was to return to Srinagar addressed a political meeting opposing such a move. Mr. Maqbool Gilani, had invited two hundred Muslim delegates to attend this meeting. [See Kashmir Ka Gandhi Page 31 by P.N. Bazaz]. Why did not administration take any action against him, although all political meetings were banned in the State? Why was Maharaja restrained in taking any legal action towards Abdullah? Was British Resident in Kashmir providing support to Sheikh Abdullah is a question that begs the answer.
- (i) In spite of this conduct, at whose behest Maharaja Hari Singh, employed Sheikh Abdullah as a teacher on a salary of Rs 60.00 per month in State High School Srinagar as a teacher? These are enigmatic questions, Sheikh Abdullah at that time was a Youngman of twenty-five years of age who did his M.Sc. (Chemistry) from Aligarh Muslim University. His knowledge of Kashmir or Indian history, World politics, British Policies in India, was only rudimentary, and, could be manipulated by British Resident in Kashmir.
- (m) Events in Jammu like Prevention of Khutba on Eid prayers on 29th April, 1931, by Dogra Police Inspector or the event of 4th June in Central Jail, Jammu when a book containing collection of Quranic verses, was

thrown out and desecrated by a Head Constable of Police called Balakram were not taken notice of by Reading Room Party. Why? Yet it is a fact that:

- (n) "On 20th June, 1930 some leaves of Holy Qur'an were found in public latrine". Who engineered this desecration of Holy Book? At whose behest this was done? This is to be appreciated in the light of the fact that although Sheikh Abdullah, had joined Government Service as a Science teacher in State High School in Srinagar, yet even as a Dogra state employee, he was allowed to be chief spokesman of the Reading Room Party. Why? Why? Why? The answer is that the whole affair was engineered by the British Resident in Srinagar. No other explanation has been offered by any Indian historian.

It was the Youngmen's Association in Jammu, that sent posters published in Punjab to the Reading Room Party in Srinagar. One Mohammad Ismail was arrested by Police for distributing this seditious material. A Protest March was held in Jamia Masjid. Sheikh Abdullah made a fiery speech at this meeting. For graphic details of this meeting, one should consult the book 'Kashmir Ka Gandhi' written by Pundit Prem Nath Bazaz, [especially page 28 of this book]. The question to be answered is that Sheikh Abdullah at the relevant time, was a teacher in Government High School, Srinagar. He was government servant. The Jamia Masjid meeting was attended by at least thirty thousand people. Why did not Dogra administration take any administrative action against Sheikh Abdullah? Sheikh Abdullah, was not dismissed from Service. He resigned from Kashmir government service, when the administration as a matter of routine administrative transfer thought it expedient to transfer him to Muzaffarabad Government High School. This also shows that the wire-string was being pulled by British Resident in Srinagar. The helplessness of Dogra rule is blatant.

I have delineated this factual matrix to emphasise that Brit-

ish Resident in Srinagar, had totally shackled the Dogra administration, who could not terminate the services of an ordinary school teacher in one of their own schools, although Hari Singh was an autocratic ruler enjoying full sovereign powers. Under constraint from British Resident Maharaja Hari Singh invited Kashmiri Muslim representatives for dialogue. Sheikh Abdullah convened a public meeting attended by fifty-thousand people according to *INQUILAB* of 9th July, 1931 at Khanqahi Maulla, the headquarters of Reading Room Party. At this meeting seven Representatives were selected to dialogue with the Maharaja. Before their names could be announced, one Abdul Qadeer Khan, an employee of Major Butt of Yorkshire Regiment, at that juncture rushed to the stage and made a fiery speech for overthrow of Dogra Rule. According to historian P.N. Bazaz, Abdul Qadeer had already met Sheikh Abdullah and was invited by Sheikh to address the Public meeting on 9th July 1931. The chronology of events shows that only the news paper *Inquilab* of 9th July, 1931 highlighted the details about this Public meeting. It also highlighted that Qadeer a resident of Amroha, UP was arrested on 25th June 1931, within seven days a case was presented in the Srinagar Sessions Court, and on 5th July, 1931, the Government shifted the venue of the trial to Central Jail, Srinagar. The question arises, what action did the Resident take in the matter? What steps Major Butt of Yorkshire Regiment, who was, the employer of Qadeer Khan take in this matter, especially when Qadeer Khan was actually arrested from the House-Boat of Major Butt at Naseem Bagh, Major Butt was an English officer who had connections with British Intelligence Agencies. Who allowed Sheikh Abdullah to convene a public meeting at Batamaloo on 6th or 7th July 1931, protesting against the trial of Qadeer Khan in camera in Central Jail? Why did not administration take any action against Sheikh Abdullah from 6th July 1931 to 13th July 1931 especially when on 12th July 1931 Sheikh Abdullah held a public meeting in a Mosque at Gowkadal making an incendiary speech. This is really intriguing, especially when on 9th

July 1931, Maharaja Hari-Singh, had issued an official communication saying: [to quote the actual words of Maharajas communication]

"The immediate burden of maintaining Law and Order necessarily falls on Magistracy and the Police whose duty it will be to ensure that Law is upheld at all costs and where it is defied, its authority is restored - - - I assure them that they will be supported by myself and my Government, in the due discharge of their duties, and will not be sacrificed to unjust clamour or intrigue." Unquote.

This communication is still extant in the archives of Kashmir government. The questions arises and needs to be answered. The first question is:

What did Hari Singh, mean, when he used the expression unjust clamour or 'intrigue'. The word 'intrigue' is gravid with signification, especially when Police and Magistracy, we find, omitted to take any action against Sheikh Abdullah from 9th July 1931 till 13th July 1931. These four days were of climactic importance. It is a quirk of fate, that the authors' maternal grandfather Moulvi Mohammad Abdullah Vakil was the defence Counsel for Abdul Qadeer Khan. Thousands of people on 13th July, congregated at the gates of Central Jail, Srinagar. They demanded a public trial. The Governor Kashmir [of the rank of Deputy Commissioner] ordered the arrest of those who were raising anti-government slogans. Five persons were arrested on spot. The crowd demanded release of the arrestees. The Governor Kashmir ordered Police to open fire. The upshot was 21 Muslims were killed on the spot. This led to rioting. Sheikh Abdullah hurried to Jamia-Masjid, and gave a certain direction to the agitation. Martial Law was clamped on the City of Srinagar and full authority was given to Brigadier Sutherland, Chief of Staff of Maharaja's Forces. What transpired between Brigadier Sutherland and the British Resident is not

recorded anywhere in official records. A question may be asked why was Mr. Wakefield dismissed from State Service? According to Prem Nath Bazaz, Mr. Wakefield the Prime Minister of J&K State encouraged the agitation? See the Book authored by Prem Nath Bazaz [Kashmir ka Gandhi page 60]. According to some sources Sheikh Abdullah was arrested on 1st August 1931. At whose behest he and his companions were released? We have no official explanation to this day. On 2nd August 1931, in a speech in Jamia Masjid Sheikh Abdullah assured Maharaja of his loyalty. On 6th of August 1931, he was asked to present a Representation to Maharaja. This date was extended to 10th. August 1931. The whole political drama offers a denouement, when we notice that in the meanwhile two Congress Leaders Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Maulana Azad visited Srinagar and met Sheikh Abdullah. Soon thereafter on 15th August, 1931 a Muslim delegation presented their demands to Maharaja Hari Singh orally. Immediately a memo of understanding was reached, and it was agreed that agitation would be suspended by Muslims in Kashmir. [See P.N. Bazaz, Kashmir ka Gandhi] The terms of the Compromise were announced to Public on 27th August 1931 in a Public meeting at Jamia Masjid. These facts are to be co-related with the furore that the incident of 13th July, 1931 created in Punjab. The entire Muslim press in Punjab, highlighted the oppression committed upon Kashmiri Muslims by the Dogra Raj. On 25th July, 1931 an All India Kashmir Committee was constituted at Shimla, and Mirza Bashir ud Din Mehmood son of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed of Qadiyan was elected as its President? Why? Even Mr. Hamid Ahmed Bidayuni, the bitterest enemy of Qadyani's declared he was willing to co-operate with Mirza Bashir ud Din Mehmood. The reason is obvious. It was the Qadyanis who were monetarily financing the agitation directed by Sheikh Abdullah against Maharaja Hari Singh. On 3rd August, 1931, the Secretary of the All India Kashmir Committee, requested the Maharaja to allow its delegation to visit Srinagar. Maharaja disallowed this delegation to visit Srinagar. On 5th of August, 1931

Mirza Bashir ud Din Mehmood sent a telegram to Maharaja to allow a delegation of All India Kashmir Committee to visit Srinagar. Maharaja disallowed this request. On 14th August, 1931, All India Kashmir Committee observed Kashmir Day in Punjab. Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal, the famous Urdu poet supported the observance of Kashmir Day. In Lahore one hundred thousand people took out a mammoth procession supporting the cause of Kashmir Muslims. [See the Issue of Rozenama Inquilab dated 13th. August 1931, and the issue of Haft Roza Kashmir Rawalpindi of the same date]

At this period Majlis Ahrar, decided to intervene in Kashmir Politics. Majlis Ahrar was political wing of the All India Congress Party. On 21st September 1931, Sheikh Abdullah was arrested. He was released on 3rd October 1931 when Notification No: 19-L an emergency Law was also withdrawn by Maharaja. On 3rd August, 1931, a procession was taken out in Jammu against the killing of Kashmiri Muslims. [See Daily Inquilab of 6th August, 1931]. On 16th October, 1931 Muslims were asked to make a representation to Maharaja. On 19th October 1931, this Memorandum was presented to the Maharaja. The chronology of these events only show and proves Congress British complicity in Kashmir. The sequence of events only lead to this inevitable conclusion, as no other explanation of these events is provided by Historians of Kashmir freedom movement. It was in September, 1931 that Maulana Atta-Ullah-Shah Bukhari of Majlis Ahrar, announced that volunteers will be sent to Kashmir to court arrest. In September 1931, 2500 Ahrar volunteers entered the State and courted arrest. Maharaja appealed to the British that Majlis Ahrar, the political wing of the Congress party should be stopped from sending volunteers to Kashmir. The British advised Maharaja to appoint Mr. Glancy of British Intelligence to enquire into the grievances of the Kashmiri Muslims. On 12th November 1931, Glancy Enquiry Commission was constituted. Any impartial observer of Kashmir Affairs would notice:

- (a) That the Muslim insurrection against Dogra Raj was encouraged by the British Resident in Kashmir. Maharaja was compelled to dismiss Mr. Wakefield, his English Prime Minister for encouraging Muslim agitation in Srinagar.
- (b) Sheikh Abdullah was in touch with Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Maulana Azad since the formation of the Kashmir Reading Room Party;
- (c) Majlis Ahrar Punjab, that was formed on the advice of Maulana Azad in 1929, was now directly intervening in Kashmir Affairs. It has been pointed out Majlis Ahrar was the political wing of Indian National Congress in Punjab.
- (d) Mr. Prem Nath Bazaz who was also in touch with Congress Leadership was projected by British as a rising liberal leader, and allowed to represent Kashmir Pundits before Glancy Enquiry Committee. He actually in accordance with the Policy of the Congress, supported the demands made by Kashmiri Muslims before the Glancy Enquiry Committee.

It is also common belief in Kashmir that Mr. Glancy was a known Muslim hater. He had earlier served the State as Finance Member of Kashmir cabinet. He was a reputed friend of Maharaja Hari Singh. His Report, had the approval of British Resident. The summum bonum of his report was that all communities in Kashmir should receive a fair share in Government appointments. The educational Reforms earlier suggested by Mr. Sharp should be implemented. The purpose of Glancy Commission was to emphasize that the aim of the future Kashmiri Muslim politics should be economic development. Muslim should not strive as a religious community for their rights. This was also the policy of Indian National Congress. The economic scenario prevalent at that time has been delineated by Dr. Tarachand, the eminent Indian historian in these words:

"In business, wealth producing activities, industry, banking, trade, the non-Muslims - Hindus and Parsis held a near monopoly. The Muslims dreamed of the old days, when the chief source of profit and influence was employment under government which under the Muslim rulers was easily available to the members of the community." - - - - - Unquote

[See History of Freedom Movement in India, page 146] by Dr. Tarachand

In Kashmir the economic plight of Muslims had touched the Nadir. The British Resident knew, that economic plight of Muslims in India had steered, Muslim nationalism. This was the reason the Plan of Federation, envisaged and suggested by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru at First Round Table Conference was rejected by Indian Muslim leaders. Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal, at that time an outstanding Muslim leader enucleated the hidden British Agenda, in these words:

Iqbal Said (to quote his own words)

"The truth of the matter is that participation of Indian Princes among whom only a few are Muslims in a Federation Scheme serves a double purpose:

- (a) The scheme appears to be aiming at a kind of understanding between Hindu India and British imperialism.
- (b) "You perpetuate me in India and I, in turn, give you a Hindu oligarchy to keep all other Indian communities in perpetual subjection." - - - - Unquote. [Excerpted from the Book, Mohd Ali Jinnah, by M.H. Sayyid page 481].

Glancy knew that Economic stagnation of a community shapes its thinking and politics. In Kashmir, the aim of the Congress and British was to channelise Kashmiri Political movement in the orientation of a struggle based upon economic policies of would be free India. As, in the words of Dr. Tara Chand,

"Wealth producing activities were controlled by Hindus and Parsis in India" the Kashmiri Muslim community would receive economic betterment if they sided with the Policies of Indian National Congress. Pakistan even if it came into being would remain an economically destitute country. On these formulations, the British in fact had executed their Irrigation Policy in Punjab that led to open hostility between the Hindu and Muslim communities in Punjab. Bazaz had convinced Sheikh Abdullah, that economic betterment of Kashmiri Muslims could be achieved by siding with Indian National Congress and not with Indian Muslim League.

In Kashmir, the British were directing their policies keeping in view the growing economic Agricultural stagnation of the Kashmiri masses Under Dogra rule. Industry and trade was minimal. Public Finances were in shambles. The Congress in January 1930 - declared its policy of attainment of Swaraj, with a socialist agenda. The economic policy of Congress had great impact upon Muslim thinking in Kashmir, although apparently Congress had decided not to interfere in Kashmir Affairs. In fact Congress was openly supporting Maharaja Hari Singh and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru was his chief advisor. Congress, never passed a resolution against the oppression of Muslims in Kashmir till 1938. It wanted that Kashmiri leadership from within Kashmir should work in complicity with All India National Congress. This fact is reinforced by the speech of Mr. Jinnah while presiding over the 26th Session of All India Muslim League on 29th December 1938. Mr. Jinnah summarised the attitude of the Congress Party in Kashmir in these telling words, which shows that secretly congress was backing up Maharaj Hari Singh. Mr. Jinnah said: "I would ask the Congress, what is it doing in Kashmir? The Arya Samajists, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Congress nationalists, as also the Press, the subservient Press of the Congress, why are they silent about the Affairs of the Kashmir State?"

Is it because Kashmir is a Hindu State? Is it because the vast majority of the Indian subjects of Kashmir State are Muslims? I have no doubt about the real meaning of the Congress solicitude for the people of the Indian States." --- Unquote. (Excerpt from Mr. M.A. Jinnah's speech quoted in the book "Kashmir Fight for Freedom" [Vol.: 1 by M.Y. Saraf] this speech is a public declaration by Mr. Jinnah about his attitude to Dogra Ruler, and his complicity with leaders of Indian National Congress.

This speech nails the lie, that Mr. Jinnah was supporting the Kashmiri Ruler, and had no concern for the Kashmiri Muslims, the charge that Sheikh Abdullah used to reiterate in his public speeches ad nauseum. The converse was the truth. British Resident in Kashmir was executing the Congress agenda. His aim was to drive Kashmiri Muslim leadership away from the politics of All India Muslim League. In this backdrop we have to understand that on 16th October 1932, Kashmir Muslim Conference was formed, and in his presidential address, Sheikh Abdullah is reported to have said or revealed his real mind. Sheikh Abdullah, declared:

"Our movement is not directed against the minorities. I assure all my countrymen, be they Hindus or Sikhs, that we shall always try to redress their grievances, but they must also respect our just rights." --- Unquote. (Excerpt from the Book on Kashmir Freedom by Rashid Taseer page 261, quoted by Saraf at Page 483 of his Freedom Movement in Kashmir]

This is the most significant document to show that there was tacit understanding between All India National Congress and the Kashmiri Leadership 'Fighting for Freedom' under the guidance of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah towards a secular movement in Kashmir, away from the politics of All India Muslim League. Sheikh Abdullah openly advised his followers to terrorize the followers of Mir Waiz Yusuf Shah who was inclined towards Muslim League aspirations in India. These differences had started to surface right from 17th. August, 1931,

when clashes between the followers of Sheikh Abdullah and Mir Waiz took place in the city of Srinagar; leading to the formation of Azad Muslim Conference led by Mir Waiz Yusuf Shah. The August rift in Muslim Conference better would be appreciated if we keep in view some telling circumstances. In July 1932, Pundit Prem Nath Bazaz had a historic discussion with Sheikh Abdullah about the orientation of Muslim Politics in Kashmir. According to Prem Nath Bazaz, it was in this meeting: [to quote his own words]

"that Bazaz and Abdullah firmly resolved that Kashmir Freedom Movement will be conducted on secular progressive and on democratic lines."

----- Unquote

[See the book Freedom Struggle by Prem Nath Bazaz]

The British Resident and All India Congress had succeeded, in their mission in Kashmir. Jinnah was in self-imposed Exile in London, and All India Muslim League was in total disarray in India at that period of thirties in India.

Sheikh Abdullah in 1933 formed a sub committee to "find out the ways and means of uniting Hindus and Muslims". It is not without significance that Maharaja Hari Singh was now totally relying on the advice of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru a prominent Congress leader, in running his administration. In 1935 a prominent Congress leader inaugurated the Journal *Hamdard* in a big public meeting at Hazuri Bagh Srinagar. This was to be edited by Bazaz and Abdullah. It was going to be a standard bearer of Congress ideology. An analytical study of public speeches made by Abdullah from 1932 to 1935 reveal, they were highly tendentious.

They propagated the Congress theory that all ills of India were due to the fact, that Mughals and Afghan were foreigners who exploited the Indians. The truth is otherwise. The Mughal and Afghans or Turks came to India, as, the Brahminical order in India had become oppressive. The Indian

masses were striving for a change in their social circumstances. These invaders brought public order and economic betterment to the people. Mughal rule was a period of prosperity in Kashmir. The Indian middle class formed the backbone of Mughal and Afghan rule in India. The decline of Mughal rule triggered off social changes that would concentrate power in the hands of the Hindu trading classes that constituted the bulk of upper caste Hindus. The advent of British in India had one climactic effect upon the Indian society. The distribution of wealth in India became uneven. Although ninety percent of the population of India was living in village. The wealth was concentrated in Urban propertied classes. [see the book India's Teeming Mullions by Gyan Chand page 90-91]. This led to decline of Agriculture. Famines also devastated rural India. The advent of the English led to substitution of Food crops by cash crops. Keeping these facts in view, the British formulated their Irrigation Canal Projects, that were bound to create ill feelings between Hindus and Muslims. Population increases in India led to small holdings of land leading to decreased yield per acre. This is the view of Erven T. Long a perceptive observer of Indian Affairs [See his 'The Economic Basis of Land Reforms']. The advent of British in India from 1750 to 1905, was a period of Population Explosion in India.

In 1880, the Government of India had to set up a Famine Commission. The area under Ryotwari System was 52%. Under Ryotwari System the State directly dealt with the cultivator; yet the cultivation did not give increased yield. During Mughal and Afghan Rule, we did not hear about any food shortages in India. With the advent of British India the emergence of food shortages became a permanent feature of Indian economy. The British encouraged cultivation of Cash Crops, so that self-sufficient village communities gradually became insufficient in food stuffs. The British even appointed a Cotton Commissioner in Central Provinces and Berar to extend the cultivation of cotton in these areas. Irrigation policies were framed to increase the production of cotton in India. The Brit-

ish encouraged rural indebtedness that helped High Caste Hindus to maintain their stronghold on Indian Agriculturists. According to Burton Stein:

"----- When Akbar was installing the Mughal Institutions, and would threaten State Revenues beside. Peasant flight was serious practical concern, and has been suggested as one of the reasons for the decline of the Mughals (on the contrary) we find that:

Aurangzeb like Shahjahan insisted:

- (a) Peasants were to be treated with consideration,
- (b) If a poor farmer, need plough, it should be provided by the Zamindars;
- (c) and, if a farmer opened forested land to cultivation, he should be given a 'Mark of Honour' such as a sash or turban;
- (d) If any peasant household took flight, the reasons were to be ascertained and causes removed" ----unquote:

[See A History of India Oxford Series. Published by Oxford University Press, London]

The Mughals followed the same policy in Kashmir. The Afghan Rule in Kashmir began in 1750 and ended in 1819. It lasted only for sixty nine years. They could not be responsible for all the ills of Kashmir. Their cruelty was "urban specific" and not, directed against the cultivators. So all the ills of Kashmiri society were not due to Mughal and Afghan Rule in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah did not speak a word against the British. Why? Is it that Congress was actually financing his Kashmir Muslim Conference? In 1935, Hari Singh was compelled to lease out Gilgit to the British India. To compensate him Poonch (Poonch) Jagir was added to his territory. The instability of the Dogra Hindu rule, made him totally dependent on Congress. That provoked Mr. Jinnah to castigate the British and the Dogra ruler in his annual address to All India Muslim

League, held in Patna in 1938. On the advice of the Congress, Maharaja decided to grant limited Franchise to people of Jammu and Kashmir State. The limited franchise gave the right to vote in the State to Zaildars, Imams, title holders, pensioners of State, professionals like doctors and teachers, Middle Pass Kashmiris - Land revenue paying proprietors, or affluent tenants paying same amount of rent. The first Legislature was constituted on 3rd September 1934. The "Azad Muslim Conference" that was not in league with Indian National Congress was decimated in the polls. Muslim elected members constituted 28% of the Assembly. The first Session of this Assembly was held on 17th October 1934. Soon thereafter Sheikh Abdullah left for India, to meet Pundit Nehru. On his return to Srinagar steps were taken to convert Muslim Conference into National Conference. In 1936 with this purpose in view Kashmir Youth League was formed. The second Student Conference was held in Autumn of 1937 under the chairmanship of Doctor Ashraf, then Secretary of Indian National Congress. 1937 was the watershed year in Indian Politics. In July 1937 Congress formed Government in seven Provinces of British India. In September 1938 a Congress led combination took office in Assam. This was also the period of Hindu-Muslim hostilities in Northern India. So British decided the policy that Maharaja Hari Singh should be encouraged to appoint in Kashmir a Brahmin Prime Minister with Hindu leanings. However, in 1938, Sheikh Abdullah decided to convert Muslim Conference into National Conference. The term of Legislative Assembly expired on 31st December 1938. New Assembly was elected on 7th September 1938 and Muslim Conference was able to secure nineteen out of twenty one seats in this Assembly. On 28th June 1938 Working Committee of Muslim Conference met in Srinagar to change its name to National Conference. On 10th June 1939 the Special Session of Muslim Conference was held at Srinagar and name of Muslim Conference was changed in Kashmir National Conference. The dates are important as in 1936, Maharaja had appointed Sir Gopalaswamy Iyengar as Prime-Minister. He was a known

Congressite. Thereafter on the advice of Pundit Nehru, All India States Peoples Conference was formed. In 1938, Sheikh Abdullah was elected as Vice President of All India States Peoples Conference. This shows that Congress had a wider game to play in the Indian Princely States. Congress was also consolidating its influence in Baluchistan, that was devastated in a terrific earthquake that occurred on 31st May 1935. Khan Gaffar Khan was encouraged by Congress to popularize the slogan of Pukhtoonistan in N.W.F.P. The Congress also tried to woo Gous Bux Bizenjoo in Baluchistan. Bizenjoo was associated with Kallat National Party, that was opposing the rule of Khan of Kallat. He was nominated to the Working Committee of All India States Peoples Conference. The Kallat National Party propagated the theory that Kallat was never a part of British India. On this promise the Congress supported the creation of an Independent Pukhtoonistan and Independent Baluchistan State, so that, proposed Pakistan would be confined to Punjab and Sindh only. This was the *raison detre* for the creation of the All India States Peoples Conference. This was the idea that later encouraged Sheikh Abdullah to launch his Quit Kashmir Movement against Maharaja. In Baluchistan, the Khan of Kallat extorted Gous Bux Bizerjoo member of All India State Peoples Conference. At that time Pundit Nehru was the President of All India States Peoples Conference. Mr. M.A. Jinnah was coerced by this situation in Baluchistan, NWFP and Kashmir to announce his Pakistan Scheme on 23rd March 1940 in Lahore. In 1936 Jamait-ul-Ulema Hind allied itself with the objectives of the Muslim League. Majlis Ahrar seeing Muslim public opinion announced they would not oppose the Muslim League. Seeing this situation the Congress openly refused to recognize Muslim League, as a representative of Muslims in British India. Nehru openly declared that economic interests of Muslims could not be safeguarded by the creation of Pakistan. Jawahir Lal Nehru said that there could be no special Muslim rights. However, he assured Abdullah that Kashmiri Muslims, social, economic and political rights would be secured within

the frame-work of Indian Constitution to be framed by the Constituent Assembly, if the British due to economic reasons decolonised India. British were keenly monitoring the widening gulf between League and the Congress. Jinnah's speech on October 15, 1937 at the annual session of the Muslim League was prelude to the declaration FOR THE DEMAND OF Pakistan. Fazal Haq Ministry in Bengal, and Skindar Hayat Khan Ministry in Punjab announced that, they would support Muslim League. British realised that the situation was grim as they realised that Muslim soldiers in British Army would resort to armed insurrection against the British Raj and for establishment of Muslim State of Pakistan. This fear of Muslims soldiers in Indian Army raising a banner of revolt against the British was a dreadful nightmare for the British. Muslim soldiers in British Army were openly supporting Mr. Jinnah.

In Palestine in April 1936, the Arabs resorted to armed struggle against the British. In July 1937 Lord Peel reported to the British Government that "the Arab and Jewish positions were irreconcilable". He suggested the creation of a Jewish State. The Problem was that Arabs rejected the idea of partition of Arab land into a Jewish State and an Arab State. In a systematic manner at that time the British government created Zionists terrorist organizations with the object of reprisals on the Arabs. By March, 1939, the British Army was able to quell the rebellion in Palestine for some time. During this period Hitler had succeeded overwhelming Czechoslovakia, and Europe stood at the edge of World War II. So to deceive the Arab World, the British in May 1939 issued a White Paper declaring:

- (a) Britain did not support the idea of the creation of Jewish State and,
- (b) After a period of ten years, the Britain would ensure the establishment of an Independent Palestine.

The British also at this time decided to partition India. This was to create a precedent for establishment of a theocratic Jewish State in Palestine. The Congress-British tacit understand-

ing on partition of India guided the policies of the Congress. In fact the congress encouraged an idea of crafting a moth-eaten Pakistan, that would be a failed State, due to problems of ethnicity and economic stagnation prevailing in Muslim dominated regions of British India. Partition of India, according to population distribution of Muslims and Hindus, became the ruling principle. Now United States was to support the idea of partition of India. British Government had the support of fifty three lakh Jews living in United States. The Labour Party in U.K. was hand in glove with the Jews. These facts are part of the History of those turbulent times. On March 13, 1940 Mr. Jinnah informed the Viceroy about his idea of Pakistan. Mr. V.P. Menon in his book "Transfer of Power in India" page 80 confirms that Jinnah was informed by Lord Linlithgow, that Britain would ensure Defence of Pakistan. So Indian attack on Pakistan would not materialize. This was a false assurance given to Mr. Jinnah by the Viceroy of India. On the contrary the British were determined to utilize the strategic location of Kashmir in such a manner that Kashmir would remain a bone of contention between India and Pakistan, whenever they achieved Independence under the partition plan of British government. U.S. supported the British Plan. However, it should be clarified that leaders of All India Congress, and the Jewish Lobby in U.K. and U.S. supported the creation of Four Pakistans

- (a) An Independent Muslim State of Baluchistan,
- (b) An Independent Pushtoon State of N.W.F.P
- (c) An Independent Sindh State based on Sindhi nationalism.
- (d) An Independent Western Punjab Muslim State to be called Pakistan. According to Dr. Tara Chand, "Merrill the U.S representative in India pointed out:
"Pakistan is the greatest bargaining point the League has and Jinnah refuses to elucidate, until times comes for him to throw it on the bargaining counter, probably bristling with exag-

gerated claims in order to extract greatest possible concessions from Congress. To define now would be to limit and Jinnah declines to be drawn." Unquote.

Reading in between these lines the reader should try to comprehend what Merrill, meant when he said that "to define now would be to limit and Jinnah declines to be drawn." Jinnah declined to be drawn, because he knew the goal of Congress was not one Pakistan but small insignificant Muslim States of Pukhtoonistan, Baluchistan, Western Punjab and Kashmir drawn on the lines of ethnicity and not religion. No Muslim Leaguer had been elected to the Sindh Legislature in the elections held in 1937. When Congress learnt that for some strategic reasons, the British may concede, one state of Pakistan, the Congress launched Quit India Movement on August 8, 1942. No other explanation for launching Quit India movement in August 1942, has been provided by Indian historians. Congress wanted four Pakistan and not one Pakistan to be created. It is at his stage, British Government again made a complete U-turn and lent its succour to the Muslim League. Cripps proposals included to quote his own words:

"Any Province or Provinces which do not acquiesce in the New Constitution will be entitled to frame a Constitution of their own giving them same full status as the Indian Union." - - - Unquote.

Realising British conceived an idea of one Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah decided to support the British War effort. Maharaja Hari Singh for the survival of his own State would have to depend on future Pakistan. So Congress did not oppose the Quit Kashmir Movement launched by Sheikh Abdullah. Sir Gopala Swamy Iyengar on 4th April 1942 declared in Kashmir Assembly that State Government fully supported Cripps Plan for United India. On 19th April 1942 Muslim Conference under the leadership of Chowdhary Ghulam Abbas, passed a resolu-

tion giving full support to the demand for Pakistan. This shows that within the State of Jammu & Kashmir, the Muslim Conference in Kashmir, was guided by Kashmiri ethnicity consideration, while the Muslim Conference in Jammu was supporting Indian Muslim League for creation of Pakistan. Mir Waiz led Muslim Conference in Kashmir was lukewarm to this idea. Sheikh Abdullah invited Mr. Jinnah to Srinagar in June 1944. On 17th June 1944 Mr. Jinnah addressed a meeting in Jamia Masjid and made a startling revelation. He said National Conference "told me, we want to tell the World that there was no communalism in the State and behind the curtain of nationalism, we will pursue the Programme of the Muslim Conference, and, that they were supporters of Pakistan"-Unquote. At whose behest Sheikh gave this assurance to Mr. Jinnah? Soon thereafter at whose behest Sheikh Abdullah started Mass Contact Campaign to discard Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League? What was the role of Mr. B.P.L. Bedi, a member of the Communist Polit - Bureau assigned to Srinagar by the Central Polit Bureau of C.P.I at Bombay? These questions are of great significance because soon after when Mr. Jinnah returned to Lahore in July 1944 the National Conference convened an annual Session on 29th September 1944 in Pathar Masjid Srinagar. On 30th September 1944 the concept of Naya Kashmir, as contained in Naya Kashmir document scripted by Mr. B.P.L. Bedi, was unanimously adopted by National Conference. The chronology of events has a magical sequence. In July 1945 Nehru was released by the British Government. He immediately came to Kashmir. The other outstanding personalities who visited Srinagar at that time were:

- (a) Abdul Kalam Azad
- (b) Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan;
- (c) Mr. Asif Ali and,
- (d) Mian Iftikhar ud Din all prominent National Congress leaders. The National Conference arranged a river procession in Srinagar for these Congress leaders. A ques-

tion arises:

- (a) why did then Sheikh Abdullah invite Mr. Jinnah in June 1944?
- (b) then why did Sheikh Abdullah assure Jinnah that National Conference would pursue the Programmes of Muslim Conference?
- (c) why did Sheikh Abdullah convene a session of National Conference in September 1944 and adopted Naya Kashmir Programme scripted by Mr. B.P.L. Bedi?
- (d) Why in 1943-44 the Politburo of Communist Party assign Mr. B.P.L. Bedi and his English wife Farida to Srinagar?
- (e) Whose game was Sheikh Abdullah playing? Sheikh Abdullah in his autobiography has avoided to answer these questions.

The Maharaja objected to the visit of Nawab Yar Jang to Srinagar. Why did not Maharaja object to the visit of Mr. B.P.L. Bedi, who in his adopted "Naya Kashmir Document" advocated that the "Council of Ministers was to be responsible to the National Assembly." This virtually amounted to downgrading Maharaja to the status of a titular Constitutional Head. Still Maharaja did not object to the presence of Mr. B.P.L. Bedi in Srinagar. Why? It is after this momentous event that Sheikh Abdullah in 1946 launched his Quit Kashmir Movement. Was all this done to pursue the Congress Agenda of Secret Understanding with British Government to create four Pakistans that would for economic reasons be compelled to federate with Union of India?

I have come to these conclusion especially in view of the revelation made by Stanley Wolpert in his book Jinnah, at page 200; According to Wolpert:

"At this juncture President Franklin D Roosevelt sent his former Assistant Secretary of State of War, Colonel Louis Johnson, out to India, as his

personal representative introducing Johnson to Linlithgow as a 'man of broad experience, with problems relating to military supply' who was selected for 'this important mission, because of his outstanding ability and high character.' Churchill, Amery and Linlithgow were all anxious about the possible political implications of a secret Agenda for Colonel Johnson's mission. Linlithgow's representative in Washington wrote that Roosevelt seemed to think that the plan concerning immediate federation did not go far enough and he felt 'that complete autonomy, including power to raise armies should be given to Provinces.' I leave the reader to draw his own conclusions, keeping in view the fact that according to Encyclopaedia Britannica [1963]:

"In 1942, there was a large scale effort to enlist the influence and wealth of 5,300,000 Jews in the Palestine cause. David Ben Gurion, Chairman of Jewish agency executive toured the country and presented his recommendations to U.S. Zionists assembled in New York City. On May 11, they approved his Baltimore Programme and repudiated the White Paper policy, for the first time called for recognition of a Jewish Commonwealth, and a Jewish army, urged that responsibility for immigration be vested in the Jewish Agency - - - Unquote. Is it that British decided to partition India to create a theocratic Pakistan, so that later they could justify the theocratic State of Israel? In British strategic thinking at this stage, keeping in view the middle east situation and the turmoil in Palestine, the idea of four Pakistan was totally jettisoned and supplanted by idea of one Pakistan. This U-turn in British strategic thinking was a terrible shock for the leaders of Indian national congress who felt they were betrayed by the British. In future, the Hindu India would never forgive the Anglo-US axis for this grand betrayal.

[CHAPTER - V]

John Robert Seelay, English author [1834-1895], has tellingly remarked , to quote his own words:

" History is not as it was once regarded merely a liberal pursuit in which men found wholesome food for the imagination and sympathies but now is a department of serious scientific investigations-we study it in the hope of giving new precision, definiteness and solidity to the principles of political science." Unquote

In the spirit of serious scientific investigation, I would endeavour to marshal and juxtapose, the historical data scantily available to comprehend the most intricate question the subject of our study, that, if the original idea was that multiple Pakistan should emerge in South Asia why, by the year 1946, this idea was supplanted and substituted by another conception of far reaching consequences for the entire Muslim world namely, the creation of a single " Moth -Eaten Pakistan". Jinnah describes Pakistan as moth-eaten in 1947, while expressing his dismay at the manner the partition of India was effected by Mountbatten. Jinnah, always suspected that the Hindu," Congress is bent upon setting up Caste-Hindu Raj in India, with the connivance of the British" This idea was not a novel idea without any foundation. I have in an earlier chapter quoted Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal who plainly expressed the view that British wanted to solve the Jewish problem and the easiest way to solve the problem was to take advantage of the political scenario that emerged in the Middle East after the break-up of the Caliphate. The creation of a theocratic state of Israel was the only viable solution in the Anglo-US perception. However, this idea of a Jewish state, necessitated the creation of home-land for Muslim in the Indian Sub-continent. The precedent would

provide justification for the creation of a Jewish state in the heart of Middle -East. British wanted to create a failed Muslim state that would implode and destroy itself. I quote from the letter of Lord Wavell to Richard G. Casey on 1st. January, 1945. Wavell said to quote his own words:

" I do not believe that Pakistan will work. It creates new minority problems quite as bad as those we have now and Pakistan state or states would be economically unsound. So the idea from the beginning was to create an economically unsound Pakistan." Brahmins in Congress also believed that it was a necessity of the time to create economically unsound Pakistans.

Wavell thought that " able Muslim leaders may regard it as a bargaining counter". So he was cautious enough to tell Richard Casey, " We cannot openly denounce Pakistan until, we have something attractive to offer in its place".

What Wavell ignored in his estimations, was the grim reality that a sizeable segment of the British army was composed of Indian Muslims, who supported Jinnah's Muslim League. Tahir Bizenjo, in his autobiography of Gous Bux Bizenjo published by Sales and Services Quetta points out that four days before the creation of India and Pakistan, on 11th. August 1947, the British declared Kallat (Baluchistan) as an independent state. The British were convinced that Muslims would launch an armed struggle against British Raj and would make Baluchistan as, a base for their armed rebellion. After the end of second world war due to economic pressure the British administration was compelled to embark upon a policy of demobilisation of British army. The demobilised British army mostly consisted of Muslim soldiers. These demobilised ex-army men idealised one Pakistan. This is why on 11th august 1947 Baluchistan was declared an independent state by British government. On 14th august 1947 it was Pakistan that recognised Baluchistan as an independent state. This also explains that although Kallat National party was banned as it merged in All State Peoples conference, the Khan of Kallat lifted the ban in

1942 imposed on Kallat national Party. On 14th August Khan of Kallat entered into Standstill Agreement with Government of Pakistan regarding the regional areas of Bolan Naushki and Naseer Abad. This Standstill Agreement was signed both by Mr. M.A.Jinnah and Mr. Liyaqat Ali Khan, giving the option to Khan of Kallat to join Afghanistan. The Baluch soldiers of British army and the Ex-soldiers were supporting Mr. Jinnahs conception of one Pakistan. The Khan of Kallat realising the situation exercised his option of executing an Instrument of Accession with Pakistan, otherwise the Dar-ul-Aman, and Dar-ul-Amra of Baluchistan at that time did not ratify the instrument of Accession. Three regional leaders of Kaieh jam-Les Bela and Kharan also executed the Instrument of Accession with Pakistan. Khan Kallat's brother Aga Abdul Karim the Governor of Makran, rose in revolt against the government of Pakistan. However the loyalty of the Baluch soldiers to the Govt. of Pakistan compelled him to migrate to Illaqa Shore Auk in Afghanistan. The Afghan government considering the ground realities did not support Aga Abdul Kareem. He had to surrender himself to Pakistan authorities. He was tried for treason and sentenced to fourteen year rigorous imprisonment. Congress had failed in its mission of creating an independent Baluchistan. I have cited the example of Baluchistan to point out that the support the Muslim soldiers in British army irrespective of their ethnicity, unstintedly given to Muslim League sent shivers down the spine of British Raj, who feared a huge civil war if creation of One Pakistan was delayed for long. By 1944, Gandhi also fully realised this verity. He adopted a policy of conciliation of Muslim League. On 29th. May, 1943 Mr. Glancy, the governor of Punjab, wrote to Lord Linlithgow "that the idea of Pakistan was gaining momentum". This was the time when Britain was feeling the strain of the war debt, that had exceeded the huge limit of eight hundred million pounds. The Europe was literally in shambles. It was totally pauperised. India was now a growing economic burden on the British. Churchill detested

India if we believe the assessment of Wavell in his Wavell as recounted by him in 'The Viceroys Journal', published by Oxford University Press [1974 Ed]. The Muslims of India regarded Jinnah as the "Conqueror of Congress" a slogan raised on the occasion of the December 1944 session of Muslim League in Karachi. Jinnah knew he was the conqueror of Congress only if the Muslim soldiers in British Indian army supported his conception of one Pakistan. On 11th August 1945 Pethick-Lawrence wrote a letter to Wavell pointing out the rift between Congress and the League as Jinnah regarded one India as a stereotype of Hindu Raj. The British government realised by August 20, 1944 the way out was holding of elections in India. Wavell informed the Prime Minister of United Kingdom in August 1945 that majority of Muslim supported Jinnah's conception of one Pakistan. [See U.K.Cabinet Minutes of August 29, 1945.] According to Stanley Wulpert:

"Jinnah had taken his pre-election fund raising tour to Karachi en route to Quetta where the dry cool air was thought to be best for his lungs. His message was simple and same wherever he spoke - the Muslim League was the only authoritative and representative party of Muslims throughout India and sole platform of league was Pakistan. Jinnah began to act like the Head of a separate nation moreover, he wired Attlee at this time to protest any softening of British ban on Jewish refugees being admitted into Palestine....."

This telegram scared the daylight out of the British politicians, especially his words "It is my duty to inform you that any surrender to appease Jewry at the sacrifice of the Arabs would be deeply resented and vehemently resisted by Muslim world and Muslim India and its consequences will be most disastrous." Wulpert has noticed the significance of this telegram because congress at the time was conniving with the Interna-

tional Jewry and the British administration. The connivance of Congress with the British is shown by the role played by Indian National Congress in totally excluding the only true patriot Subhash Chander Bose, who escaped from India, organised the Indian National Army and, literally fought against the British. Subhash Chander Bose was a straight forward, honest patriot, who openly despised the Chicanery of both Nehru and Gandhi. For the past one hundred years, Hindu India has failed to produce a man who could really match the stature of Subhash Chander Bose. Some people in India still advocate the theory that Bose did not die in a plane crash in Taiwan. He survived the second world war, and was allowed by the USSR government to stay in Moscow on a political pension. He died in Moscow in 1956. The Govt. of India constituted a Commission of Enquiry to find out the truth about Subash Chander Bose, but the findings of these Commission of enquiry, have remained a mystery till this date. Congress does not want that people of India should lionise Subhash Chander Bose as an Icon. while Bose was fighting the British, Gandhi was siding with the British. The attitude of the All India Congress Party is best reflected in an article written by Mahatma Gandhi in paper dated 30th. September 1939 widely published in India. Gandhi wrote:

"Strange as it may appear, my sympathies are wholly with the Allies."

These words are full of significance. Gandhi, wanted that allies should succeed, so that a Jewish state is established in Middle-East and a Hindu state is established in south Asia. The real fear of Gandhi was that Pakistan, if it was born would support the cause of Palestinian Muslims. According to Dr. Tarachand: Jawahar Lal Nehru's mind seemed driven into two directions anxiety for immediate independence and sympathy for the allied cause" Unquote[See History of Freedom Movement in India]. However during war years 1939-1945 the policy of the Congress was that Govt. should abstain from making

excuses on the pleas of minority rights. The problem was the British government also wanted to eschew emphasis on "Minority Rights". They could not do so as three Muslim states, Egypt, Turkey and Iraq had joined the Allies and were fighting against Germans. The war years were coming to an end. Jinnah realised the complicity between the British and the Congress. So at the annual session of the Muslim League held in Peshawar on 24th. Nov. 1945, he openly declared, to quote his own words:

"We have no friends.....Neither the British nor the Hindus are our friends. We are clear in our mind that we have to fight against both of them." Unquote.

Only the British understood what Jinnah meant when he said "we have to fight both of them." Jinnah was saying the obvious. The entire Muslim segment of the British Army would fight literally for the creation of Pakistan. The concern of the British at that period was that Pakistan should be the Turkey of South Asia and not a theocratic state. On August 20, 1945, Lord Wavell went to Britain and informed the British government that there was "fear among Indian Muslims of Hindu domination and Hindu Raj." See in this behalf the British Cabinet Minutes of August 29, 1945. This was the real situation existing in India. The All India Congress, realised that war would lead to decolonisation and emergence of some new Muslim states in India. The emergence of Pan-Islamic feelings in Middle East was the real nightmare for the Congress. Gandhi could not conceal his feelings. Gandhi met the Bengal Governor Casey in Calcutta and threw a bombshell. According to Stanley Wolpert: "Gandhi responded that he had conceded, safeguard after safeguard to Jinnah, who constantly raised his price, until he reached what in essence was Pakistan and Gandhi did not believe anything less would satisfy him. Gandhi also told Casey that he believed Jinnah to be a very ambitious man, and, that he had visions of linking up the Moslems of India, with Muslims in Middle East and elsewhere, and, he did

not believe that he could be ridden off his dream." Unquote. [See his book "Jinnah" Page 253]. The entire Indian Foreign policy is founded on the bedrock of this conception to prevent Pakistan, that is "Muslims of India getting linked with Muslims in Middle East." Otherwise Congress had no objection to the creation of several Pakistans, that would have remained socially, culturally, politically dependent on India. The British also realised that the Muslim soldiers in British Army might not obey orders. After Gandhi communicated his views to the Cabinet Mission, Wavell reported:

"Pakistan was a sin, which he (Mr. Gandhi) would not commit."

Francis Turnbull in his note to Cabinet Mission said: "That the division of India will be born in bitter antagonism."

The antagonism was not due to the fact that Muslims in India were demanding a homeland. The antagonism was because in the words of Mahatma Gandhi "Jinnah had vision of linking up the Muslims of India with Muslims in Middle East." This also explains the speech Mr. Jinnah made on the occasion of the annual session of Muslim League in Peshawar on 24th November 1945. Mr. Jinnah thundered to the audience of several thousand strong "who made sacrifices in 1920-1921? Mr. Gandhi ascends the Gaddi [throne] of leadership on our skulls." Unquote.

The tragedy of Kashmiri people is that at that particular period the entire leadership of National Conference, was a bunch of political illiterates. Sheikh Abdullah even did not knew that forty thousand punch Muslims were enlisted in the British Army. Not to speak of British Army the National Conference did not know anything even about the strength of Muslims in the Dogra Army. For Kashmir, the year 1944, was of climactic character. In May 1944, Mr. Jinnah visited Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah could not comprehend the remarks which Mr. Jinnah made when Aligarh Old Boys Association held a reception in his honour: Mr. Jinnah is reported to have said

that:

"Had the Hindus and Sikhs made a common cause with you and joined the National conference, the Maharaja could not resist your demand for responsible government even for seven days."

Mr. Jinnah wanted to convey that both the British Army and the State forces by 1944 were fully polarised. Maharaja was not conceding the demand of National Conference because he had the full assurance of Dogra non-Muslim soldiers and also the Sikh soldiers of Patiala state who regarded the creation of Pakistan as a sin. Sheikh Abdullah did not realise that Muslim soldiers in Dogra Army were committed to the Idea of One Pakistan. He did not understand what Mr. Jinnah meant when in his public speech in the compound of Jamia Masjid (Jamia Masjid means principal mosque), Srinagar Mr. Jinnah remarked:

"Even then I assure you that despite the Muslim League policy of non-intervention in the affairs of Indian States the services and support of both myself and Muslim League is at your service." Unquote.

If the policy of Muslim League was non-interference in the affairs of Indian states how could Muslim League support the National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah. Apparently, the statement is an oxymoron. A deep analysis would show that Muslim league could support by asking the soldiers [Muslims] in dogra force to pressurize the Dogra Raj. Dogra Maharaja understood what Mr. Jinnah said in his speech. Now he would endeavour to link his state through a corridor with the future Union of India. His solution to the problem was simple.

- (a) to seek physical extermination of Jammu Muslim at an opportune occasion
- (b) to seek a corridor to the future Union of India.

The tragedy of the Kashmir people is that the leadership

of the All India National Congress, had no other alternative solution to the Kashmir enigma.

Congress had since 1943 encouraged the policy of Hindu-Muslim riots, This in 1946 had assumed alarming proportions. One can appreciate the implications of this policy, if one cares to read in between the lines in the correspondence between Pethick -Lawrence and Lord Wavell. In fact one develop an empathy with the helplessness of the Viceroy. Wavell wrote a missive to Pethick Lawrence on August 21, 1946 complaining that in Hindu-Muslim riots "appreciably more Muslims than Hindus were Killed? Wavell complained the Congress accused the Muslim of engineering the riots. Great Calcutta killing had set the pattern, Jinnah pointed out that Congress governments in some provinces had embarked upon a plan of suppression of Muslims. The situation on 8th September, 1946 had become deplorable. Wavell was expressing his helplessness to Pethick Lawrence. After Calcutta the next seat of Hindu -Muslim riots was the province of Bombay. On 16th, September 1946 Vice-roy discussed the situation with Jinnah. Wavell now branded Gandhi as a hypocrite. Who was extremely unscrupulous. The Secretary of State invited Wavell to return to London. Wavell's note to Attlee on December 3rd. 1946 pointed out:

- (a) Congress wanted to get power
- (b) to deal with Muslims by "Bribery", "Blackmail" and propaganda
- (c) and to deal with Princes by stirring up their people against them."

This is a vital document. Now this policy was being pursued at official level by Indian National Congress in complicity with:

- (a) Hindu Maha Saba
- (b) Socialist Party
- (c) Akali Dal in Punjab

Bribery and Blackmail the two expressions used by Lord

Wavell conveyed the real politics of the Congress party. Blackmail was euphuism for engineering Hindu-Muslim riots. Alstair Lamb has done painstaking research to show that to provide corridor to Maharaja to join India Gurdaspur a Muslim dominated area was first shown by Cyril Radcliff to have been awarded to Pakistan, and later for some ulterior reasons this district was shown in the Boundary map as part of India. The demographic alteration of population took place in this district when some eighty thousand Muslims were butchered in this district. Gandhiji never condemned this massacre or Hindu-Mahasaba. Why? Woodrow Wyatt reported that Jinnah had complained to him about the "deliberate butchery of Muslims by Hindus in Bihar. Pethic Lawrence has written that Nehru admitted to him "that more communal elements" within Congress would not allow him to settle the Muslim question. No Indian historian has told us, who were these communal elements in the Congress. Sardar Patel was considered to be leader of the communal elements in Congress. He was having the support of majority in the Congress working Committee. These communal elements in the Congress working committee have not been identified by Pundit Nehru. Nehru conversation with Pethic Lawrence took place on 6th December 1946 on the occasion of London's Indian conference. On 11th. December the debate in House of Commons took place, when Churchill made a soul stirring speech saying: to quote his own words.

"these frightful slaughters over wide regions and in obscure uncounted villages have, in main fallen upon Muslim minorities." Unquote

Why did not any leader of Congress especially Gandhi, Nehru, Azad, Patel refute the allegations made by Churchill in the House of Commons that this slaughter had fallen upon Muslims in India? Even no member of the Labour government present in the House of Commons refuted Churchill's statement. Why? Churchill was not an ordinary politician. He was armed with facts and statistics. Why this "frightful slaughter"

had in "main fallen upon Muslim minorities."? Neither Lord Attlee, Pathic Lawrence or Lord Wavell ever explained this question. Congress simply disregarded this question, why? These questions have relevance to the fact that immediately from London, Jinnah went to Cairo and attended a Pan-Islamic meeting. He stayed in Cairo till 17th. December. Attention is invited to Reuters "Report of Jinnah's meeting in Cairo" quoted by Atique Z. Sheikh and Mr. M.R. Malilik in "Quaid-Azam and Muslim world: Selected documents published by Royal Book Co. 1978 Karachi. What is important is the remarks made by Mr. Jinnah to the effect: "I told them of the danger that a Hindu empire would represent to Middle East." Sheikh Abdullah was a political illiterate who was not even aware of what Churchill has said in the House of Commons of why Jinnah and Liaquat went to Cairo, to attend a Pan-Islamic meet. Sheikh Abdullah, the Kashmiri leader, was still under the spell of Nehru. He was totally unaware of what was happening in the Middle East. He was even unaware of what was happening in Mirpur and Jammu region of Jammu & Kashmir state. His entire vision was Kashmir centric and he represented the aspirations of Kashmiri ethnicity. He had not even familiarised himself with the geographic map of Kashmir. On 15th February, 1946, Hindu-Muslim rioting took place in Jammu city. Why? Who instigated these riots? What was the connection between Hindu rioters of Jammu with Hindu Mahasaba in Punjab? Why did not Gandhi or Nehru condemn these riots? Why did not Hindu National Press, condemn these riots? These are troubling questions, when one keeps in view the fact that Punch and Jammu region had provided seventy one thousand six hundred sixty seven soldiers to the British Army during second world war. These soldiers belonging to Punch region were now to be demobilised by the British. These soldiers owed their loyalty to Pakistan. Ethnically, culturally, linguistically Jammu Muslims had close links with Muslims in Punjab. These ground realities induced Lord Wavell and his wife to visit Kashmir in October 1945. Prime Minister Gopala Swamy Ienger, had

manipulated Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference in Kashmir to support Congress. He had no solution for Jammu Muslims. Differences developed between Iyenger and Maharaja on these concerns. On 9th April 1943. Gopala Swamy Iyenger left the state of Jammu & Kashmir. For a short time a Christian Sir Maharaj Singh succeeded him. He was the brother of Raj Kumari Amrita Kour. He found he also had no solution to the problem of Jammu Muslims. He was soon replaced by K.N.Haksar as the new Premier of Kashmir. During his tenure food riots took place in Jammu city. What were the causes of food scarcity in Jammu region, because at that time Kashmir was surplus with food grains? He was succeeded by Sir Benegal Narsing Rao as a stopgap prime Minister on 8th. February, 1944. He was also given the boot by Maharaja. He was succeeded by Pundit Ram Chander Kak, a Kashmiri speaking, Kashmiri Pundit on 28th June 1945 whose elder brother according Mr. B.J.Kirplani (Ex- President of Indian National Congress) was an important activist of Hindu Mahasabha. Kirplani in Srinagar met Kak and his elder brother and found both were close to Maharaja. In this backdrop we have to appreciate that Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, the congress stalwart who was also the advisor to the Maharaja prevailed upon him to accommodate two members of National Conference in his Cabinet. Mirza Afzal Beg of National Conference was inducted as a Minister in the Cabinet. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru also had no solution for Jammu Muslim problem. After all eighty thousand fully trained Punchi soldiers were being demobilised from British Army and would return back to the Jammu & Kashmir State. In January 1947 a new Kashmir Assembly had been constituted. In July 1946, sheikh Abdullah was in Jail for launching Quit Kashmir Movement. So he was totally unaware about the trend of the politics of Jammu Muslims, and the rise of communal elements, especially the Akali Dal in Punjab. He had no time to study the nexus that existed between Akali Dal and Congress. It was beyond his comprehension to understand the nexus between Maharaj and Congress and Hindu Maha Sabha

that advocated the formation of a Hindu India. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru was advising the Maharaja on all issues of concern. Sheikh Abdullah had not the faintest idea about the *dramatis persone* involved in Kashmir drama. The biography of Sheikh Abdullah is a totally shallow document. It shows that Sheikh Abdullah had never deliberated on the question of demobilisation of eighty thousand Muslim soldiers belonging to Punch and jammu region. Sheikh Abdullah never applied his mind to the question, why. Kashmir Muslim Conference did not submit any agenda to the Cabinet Mission when it visited Srinagar on 19th April 1946? What were Mr. Jinnahs instructions to Muslim Conference? As Congress had no solution to the problem of eighty thousand jammu and Punch Muslims demobilised from the British Army, a bloody civil war was in offing. The extermination of Jammu Muslims was one of the solutions that seemed feasible as a policy of continuation of Hindu-Muslim riots in Punjab. We find that since 1946 till 15th August 1947 the National Conference had not even deliberated on this question. Now Kashmir politics was getting murkier. The troubles in Kashmir, had just started. Maharajas State forces comprised of :

- (a) One Army H.Q at Srinagar
- (b) One Brigade at Jammu under the Command of Brigadier N.S.Rawat with H.Q at Jammu
- (c) Mir Pur Brigade under Brigadier Chatter Singh
- (d) Punch Brigade under Brigadier Krishna Singh
- (e) Some battalions located in Domel-Kohala area.

Medium machine guns were the only integral part of his infantry battalions. Raja Yakub Khan of Hazara got wind of the plan of the massacre of Muslims in Punch and Jammu region. He sent a telegram to Maharaj on 29th August, 1947 [that telegram still exists in J&K Govt. Archives] alleging to quote his own words:

“ We are ready to enter the state fully equipped

to fight with your forces. You are requested to ease the situation, otherwise, be ready to bear the consequences." It is naive to suggest that Maharaj was not aware of the consequences that would flow from the massacre of Jammu Muslims. This telegram has been mentioned in Govt. of India: Kashmir Story, page 40 of the white paper issued in New Delhi.

The only choice open to Maharaj was to look forward to Govt. of India and to Maharaja of Patiala. Indian troops were already in Srinagar even before Maharaj Hari Singh signed the instrument of Accession with India. This admitted by Mr. M.C. Mahajan in his book "Looking Back" [Asia Publishing House, page 152-153.] Mahajan was the Prime Minister of Kashmir in 1947. Maharaja was infact dependent upon Indian National Congress and according to Lord Wavell on "the subject of states Nehru and Gandhi are pathological." See Missive of Lord Wavell to Secretary of State, 27th. June 1947. Why did Wavell use the expression "pathological"? One can understand that Nehru was a Kashmiri Pundit, and his approach was grounded upon emotions. But why did Wavell say Gandhi was pathological? Unfortunately, Lord Wavell is dead and there is nobody to explain his comment. What he meant when he said about Kashmir, Gandhi is pathological. In June, 1947 Wavell visited Kashmir and Maharaj avoided to meet him. Why? On whose counsel Maharaja avoided to meet Wavell? No Jammu historian has ever answered this question. On 24th July, 1947 Wavell arranged a meeting between R.C.Kak the Prime Minister of Kashmir and Mahatma Gandhi. No body knows what transpired at that meeting. No minutes of that meeting are available even today. According to Prof. Robert A. Huttenback [See 'Kashmir and British Raj' published by Oxford University Press, London] "Nehru held forth at some length about his mental distress and defended his visit to Kashmir..... on the basis of explaining India's case for state accession to India and his own personal need for relaxation." Unquote

This shows that Nehru never wanted people of Kashmir to decide their own future. He wanted to engineer the accession of Kashmir to India. Of course at that time it was Gandhi who travelled to Kashmir, to mislead Kashmiri Muslims that Congress wanted to give choice to people of Kashmir of joining either India or Pakistan. The most crucial fact to notice is that after Gandhi visited R.C.Kak was asked to resign as Prime Minister because he had no solution to the problem of Jammu Muslims. Abdullah and National Conference leaders were released from jail. Mr. M.C.Mahajan a trusted man of Congress who later became the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India was appointed by Maharaja as his Prime Minister. Mahajan's first act was to allow thousands of Hindu and Sikh refugees from Punjab to enter the Jammu region. Arms and ammunition was freely distributed to the non-Muslims of Jammu region. The graphic details of these events has been given in the book "Kashmir Right for Freedom" Vol. II by M.Y.Saraf. I need not repeat the plethora of facts in this behalf. Except that only two facts require serious attention. Why at this particular period when riots in Punjab were in full swing, and Sikhs had butchered thousands of Muslims in Gurdaspur to provide a corridor to Maharaja to join India, Maharajas of Patiala and Kapurthala, visited Kashmir? No minutes of their meeting with Kashmir Maharaja and Mr. M.C.Mahajan have been preserved. Soon thereafter killings started in Udhampur, Ram Nagar, Kishtwar regions of Jammu. On 4th. Nov. 1947 Dogra troops massacred Muslims in Reasi. The date 4th Nov.1947 is quoted in the book: Kashmir Fight for Freedom by M.Y.Saraf. No Indian historian has refuted this fact. On 6th. September 1947, organised systematic massacre of Jammu Muslims commenced. Mr. Yousuf Saraf in proof of this fact quoted in Extenso, the interview of Mr. G.K.Reddy, a Congressite journalist in Lahore. Now chronology of events is important. Pakistan as a Muslim state wanted to stop this massacre of Kashmiri Muslims. It assured Maharaja of an independent state. On 8th. September 1947 just two days after

the jammu massacre of Muslims Kashmir state concluded a standstill Agreement with Pakistan. India avoided to execute any standstill Agreement with Kashmir. Why? What were the Indian plans. In Jammu by 6th. September 1947 several hundred thousand Muslims were already killed. Knowing this ground reality why did not Govt. of India enter into a standstill agreement with Kashmir ? The upshot of the refusal of India to enter into a standstill Agreement with Kashmir state was according to the letter of Sir. T.Shore to Sir P.I. Patrick dated 20th august 1947, the idea of Jammu Muslims setting up a provisional government in Muzaffarabad in Kashmir. The Govt. of India wanted this provisional government to be set up so that Kashmir dispute is factually created. By 8th. September 1947 this provisional government was fully operative. On 5th October 1947, the UK High commissioner in Pakistan telegraphed London that " Maharaj feels that he can rely on new road from Pathankot for supplies and possible military assistance from India." [extract from I.B (47) 165, September 12, 1947 contains other details] Officially now on 13th. October 1947 Mr. M.C. Mahajan was declared to be the Prime Minister of Kashmir. Till then Gen. Jamwal T. Singh was Prime Minister in name only. Allen Campbell - Johnson in his diary of 4th October, 1947 writes:

"Apparently Jinnah was in an angry and difficult moods. He is utterly convinced that the Indian leaders real aim is to:

- (a) Strangle Pakistan at birth and,
- (b) that Gandhi has never accepted partition, and,
- (c) under the guise of religious teaching is all the time spreading "Hindu poison" and that
- (d) Nehru inspite of appearance of moderation is not really master in his own house,
- (e) He regards Patel, as the real director, who, he alleges,
- (f) has entered into an unholy alliance with Hindu Mahasabha and,

(g) would be quite ready to overthrow the Congress, if it failed to serve , as

(h) an appropriate instrument for his anti Muslim design. [see Mission with Mountbatten (1985 Reprint) page 217]

These remarks about Jinnahs thinking were made after the mass killing of Jammu Muslims had been accomplished on 6th September 1947. On 29th. September 1947 Sheikh Abdullah was released from prison. On 5th October 1947 U.K High commissioner in Pakistan telegraphed London that immediately after release Sheikh Abdullah journeyed to Delhi to meet Nehru. On 16th. October, 1947 "News Chronicle" reported that tribals of Waziristan were infiltrating in Kashmir. The massacre of Jammu Muslims had induced the Pathans to infiltrate in Kashmir to save Kashmiri Muslims from another blood bath. On 18th. October 1947 actual armed clashed between Pathan tribals from Waziristan were in full swing all along the Kashmir border. The date 18th. October 1947 is of great importance. Kashmir on this date was an independent state. Yet, there is evidence that on 18th. October 1947 the Indian Air force was assisting the Dogra forces of Maharaj Hari Singh with the approval of Ministry of Defence of Govt. of India, Military historians Mr. S.N.Prasad and Mr. Dharam Pal have published a monograph entitled:

History of operations in jammu & Kashmir [1947-1948] published by Natram, Dehra Dun and in chapter II of their book " the tribal Invasion", they have appended a foot note which reads as under"

"The state troops resisting the invaders near Uri, were estimated to consist only of one company of infantry, one machine-gun section, two mortar detachments.

The Mortars and MGS were spared from Jammu brigade by Brigadier N.S.Rawat at great risk, and, "Flown to Srinagar". Unquote [emphasis added]

Maharaj was not having any Air force or Aeroplane. The billion dollar question to be answered is: who supplied the air-

craft to Maharaj to fly this armament to Srinagar? Who was the pilot of this plane? His name has not been disclosed in any official record or by the Military Historians of Kashmir conflict. Who was the officer of the state forces who received these armaments sent by Brigadier Rawat from Jammu at Srinagar Airport? When was Srinagar Airport made functional? When was Jammu airport made functional? If Jammu airport was not functional was this armament sent from Pathankot Airport or any other Airport in India? Who had setup Air traffic control tower in Srinagar and who were the personnel who were manning the Air traffic Control tower in Srinagar. The budget of the State government does not mention any amount to have been earmarked for upgradation or maintenance of Srinagar Airport. Then who was maintaining the Srinagar Airport. The composition of the state forces do not show the existence of any Airport facility in any of its documentations. The date 18th. October 1947 is very important. On this date Kashmir had not acceded to India. After Brigadier Rawat of Jammu brigade was able to fly armaments to Srinagar, on this very day, a stern warning to Mr. Jinnah was given in a cablegram sent by Kashmir government. According to Indian Military historians Parsad and Dharampal this cablegram informed Jinnah that "State government would be compelled to seek friendly assistance in fulfilling its sacred duty of protecting its subjects and frontiers. The reply to this cablegram speaks volumes. Liaqat Ali Khan in his reply pointed out that even on that date the massacre of Muslims was continuing unabated in Jammu region. The Ex-servicemen in Punch area had risen in revolt against Dogra rule in Kashmir. Kashmiri Muslims were now in peril. Another blood bath of the Kashmiri Muslims was in the offing. The period from 18th. October 1947 till 31st. October 1947 is the real turning point in the history of Kashmir. Jinnah was exercising restraint. He took all steps to prevent the tribal invasion of Kashmir. He knew the massacre of Jammu Muslims will provoke a backlash. On 4th. October 400 raiders with Tommy guns and bombs surrounded Chirala. On 10th.

October raids had taken place in Jammu area. On 11/12 October 1947, 500 armed raiders crossed river Jehlum and entered Punch. [See operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947/48 by Parsad and Dharampal, published by Natraj, Dhera-Dun]. The pertinent question arises, what was Maharaj Hari Singh doing in Srinagar? According to these Indian Military historians the state army was getting immobilised. Then why did Maharaja disregard the Jammu situation and continued to stay in Srinagar? Did he send a telegram to Govt. of Pakistan complaining about these incursions from across the border? If not why? According to Dogra administration the worsening Muslim-Hindu riots, had led to economic blockade. On 15th. October 1947 the Kashmir government sent a cablegram to British Prime Minister. According to Indian version of events the Pakistan government had taken control of postal services in the state on 12th September, 1947. According to S.N.Prasad and Dharampal:

"Very soon the Pakistan Post office within the state, refused to operate the Savings Bank Accounts of the people and to cash postal certificates. Cheques from the branches within the state, of banks in West Punjab, were not honoured and remittances of money from Lahore currency office from Srinagar branch of Imperial Bank were stopped." Unquote [See the book "Operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-1948", Page 15; published under authority of Defence Ministry, Govt. of India by Natraj, Dhera-Dun].

If the post office within the state of Jammu & Kashmir in September 1947 were under the control of Govt. of Pakistan, then, which was the Agency, that helped Maharaja to send a cablegram to British Prime Minister? Was Govt. of India taken into confidence about the contents of this cablegram? On 29th September 1947, Sheikh Abdullah had flown to Delhi, after having been released on the advice of Mahatma Gandhi. Which aircraft flew him from Srinagar to Delhi? On 22nd. October 1947, Mr. M.C.Mahajan, the Prime Minister of Kash-

mir sent another telegram to Govt. of Pakistan; complaining about raiders. Did he also inform the Govt. of India? Sheikh Abdullah was already in Delhi? According to Indian military historians Parsad and Dharmpal the invasion of Kashmir was planned by British C in C of the Pakistan army and was called Operation Gulmarg. If this is true did Nehru inform Mountbatten or the British government about it. The evidence in support of this theory is cited on the testimony of Major Onkar Singh Kalkat. According to Parsad and Dharmpal to quote their own words:

"The first was Major Onkar Singh Kalkat, then serving as Brigade Major at HQ, Bannu Frontier Brigade Group under Brigadier C.P. Murray. The Brigadier being away at Mirali out post, Major Kalkat on 20th August 1947 received and opened an envelope marked personal/Top Secret, and found inside a letter from C in C Pakistan army, giving detailed plan of operation Gulmarg. He hastily called up the Brigadier and, was advised not to breathe a word about it to any body, or else he (kalkat) would never be allowed to leave Pakistan alive. However Pakistan army got scent of Major Kalkat's knowledge of the "Operation Gulmarg".

Consequently he was put under virtual house-arrest in his residence. But the officer made a daring escape and reached Ambala on 18th. October 1947. Unquote.

These are very serious allegations as the book operation in jammu & Kashmir 1947-1948 has been authorised to be published by Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India as a part of military history of military operations in Jammu & Kashmir during 1947-1948. Several questions arise in this behalf.

- (a) Pakistan became sovereign state on 14th August, 1947.
- (b) According to Ian Stephen of the "The Statesman" India, the coffers of Pakistan were empty.

- (c) Indian government had put an embargo on the transfer of Money to Pakistan which it was liable to transfer to Pakistan under partition plan.
- (d) near about sixty lakh Muslim refugees from India had crossed over to Pakistan on this date.

In this backdrop, how could British C in C of Pakistan army conceive of operation Gulmarg. If the Govt.. of India was aware about Operation Gulmarg did they inform Maharaja about it? Was the British C in C of the Indian army informed about Operation Gulmarg? Was not Lord Mountbatten informed about it? When India took its case to Security Council, why were not the members of the Security Council informed about Operation Gulmarg? On 28th October, 1947 Nehru sent a telegram to Clement. Attlee (which is now part of British Archival records) Saying:

"We decided at first not to send any troops to Kashmir but to supply arms for which demand has come to us sometime ago. Later developments made it clear that unless we sent troops immediately, complete disaster would overtake Kashmir, with terrible consequence all over India. Immediate action was necessary to avoid this and save Kashmir." Unquote

The billion dollar question that yet remains to be answered is that why did not Nehru inform the British Prime Minister that the British C in C of Pakistan army has conceived a diabolical plan called Operation Gulmarg for Tribal Invasion of Kashmir? Nehru on the same day sent his top secret telegram no 1115, informing London that:

"Gracey, the officiating C in C Pakistan army, reported by phone to me 0100 hours night of 27th October that he had received orders from Jinnah, which he had not obeyed..... to send troops to Kashmir to seize Baramulla and Srinagar also Banihal pass and to send troops

into Mirpur district of Jammu." Unquote

Why did not Nehru complain to Gen. Gracey about his own 20th August 1947 plan of Tribal invasion of Kashmir? Why Jinnah did not mention about sending troops to Punch, that had risen in revolt against Dogra rule and already an Azad Kashmir government was established by the Punch rebels? Attlee's serial telegram No. 6/47, Prime Minister to Commonwealth Relation office dated 28th October, 1947, speaks volumes. Attlee admitted that Nehru was to quote his own words: needlessly provocative in (a) choosing Sikh troops to send (b) accepting accession to India." Unquote.

Why did Attlee specifically refer to Sikh troops being sent to Kashmir? Was he of the opinion that the Sikh troops were responsible for the massacre of Muslims in Gurdaspur and Jammu? What did he mean by using the expression "provocative". Forty Dakotas had airlifted the Sikh troops to Srinagar and the only civilian passenger in the vanguard Dakota was sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. In this backdrop we have to appreciate the statement of Clement Attlee the Prime Minister of U.K to the Commonwealth Relation Office that:

"The account of planned coup d'etat by Jinnah sounds to me like a wild exaggeration." [see serial telegram no 6/47, Prime Minister to Commonwealth Relation Office, 29th October 1947].

Why did not Nehru or Patel or Azad or any other Congress leader protest against the strong expression "wild exaggeration" used by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom? Who had openly disregarded their account of Tribal invasion of Kashmir by calling it a wild exaggeration. These are complex questions and no easy answer is available. Especially, when Pakistan government at that particular time was living from hand to mouth. The key to understanding the psyche of this darkest period of Indian history is provided by the way Jinnah's mind was perceiving these events in Kashmir. The massacre of three hundred thousand or more Muslims in Jammu had sent

Jinnah into a phase of intense introspection. Allen Campbell Johnson in their diary notices the sullen mood of Mr. M.A. Jinnah in these words:

"He is utterly convinced that Indian leaders real aim is to strangle Pakistan at birth that Gandhi had never accepted partition and under the guise of religious teachings is all the time spreading Hindu poison [Unquote] Diary of Sunday 4th October 1947. Was Jinnah hallucinating? Or facts substantiated his perception, that Congress Hindu Mahasabha and Socialist had developed complete concordance on destruction of Pakistan is proved by some critical evidence, which is noticed as under:

Pakistan was created on 14th August 1947 and just three and a half months had elapsed when Ram Manohar Lohia, the socialist leader of India wrote a confidential note to Gandhiji and Gopalaswamy Iyenger. His note read as under [to quote his own words]

"On Kashmir's frontiers are the Sinkiang Chinese, NWFP Muslims, Afghans, Russians and I am excluding the British factor at the moment. No further time should be lost in finding contacts in Afghanistan and Sinkiang. This work is to be done from Delhi. Whether via Afghanistan or in any other way, the Khudai Khidmatgar must know our plans as we have to know theirs. That Hunza, Nagar and other tribes invading Kashmir is an additional reason why other tribes inimical to these and other frontier Pathans could be persuaded to strive for paralysing the League Administration." Unquote [The whole letter of Mr. Ram Manohar Lohia, Socialist leader of India is quoted in extenso by Mr. Sandeep Bamzai in his book "Bonfire of Kashmiriyat" published by Rupa and Co. This was the period when British Generals of Indian army were monitoring war operations in Kashmir. On 23rd. September 1947, Jinnah appealed to the Commonwealth to "intervene in Pakistan dispute with India." By this time the mass migration of Muslims from East Punjab was complete. Allen Campbell - Johnson in their Diary of 10th November 1947 noticed, "Be that as it may,

evidence is accumulating that Mountbatten is to be made the target of a fairly heavy propaganda barrage from Karachi. The first salvo was an article in the Pakistan Time Today accusing him of being in active command of Kashmir operation." Unquote. Page 242. Mountbatten left for London the next day, to attend the Royal marriage of Prince Philips his nephew. What did he report to U.K government about the war in Kashmir? At that particular time Lt. Gen. Sir Dudley Russel was in command of Kashmir operations. He was to receive orders from Gen. Sir Roy Bucher C in C of the Indian army. According to official records of the Defence Ministry Govt. of India it was on 18th January 1948 that Cariappa took over the DEP command with the rank of Lt. General. According to Parsad and Dharampal, the Indian military historians:

"Only the improptu airlift to Srinagar in October 1947 saved the kashmir Valley. A hundred planes landed everyday on the improvised air field and supplies and evacuating casualties and the refugees. The air force and civilian pilots of these Dakotas defied the mountain the weather, and fatigue to continue the air lift till the valley was saved". The Historians do not tell us how many "spitfires" fighters took part in the operations? How many of the pilots who took part in the operations of 1947-1948 i.e. till 18th January 1948 when Lt. General Cariappa took over the command of the operations in Kashmir) were British. Who was manning the Air Control tower in Srinagar? When was Air Control Tower set up at Srinagar Airfield?. On 1st December 1947 at the inauguration of Jammu Radio Station Maharaja Hari Singh complained in a public speech that "accession to Indian Union was a decision arrived at in state of Emergency, owing to acts of aggression" Committed one our territory." Was Maharaja complaining that he had acceded to India under compulsion? These remarks are to be understood in the light of the ground situation that existed in Kashmir Province. Abdullah was released on 29th September 1947 from Srinagar jail by Maharaja. According to G.K Reddy, the editor of the Kashmir Time: "Liaqat Ali Khan offered, that

if Sheikh Abdullah agreed to Kashmir's accession, by hook or crook he would lead the Provincial government in Pakistan." [see Bonfire of Kashmiriyat by Sandeep Bamzai page 44]. On 27th. September, 1947 two days before Abdullah release from prison, Nehru wrote to Patel: "Abdullah is very anxious to keep out of Pakistan, and relies upon us a great deal for advice". Unquote. In he middle of October 1947 Sheikh abdullah met Mountbatten according to Aide Memories of Mountbatten dated Feb., 25, 1948. On 20th December, 1947 Liaqat Ali Khan wrote to Mountbatten a length missive in which he pointed out:

"The Plea that the accession is only temporary pending the restoration of peaceful conditions is too flimsy to stand examination, particularly, in the light of recent negotiations, in the course of which a perfectly fair and workable plan of withdrawal of opposing forces followed by a referendum, under impartial aegis, suggested by us, was turned down by your government. But all this fit in with the general pattern of India governments Political attitude, to wards Pakistan, ever since it became evident that partition was the only possible solution of our constitutional problems". Unquote.

The words the "general pattern of Indian governments Political attitude, towards Pakistan", are gravid with meaning. In ordinary parlance they connote that Indian Leadership had not accepted the ideological basis of the creation of Pakistan. This is the crux of the Kashmir dispute: Liaqat Ali Khan's letter of 30th December, 1947 in a straight forward manner Complained to Nehru that "the Indian Govt. is deliberately withholding the payment of Rupees fifty five Crore of the cash balance, which is the legal due of the Pakistan government. This is the latest manifestation of their desire to strangle Pakistan financially and economically, which characterised the partition proceedings." Unquote. On December 22nd 1947,

Nehru in his letter to Liaqat Ali Khan hinted that India would refer the matter to U.N O. However the dispute was referred to U.N.O on 1st. January 1948? Why did Govt. of India wait for full one year before referring the dispute to U.N? Pamela Hicks, the daughter of Mountbatten says her father also played a role in this episode.

This question requires serious consideration. Two inferences may be drawn. Indian forces were totally unsuccessful in making a headway on the Uri front. They were compelled to go on the offensive on Uri and Askardu front. This is an inevitable inference if one comprehends, the significance of the loss of Indian position across Kishenganga, and, the build up of the Azad forces in uri sector in June 1948. General Thimayya was totally demoralised as Indian forces were suffering great reverse on the Uri front. According to Parsad and Dharampal, the, Indian military historians: "General Thimayyas appreciation of the situation succinctly summed up the various problems, which confronted him. His main object was:

- (a) to consolidate his existing position from Tithwal to Chakoti and
- (b) to prevent the enemy from infiltrating into Kashmir Valley from this or any other direction. The area between Tithwal and the jehlum was divided from East to West, by a massive mountain range starting approximately from point 10147, known as Kafir Khan range.

The mountainous mass offered many avenues of approach to enemy infiltrating parties. The main pass through the Kafir Khan range was Reshian Gali. General Thimmayya's conclusion was that the best way for him to dominate, this area (Tithwal to Chakoti) was to hold the ridge running South from Kishenganga point 7802 to Kafir Khan Peak and the high ground between this range and Jehlum. The northern position would require at least

- (a) three battalions
- (b) with one battalion in depth

(c) and southern portion would require two battalions. This would however leave

- (a) Reshian Gali uncovered which would
- (b) enable the enemy to infiltrate northwards towards Tithwal line of communication or eastward towards the Tutmar Gali.

This would be prevented by placing:

- (a) an additional battalion in the area of point 7520.

The total requirement, therefore, for this Tithwal area alone would be 7 battalion..... General Thimmayyas appreciation, highlighted the difficulties, with which he was faced, in guarding a long straggling and vulnerable defence line with inadequate forces. Regular Pakistani troops were now openly taking part in the operations in a big way. The trend of the enemy was unmistakable he was more and more aggressive. After having gained a victory in the Tithwal area the enemy turned his attention to the Chakoti area. His efforts brought fruit and he gained another significant victory on 23rd, July, 1948 by driving to bihar from Pandu-the commanding feature which dominated the road to Uri-Dommel." Unquote [see the book Operation in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-1948] page 202. There were reports of enemy successes in Guraiz, Dras and Askardu and Kargil. According to Parsad and Dharampal:

"The operations, described above represented the high tide of the Pakistans success. Within a period of about 8 months and, with only about two battalions of troops, the invaders had occupied a vast and strategic region from Gilgit to Nubra and from Karakoram to the Zojila and Guraiz. As a result of these successes the line of communication to Leh was cut and Kashmir Valley itself was surrounded from the north and east also. From the West and south West the raiders were already threatening the Valley." Un-

quote [see Operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-1948, page 305].

Nehru confronted with these ground realities and the failure of the Indian Army to defeat Azad Kashmir forces was compelled by circumstances to refer the dispute to U.N.O. The second reason was more diabolical. Nehru wanted to create an economic burden for Pakistan. Kashmir would be an economic albatross, around Pakistan's neck. Nehru was certain that Western powers would not assist Pakistan in view of the global situation existing in Asia. Nehru wanted to perpetuate the Kashmir dispute. On 29th October 1947 just two days after the tribal invasion of Kashmir, V.P. Menon called on the British High Commissioner. Menon according to Robert A. Huttenback "referred to a very real danger of Russian infiltration through Gilgit. In this connection it was important to bear in mind that the Muslim inhabitants of the Kashmir province with its long International frontiers were a weak link to a man and would thus be easy and immediate prey to communist propaganda if an orderly government was replaced by tribal rule. The next step would be India itself." Unquote [see the book Kashmir and British Raj 1847-1947] published by Oxford page 166. On October 31st. 1947 Maharaja appointed Sheikh Abdullah as Head of Administration. On 3rd. March 1948 Sheikh Abdullah was appointed as Prime Minister of J&K state. Soon thereafter the entire Jammu province with Hindu majority areas rose in revolt against Abdullah, and wanted complete merger of J&K State with India. In other words at that stage this meant financial integration of J&K State with India. In December 1952, the Praja Parishad agitation for abrogation of Article 370 was in full swing. Sheikh was convinced: "that Jammu will not reconcile with Kashmir Valley"? Why could not Sheikh conceive this political reality in 1946, when he gave call for Quit Kashmir Movement? Nehru's basic aim since 1947 was that unresolved Kashmir dispute, should be a vast economic drain for Pakistan, and should lead to its disintegration under an unbearable economic burden. Today, also the policy of Govt. of

India is to keep alive the Kashmir dispute, so that militancy in Kashmir is also kept on the boil, draining Pakistan economically. Economic considerations will always compel Pakistan to be an ally of Anglo-US axis, that would also enable it to obtain trade concessions from European Union. The danger is that economic regeneration of communist China may upset this arrangement. If India indicated here in above Pakistan in the next decade, would be literally pushed into the lap of communist China. This is the Hobson's choice for Pakistan. At the present moment no other rational political scenario is conceivable.

[CHAPTER VII]

Sheikh Abdullah was released from prison on 29th September, 1947. Even while in prison he was fully posted with information that on 6th September, 1947, near about three hundred thousand Jammu Muslims had been killed by Dogra Forces. Rumours were making the rounds in the town of Srinagar that Patiala Sikh Forces had reached Srinagar and had taken actual physical possession of the Srinagar Air field. Kashmiri Muslims now felt that they were not safe in India. Sheikh Abdullah addressed a huge public gathering on 30th September, 1947. At that gathering the crowd raised only two slogans "Sheikh Abdullah Zindabad",* "Pakistan Zindabad". Sheikh Abdullah sensing the mood of the people in his speech advocated that people should first get independence and then they should decide if they would join the dominion of India or Pakistan. This was an excellent Political Ploy to avoid making any commitment about joining Pakistan. Sheikh was buying time. Next day he dashed off to New-Delhi. Nehru personally received him at Safdar Jung Airport. In Delhi, he stayed with Nehru. He had long parleys with Congress Leadership. On 20th October, 1947, Jinnah sent a telegram to Maharaja denying that Pakistan had violated the Kashmir Stand Still Agreement. Needless to mention that Sheikh Abdullah sent one of his colleagues G.M.Sadiq to Pakistan at this time to negotiate terms. He was playing a charade. According to Mr. M. C. Mahajan, Ex Prime Minister of Kashmir on 25th. of October, 1947, when Defence Committee was deliberating if they should accept the offer of accession to India by Maharaja. It was Sheikh Abdullah who prevailed on Nehru to immediately accept this offer. [See

* Sheikh Abdullah Zindabad means long live Abdullah.

Mahajan's Book, Looking Back]. Liyaqat Ali Khan assured G. M. Sadiq [Sheikh's special emissary] about three matters. He made the following significant commitments to G.M.Sadiq:

- (a) that complete internal autonomy would be given to Kashmir,
- (b) Kashmir would be given the Right to Secession,
- (c) And Kashmir would be free to implement Naya Kashmir Plan.

Having received these specific assurances from Pakistan Mr. G. M. Sadiq left Lahore on 19th. October. Without trying to contact Sheikh Abdullah in Delhi he along with Mirza Afzal Beg*, flew from Delhi to Srinagar on 22nd. October, 1947. The dates are extracted from the concept note on the genesis and progress of Kashmir National Movement, referred to by Sandeep Bamzai in his book [Bonfire of Kashmiriyat] published by Rupa & co, Delhi. Following facts require serious consideration. The factual scenario of that period shows that:

- (1) Sheikh Abdullah was fully aware that there were communal elements in Indian National Congress that had not accepted the idea of Pakistan, in 1946 itself.
- (2) Sheikh Abdullah was aware that demographic alteration of population had taken place in East Punjab especially in Gurdaspur and Kapurthala districts due to large scale massacre of Muslims.
- (3) Sheikh Abdullah was aware that nearly 3,00,000 Muslims were killed in an organized manner by Dogra and Patiala Forces on 6th September, 1947.
- (4) Knowing all these facts Sheikh Abdullah deputed his close associate Mr. G. M. Sadiq to Pakistan on 12th October, 1947. Obviously the purpose was to gain time. From Lahore Sadiq came to Delhi, and met Indian leaders. He did not even try to meet Sheikh Abdullah who was at that time in Delhi. Why? Functionaries of Gov-

* Mirza Afzal Beg was a very close associate of Sheikh Abdullah

ernment of India arranged for Sadiq and Beg's Dakota flight to Srinagar on 22nd October, 1947? There was till that dates no passenger service between New Delhi and Srinagar.

- (6) Sheikh Abdullah against all reasons of rationality was a pursuing a political policy that Maharaja Hari Singh should abdicate his throne. Hari Singh had the full support of non-Muslims and Hindu Dogras in Jammu. Jammu Muslims having been massacred how is it possible that Sheikh Abdullah did not realize that the Jammu Dogras would resent Hari Singh abdicating his throne. They would oppose any domination by Kashmiri Muslims. They would strive for full integration of Jammu and Kashmir State with India? They had massacred the entire Population of Jammu region only to facilitate the merger and full integration of J & K State with India. Merger with India would transform them into a majority and consequently the Kashmiri Muslims would be reduced to a minority status in India. This is what they wanted. Yet Sheikh was oblivious to this reality. Why? No rational explanation is conceivable,

- (7) In 1950 for the first time elections were held in the State. The Praja Parishad, the Hindu Dogra political party, boycotted the elections. The Assembly was inaugurated on 5th. Nov., 1950. On its inauguration Sheikh Abdullah is reported to have said, "we have to consider the alternative of making ourselves an Eastern Switzerland of keeping aloof from both States of India and Pakistan but having friendly relations with both." Unquote [extracted from records of Kashmir Constituent Assembly Debates of 1950].

What course the events had taken in Kashmir from 26th October, 1947 to November, 1950, call for closer scrutiny. We will have to examine these events in order to understand the orientation of politics in Kashmir during this critical period. To

wipe off some of complexities that have thickened the nebulousness of the situation we will have to notice Nehru's letter of 27th. September, 1947 to Sardar Patel. Nehru said, "it can be done chiefly because Abdullah is very anxious to keep out of Pakistan and relies upon us a great deal for advice."

This letter shows that Nehru and Patel were hands in glove with each other, so far their policy on Kashmir was concerned, and Sheikh Abdullah was in league with them.

On 30th. September, 1947 Abdullah told his audience that first Kashmir should achieve independence and then it would decide which dominion it should join. What did he mean by "independence"? Did he mean abdication by Maharaja Hari Singh? How do we reconcile his thinking with his May 17th. 1949 out-burst in New Delhi? In that outburst on the question of Independent Kashmir he said: "Has it got necessary sanctions and guarantees and can a small country like Kashmir with its limited resources maintain it. Or all the countries concerned in a proper political temper at the present moment to give their willing and sincere assent to it or, by only after a formal declaration of independence, shall we not be making Kashmir a victim of some powerful and unscrupulous country? [Speech quoted by Sandeep Bamzai in his book "Bonfire of Kashmiriyat"]. On 1st. January, 1948, India referred the case of Kashmir dispute to U. N. O. On 5th February, 1948, Sheikh Abdullah addressed the U. N. Security Council and in his peroration remarked, "We shall prefer death rather than join Pakistan." If this was his real state of mind then why did he send his close associate to negotiate terms with Pakistan on 12th. October 1947? Sadiq held negotiations with Pak leaders till 18th October, 1947. Why? He reached New Delhi on 19th October, 1947. The question arises what was his mission in Pakistan? By conviction Sadiq was a communist. Was he playing this drama under instructions from U.S.S.R? Russia needed India as an ally to create anti-US lobby in South Asia.

On view is that Sadiq was an Indian Agent who was on

"mission procrastination" According to Lt. Gen: L. P. Sen. [See his book *Slender was the Thread*]. At that time one Patiala battalion was already in Srinagar. Srinagar Air field was made fully operational and suitable for Indian Air Force. Sadiq at Delhi met Indian intelligence officers and briefed them about the situation. This explains why raiders lost the battle for Srinagar Air field that took place on 3rd. November 1947. On 29th October, 1947, Srinagar Air field was fully operational for Indian Air Force. According to Prasad and Dharampal Indian military historian: "on 29th October, 1947, Tachal H. Q. 161 Infantry Brigade was opened up at Srinagar Air Field. During the day 56 men of Sikh and 218 men of 1st. Kumaon (Paratroopers) were flown in bringing the total men flown to Srinagar since October. 27th to 941. Through out 29th October, it was touch and go for the slender forces defending Srinagar. At 0630 hours on 29th October, Sikh company and D company but strengthened by platoon (Indian elements) of 3/15 Punjab and a composite company of 13 Battery Royal Indian Artillery was forced back by enemy pressure. It retreated and enemy followed up at 0930 hours opened a Line of barrage on the Sikh position with three inch mortars. The situation appeared critical. To help the gallant defenders against the far superior number of the enemy, D company of Sikh was rushed forward from the Air field. Its task of defending the airfield being taken over by company of [Para] Kumaon just landed from the air" unquote [See the book *Operation in Jammu and Kashmir 1947- 1948*] published under the Authority of Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India.

This nails the lie of Indian Government that the Srinagar Airfield was derelict and totally unsecured at that time. In fact in the month of October. 1947 it was made fully operational. According to Prasad and Dharampal, "on 3rd. November a bitter battle took place near the Srinagar Air field itself. That morning one company of 1 [Para] Kumaon took up position on a ridge near Budgam while one company of 4 Kumaon re-

turned towards Srinagar at 1230 hours. The other company of 4 Kumaon was suddenly attacked by about 700 raiders at 1400 hours at a point just north of Budgam. Taken by surprise and greatly outnumbered the company fought bravely but suffered heavy casualties.....but the enemy attacks were at last held, their surreptitious advance on Air field was stopped and they suffered several hundred casualties by bombing and strafing from air."

"Air activity was further stepped up four spit fires and five Harvard sorties being flown against the Budgam. Baramulla area." Unquote [See the book operations in Jammu and Kashmir. 1947-1948]. In fact several spit fire fighters were already stationed in Srinagar Air field, even before formal instrument of Accession to India was signed by Maharaja Hari Singh the ruler of Kashmir. "Bombing and strafing from air", are two expressions that leads to this interference otherwise how could Indian Air force planes be available at the nick of the time?

On 4th. November. 1947, itself the Indian propaganda department invented a canard that Srinagar air field was saved because one of the trusted followers of National Conference offered to be the guide of the raiders and misled them about the route to the air field and delayed their advance so that Indian Army could take up position near Srinagar air field. Sandeep Bamzai had romanticized the Maqbool Sherwani episode in these words.

"Maqbool Mohd Sherwani became a symbol of this exemplary courage. He went on a motor cycle from National Conference H. Q. at Palladium Cinema in Lal Chowk to Baramulla where a nunnery had been desecrated. His sole objective was to (slow down the raiders as they were now within striking distance of the Capital. The raiders understood Sherwani's ploy and found him and nailed him to a tree and shot him. On

his head they engraved *Yeh Gaddar Hai, Iski Saza Maut Hai.*" * Unquote [See Bamzai's "Bone fire of Kashmiriyat"].

This version is not corroborated by Indian Military historians Prasad and Dharampal in their book [Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947-1948, published under the authority of Ministry of Defence, Government of India.]

According to Prasad and Dharampal, "A Kashmiri Muslim Patriot Maqbool Sherwani was shot dead in Public Square for professing to treat Hindus and Sikhs as his brothers [page 23]. Unquote.

Sherwani has special importance because he was one who had used foul language against Mr. M. A. Jinnah, when for a short duration Jinnah sojourned at Baramulla in 1944. He was very close to Sheikh Abdullah and was his informer in Baramulla town. Nehru specially visited his grave on 11th November, 1947 and extolled him to the skies. The canard about Sherwani was invented to conceal the fact that Srinagar Air field was fully secured by Patiala battalion on 1st. October, 1947, itself and was made fully operational by 18th. October, 1947, the date G. M. Sadiq left Lahore for New Delhi. Srinagar air field was not only fully secured but fully operational for Indian Air Force by 25th October, 1947. This securing of Air field by Indian Air Force in the month of October 1947 was one of the reasons that Mountbatten accepted the letter of Maharaja offering Kashmir's accession to India. Mountbatten knew that Indian Forces could be landed in Srinagar at a short notice.

Sheikh Abdullah was also aware that in October. 1947 itself the Air field was fully secured by Indian Forces. He went to Delhi in an Indian Air Force Dakota and was personally received by Nehru at Safdar Jung Airport. His speeches and policies following the acceptance of offer of accession by Maharaja to Mountbatten have to be understood in the back drop of this fact situation. The backdrop fact shows that in 1943-1944

* Meaning his is a traitor and his punishment is death.

period, communist party deputed one of its trusted workers Mr. B. P. L. Bedi to make Srinagar his headquarters and work in close co-operation with Sheikh Abdullah. He scripted the manifesto of National Conference called *Naya Kashmir*. What was the reaction of Indian National Congress? What was Bedi's mission? Why did not Nehru object to his presence in Srinagar? Was Nehru in touch with U. S. S. R? On what special mission Congress leader Subhash Chandra Bose had then gone to U. S. S. R? Was it a part of U. S. S. R policy that Kashmir should link up with India? Nehru was it seems already in confidence of U.S.S.R, and, at his bidding B.P.L.Bedi, a known communist associated with Sheikh Abdullah, in scripting the manifesto of National Conference called *Naya Kashmir*.*

On May 17th. 1949. Sheikh Abdullah declared in Delhi, "the National Conference has always and during past decade particularly given positive proof of its alliances:

- "(a) out side Kashmir and
- (b) has not vociferously expressed her choice
- (c) between two dominions but has
- (d) while expressing the will of the people
- (e) sacrificed and struggled against heavy odds for
- (f) linking up the four million people of Kashmir with their 300 million brethren in India." Un quote.

Whose language was Abdullah speaking. In order to comprehend these utterances we have to recall that socialist leader Ram Manohar Lohia visited Kashmir in December, 1947 and on 2nd. December, 1947, wrote a confidential note to Gandhi, stating to quote his own words, "Sadiq is a Communist, is Incharge of National Militia and it is probably through that a very large number of Communists are managing and officering the cultural publicity and women's fronts. Curiously most of the Communists are emigrants from Pakistan. The general com-

* *Naya Kashmir* means New Kashmir

munist position is only too well known but in Kashmir they are acquiring a good influence. The keenness with which they advocated self-determination and are still advocating it, so as to satisfy the separatist sentiments of a great many sections of people as also their pro-Pakistan attitude in the past, has given them a favourable position in Kashmir Muslim Politics. Kashmir Communists have been in habit of suggesting different types of solution:

- (a) Kashmir Valley to Azad Kashmir
- (b) Dogra areas of Jammu to go to Indian Union
- (c) Kotli and other areas to Pakistan."

Such solutions are orally canvassed and can often satisfy various trends of opinion. It is quite obvious that at any given moment that solution may be emphasized which suits the Communist Party best. The Union and democratic idea can of course not count on continuing communist allegiance. [Unquote]. The whole letter is quoted in Extenso in the book *Bone Fire of Kashmiriyat* by Sandeep Bamzai. Sheikh Abdullah had suggested to Ram Manohar Lohia that best way out would perhaps be for India and Pakistan to achieve an understanding on Kashmir's neutrality and independence. According to Lohia the Sheikh's Communist assistant encouraged him in this idea. It is clear U.S.S.R had its own axe to grind in Kashmir.

The question that begs the answer is that at whose instructions Sheikh allowed B. P. L. Bedi and Freda Bedi members of the Communist Party of India to actively influence National Conference agenda? Was Sheikh in touch with U.S.S.R? Was Sheikh endeavouring to have some connection with U.S.S.R. So that some sort of independent Kashmir would emerge in South Asia? This leads to a further question of seminal importance. Was Pundit Nehru also in touch with U.S.S.R. on the question of Kashmir's neutrality? Sheikh Abdullah in 1947 wanted to create a National Militia why? Fact is proved by the letter of Sheikh Abdullah to Sardar Patel, the Home Minister of India. Sheikh said, "it will not be quite the whole truth to say

that the question of the administration of the Army has been settled. Even such settlement as has been arrived at which took fully six months to materialize has not so far been implemented in its entirety. With the taking over of state forces by the Indian Government it was agreed that steps would be taken to re-organize and re-build our Army so that when the present emergency is over and the Indian Forces are withdrawn the State will be left with a proper organized army of its own to fall back upon. This request was made as early as March last and has been repeated several times since." Unquote. This important letter is now a declassified document, and is of seminal importance to students of History. The Indian Archival records have not preserved other letters of Sheikh Abdullah to Home Minister of India written since March, 1948 to 7th October, 1948. This was also the period when the Communist Leader B. P. L. Bedi was in close touch with Sheikh Abdullah. A tug of war between Sheikh Abdullah and the Government of India began on the question of re-organization of Kashmir Militia. No archival material is available to show that Sardar Patel or Nehru informed Mountbatten about the question of Sheikh's demand for re-organization of Kashmir Militia, although at that particular period India was fighting a gory war with Pakistan and Lord Mountbatten was impresario of this drama. On 1st January, 1948, India lodged a complaint with U. N. On 5th March, 1948 Sheikh Abdullah was appointed Prime Minister of Kashmir by the Maharaja of Kashmir. In March, 1948, Sheikh Abdullah raised the question of re-organization of State Forces with Union of India. The sequence of dates and chronology of events is important to understand the role of U. S. S. R in the Security Council on this issue. It seems, Sheikh had some tacit understanding on this question with U.S.S.R. The Security Council then consisted of five members [permanent] and six members [non permanent] including Ukraine, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Colombia and Syria. China the other permanent member was represented by Nationalist Government of Gen. Chiang Kai-Shek. It is interesting to note that between

January, 22nd. and February 28th the Security Council held 8 meetings. According to Campbell Johnson [see His diary of 17th. February 1948] "both Austin and Noel Baker are widely accused of being unabashedly pro Pakistan"? Question arises why this feeling in India? Why Russia and Ukraine did chose to remain neutral? Was U.S.S.R aspiring to have a base in Kashmir to contain communist China? The nationalist China was confined to Taiwan and was virtually in the throes of political death? If Maharaja in his instrument of Accession surrendered three subjects' defence, foreign affairs and communication to Union of India who were the Indian leaders who assured Sheikh Abdullah that Jammu and Kashmir state will have its own armed forces? The Indian archival records do not throw any light on these vexed questions? Even when Ram Manohar Lohia in his letter to Gandhi on 2nd. December 1947 said "Curiously most of these communists are immigrants from Pakistan." Unquote. Even to this day the Government of India has not disclosed the names of these immigrants from Pakistan who infiltrated National Conference.. Another vital question to be answered is if Nehru ever consulted USSR on the question of making a reference about Kashmir dispute to U. N.O? Is it a fact that Nehru wanted to placate U.S.S.R.? The Indian Government took up the position that the British C in C of the Pakistan army conceived [Operation Gulmarg] for triple invasion of Kashmir. [The Canard is repeated in Book" Operation in Jammu and Kashmir 1947-48 published under the authority of ministry of Defence Govt. of India at page 17] Allen Campbell Johnson in their book "Mission with Mountbatten" points out: that at that period:

"Indian opinion has been inclined to suspect Cunningham of Machiavellian design and of secretly sponsoring the diversion of tribes into Kashmir." Needless to mention that Sir George Cunningham was governor of North West Frontier province from 1937-1946. Unfortunately Allen Campbell Johnson did not tell us on what material evidence the Indian suspected Cunningham of secretly sponsoring the diversions of tribes in

to Kashmir"? However, one fact is apparent that Indian Leaders were interested to implicate Sir George Cunnigham for their own political ends. A question may be asked if this Canard was invented to appease the U.S.S.R authorities who were directly affected by the great divide of India into two dominions of India and Pakistan in south Asia? Is it a fact that the neutrality of U.S.S.R in Security Council induced the said Council on Jan. 20th 1948 to establish a UN fact finding commission and for exercising mediatory influence upon India and Pakistan? Historians will have to probe this question as most of the relevant documents are still classified by Russian government. 21st. April 1948 the Security Council approved a revised draft resolution enlarging the scope of the commission from three to five members. On August 13, 1948, the U.N Commission passed a resolution asking both governments to declare a Ceasefire. Why did not U.N Security Council itself pass a resolution asking both India and Pakistan to observe a Ceasefire while U.S.S.R remained neutral? The Nationalists China presented a Pro-India resolution. On 21st. April 1948 Security Council passed its resolution approving plebiscite in Kashmir. Russia and Ukraine abstained from voting. Why? Was U.S.S.R having some understanding with Government of India? After that the U. N. Commission had its first meeting, on 15th June, 1948, at Geneva, Sheikh Abdullah realized his dreams of an independent Kashmir would not be actualized. By 7th. October, 1948, he realized that Govt.: of India would not allow him to have independent State Forces. This was the reason he was alienated from the mainstream Indian politics. Those historians who advocate the theory that support by Indian National Parties to Hindu Praja Parishad agitation in Jammu in 1948, disillusioned Abdullah, who thereafter strived for an independent Kashmir are only stating a partial truth. Sheikh Abdullah was aware in 1946 itself that communal elements were predominant in Indian National Congress. Sheikh Abdullah knew that Hari Singh was close to Sardar Patel and with Patels consent Golwalkar the Rashtriya Sewak Sang chief had held long meetings with

Hari Singh in October, 1947. Sheikh Abdullah was told that his Kashmir militia would receive armaments from Union of India. However, these arms and ammunition were supplied to R. S. S. the militant anti-Muslim organization [See the book "Kashmir, the wounded Valley by Ajit Bhattacharya, page 91]. After the assassination of Gandhi on 30th January, 1948, Patel openly advocated that doors of Congress should be thrown open to R. S. S. workers* who should be assimilated in Congress. Jammu Dogras were advocating full integration of J & K State with India. In 1951, the Jana Sang, the political wing of R. S. S. formally published a manifesto demanding full integration of J & K State into the Indian Union. In Kashmir ceasefire was declared by both India and Pakistan on 1st January, 1949. Sheikh Abdullah's role from August, 1947 to 1st January, 1949, is of crucial importance to students of history. By this time Pakistan secured a huge tract of area especially in the Northern regions close to the Communist China which at that time was not recognized as a State. This would change the course of politics in Kashmir. In this context we have to recall the fact emphasized by noted historian Robert A. Huttenback who in his book "Kashmir and British Raj", states that, "In addition [on afternoon of 29th. October, 1947] Menon referred to a very real danger of Russian infiltration through Gilgat. In this connection it was important to bear in mind that Muslim inhabitants of Kashmir province with its long international frontier were have-nots to a man and would thus be easy and immediate prey to communist propaganda if an orderly Government were replaced by tribal role." Unquote.

The intriguing question that baffles the mind is that if Govt. of India was afraid of communism overwhelming the Kashmir valley, why did Nehru encourage the communists to infiltrate Kashmir National Conference from 1943 till 1948? In 1943 the central political bureau directed one of its ablest communist leaders Mr. B. P. L. Bedi and his wife Freda Bedi to join the

* Gandhi was assassinated by an R.S.S.worker in 1948.

working group of the J & K National Conference. Why? It was Mr. B. P. L. Bedi who drafted the manifesto of National Conference called Naya Kashmir. On 28, 29 and 30th September, 1947 a special annual session of National Conference was held in Srinagar. The manifesto called Naya Kashmir was adopted amidst great jubilation by the working committee of the National Conference. The core of Naya Kashmir document was 'land to tiller' and 'abolition of big private capitalist factories. In fact the nationalization of all key industries to be managed by the State. After the adoption of this programme Bakshi Ghulam Mohd and G. M. Sadiq two trusted leaders of National Conference had been deputed to India to get support from fraternal organizations. Communist party of India and congress gave unstinted support to Naya Kashmir (Naya means new) programme. How can we reconcile this policy with the statement of Menon [quoted by Robert A. Huttenback] to British High Commissioner, on 29th October, 1947, that there was danger of Russian infiltration in Kashmir? How do we explain the fact that when in February, 1948, U. N. Security Council tabled a resolution on Kashmir it was Russia and Ukraine that abstained from voting. There are other conundrums also that are difficult to resolve. According to H. V. Hudson, the reference to the United Nations as peace keeper was made at the behest of Lord Mountbatten. May be he has not noticed Nehrus tacit understanding with U.S.S.R in making a reference of Kashmir dispute to U.N Security Council. Again we find that on 1st November, 1947, Mountbatten personally met Mr. M. A. Jinnah in Lahore and assured him of a plebiscite under U. N. auspices. However, how do we reconcile these facts with the telegram 1116 [cipher] dated 29th October, 1947, sent by Symonds, the British High Commissioner to the U. K. Government informing it that V. P. Menon, the Secretary of State in Govt. of India, had suggested one of the solutions of Kashmir dispute could be an independent Kashmir under the joint management of both India and Pakistan? The plot thickens when one notices the contents of the telegram sent by Mr. Warren Austin to

U. S. Secretary of State George Marshall dated 28th. January, 1948, in which Austin disclosed to quote his own words, "it is possible that principle purpose of Abdullah's visit was to make it clear to U. S. that there is a third alternative namely independence. He seems overly anxious to get this point across. He did not want his people torn by dissensions between Pakistan and India. It would be much better if Kashmir were independent and could see American and British aid for development of the country. I, of course, gave Abdullah no encouragement on this line and am confident when he left he understood very well where we stand on this matter." Unquote.

Abdullah met Warren Austin when he had gone to New York as a member of Indian delegation to the Security Council. Did he meet Warren Austin at the behest of the Indian delegation? Was it a stealth meeting of Abdullah with Warren Austin without the knowledge of Indian Government at the behest of U.S.S.R? What did he mean that Kashmir could seek American and British aid for development? V. P. Menon on 29th October, 1947, had suggested to Symonds the option of Kashmir under the joint management of both India and Pakistan. In other words a confederation of India, Pakistan and Kashmir that would undo the very existence of Pakistan. If Abdullah had surreptitiously met Mr. Warren Austin, what was the reaction of Indian Government when it discovered this fact about this meeting? No Indian historian has explained the implications of this episode. We also find that soon after the telegram of Warren Austin to John Marshall, on 30th January, 1948, Gandhi was assassinated by a Hindu fanatic in New Delhi. Just six days after the assassination of Gandhi, Sheikh Abdullah on 5th March, 1948, was appointed as Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State. Abdullah at U. N. also met Mr. Noel Baker who told Abdullah that Indian charges that Pakistan was aiding raiders in Kashmir were groundless. Did Abdullah also inform Nehru about his conversation with Warren Austin? We have to analyse this back drop of facts in the light of the telegram Nehru sent to his trusted friend M.C. Mahajan [who ear-

lier was the Prime Minister of Kashmir] dated 17th January, 1948. Nehru insinuated that Pakistan would co-operate with U. S. in providing military facilities against the Soviet Union. Does this suggest that Nehru was already in league with U. S. S. R? Is it Abdullah had met Warren Austin at the behest of Nehru to know first hand the stand of U. S.? Is it that at the behest of Nehru, Abdullah in his speech to U.N. Security Council gave an assurance to U. S. S. R. when he declared that Kashmir would never join Pakistan? On 16th Feb. 1948, Nehru wrote a letter to his sister Mrs. Pandit saying that U. S. A and U. K. had played a dirty role, the U. K. probably been the main actor behind the scenes." H.V. Hudson in his book "the Great Divide" points out that the Indians believed that:

- (a) U. K. wished to appease the cause of Muslim solidarity,
- (b) And U. S. wanted to rehabilitate their positions with the Arabs after advocating the partition of Palestine.

The global politics may have shaped the course of events at that period but the fact remains that Indian Leadership had tacit understanding with U. S. S. R. even before the creation of Pakistan. In fact in 1943 the Politburo of Communist Party of India not only deputed its most trusted leader Mr. B. P. L. Bedi to work in Kashmir, there are strong reasons to suggest that some financial aid from U. S. S. R. was also available to the communist party of India itself. Alan Campbell Johnson [their diary of 26th Feb. 1948, mentions] "Vernon Hood asked me to comment on a draft memorandum he is preparing giving a brief survey of the accession policy to date with particular reference to Junagadh and Kashmir. After covering some details I made the following brief distinction between these two events." Quite apart from the test of majority population the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan was in violation of the principle of geographical compulsion to which the Pakistan leaders had themselves subscribed The accession of Kashmir was not. Moreover from strategic and economic point of view while Pakistan had no interest in Junagadh. India had considerable

interest in Kashmir." Unquote. See Mission with Mount Batten, page 291.

The question arises what was India's strategic and economic interest in Kashmir? The answer is obvious. India's strategic interest in Kashmir lay in the fact that India had given an assurance may be tacit to U.S.S.R that it would actively co-operate with that country in creating a powerful anti-U.S lobby in South Asia. Gandhi was never leaning towards U.S.S.R, and his assassination seems to have been engineered by some lobby who regarded him as a road block. These misgivings about Gandhis assassination can be set aside only if an independent Commission of Enquiry is set up to reinvestigate the facts leading to Gandhi's assassination.

On 29th October, 1947, Robert Trumball, the U. S. Correspondent, wrote in "The New York Times" Indian officials quite frankly believe that possession of Kashmir is vital to the security of India". A question may be asked was security of India linked with its association with U. S. S. R? We will have to examine these speculations in the context of the global situation that emerged in 1950. On 25th June, 1950, North Korean Forces invaded South Korea. This signalled a Korean war that ended on 27th July, 1953. By the middle of July, the U. S. 24th and 25th Division joined the South Korean Forces. U. S. S. R. and Communist China moved their defence forces to fight alongside the North Korean Forces. On June, 29th, the U. S. ordered the naval blockade of North Korea. Communist forces were mainly composed of the Chinese and the Communist China also provided air support from its Manchurian Airbase near Yalu river. By this time the United States the Republic of Korea and 15 other U. N. members sent their troops to fight in North Korea, under the command of Gen. Douglas Mac Arthur. On June 23rd, 1951, Jacob Malik sensing the seriousness of the situation suggested a cease fire. Sheikh Abdullah realized that India was now virtually an ally of U. S. S. R. Pakistan would join the CENTO and NATO alliances aimed at containing U.

S. S. R. in spreading their influence in its Northern Regions. At this stage Abdullah made a new demarche. On 29th September, 1950, he met Loy- Henderson, the U. S. Ambassador to India. Henderson sent a cablegram about his secret parleys with Abdullah. Henderson pointed out "in discussion of the future of Kashmir Abdullah was vigorous in restating that in his opinion it should be independent." Unquote. He even pleaded for U. S. assistance either directly or through the Agency of U.N. Abdullah pointed out that accession of Kashmir to India would not improve the economic backwardness of Kashmiri people. Abdullah thereafter met Walter Crocker the Australian Ambassador in 1952. Abdullah was now distancing himself from U.S.S.R, or was he wooing both super-powers?

In May, 1953, Abdullah had discussions with Adlai Stevenson on the question of U. S. support to the idea of one Kashmir. As Adlai Stevenson was a U. S. presidential candidate the U. S. had to officially squash rumours that U. S. was interfering in Kashmir affairs. U. S clarified that Adlai Stevenson had met Abdullah in his personal capacity.

What Abdullah did not realize was that India soon after Korean War was adopting the broad outlines of U.S. S. R. foreign policy? Second, U. S. S. R. would never support an idea of independent Kashmir that for its survival would depend upon economic support from U. S.A. So Abdullah and Government of India were at cross purpose under compulsion of circumstances, and had now become antagonists.

The emergence of Communist China in 1949-1950, as a major force in Asia would prevent U. S. to support the idea of an independent Kashmir. Abdullah could not appreciate this blatant political reality. His knowledge of Global Politics was rudimentary, and he made no conscious attempt to improve it.

Fourth the idea of independent Kashmir was totally repugnant to the Jammu Dogras and the Buddhists in Ladakh. The idea of independent Kashmir was in fact a euphemism for an independent Kashmiri speaking [Muslim valley]. The inde-

pendent Kashmir grounded upon the adamant foundations of Kashmiri ethnicity would trigger off the centrifugal forces in N. W. F. P and Baluchistan. The dynamics of the situation were of such a character that Pakistan for its own survival would not ever support the idea of an independent Kashmir valley. Infact the realisation of independent Kashmir would lead to dismemberment of Pakistan.

Realizing the implications of Abdullah's thinking on an independent Kashmir valley, at this stage Pakistan took full control of the administration of Gilgat and other Northern areas. In this back drop we have to appreciate the letter of 28th June, 1953 written by Nehru to Abdullah. This missive was straight forward honest and forthright He frankly told Abdullah, "it is always painful to part company after long years of comradeship but if our conscience so tells us or in our view an over-riding national interest requires then there is no help for it." Unquote. He was squashing the idea of Independent Jammu & Kashmir State, that would lean on U.S.A.

The intelligence agencies of Government of India by that time had succeeded in creating a split in the National Conference headed by Abdullah. The device employed was simple. The Hindu elements in National Conference would work for the over-riding National Interests of India. The Muslim elements were to be manipulated by G. M. Bakshi and G. M. Sadiq, the two Indian agents who held considerable influence in the party and who could suborn the party members by bribery and promises of political offices. Dr. Karan Singh, the son of Maharaja Hari Singh, represented the aspirations of Jammu Dogras and was acting as a mole for the Indian Govt. in Kashmir. In fact a stage had reached when Kashmir was slowly and steadily getting submerged in the great cataclysm of political events. While the Korean War was at its height the Indian intelligence agencies encouraged the formation of Jana Sang on 21st October, 1951, Abdullah realized that Jana Sang was another name of R. S. S. organization that was responsible for assassination of

Gandhi on 30th January, 1948. He realized that the Govt. of India was also encouraging Jana Sang in Jammu district of Kashmir. Abdullah expressed his fears in a public speech on 11th April, 1952, Nehru on Abdullah's public speech gave vent to his rage in his letter of April 23rd, 1952, written to Abdullah by commenting, "if you feel as you do then the link that has bound us together necessarily weaken and I have little heart left to discuss such matters." What did he mean when he said "I have little heart to discuss such matters?" Did Abdullah reflect on these words? Abdullah realized that he had no choice in the matter. Under compulsion of circumstances Abdullah met Nehru in June, 1952. He was asked to accept what is now known as Delhi Agreement. Two points were emphasized in this agreement

- (a) Kashmir will be allowed to have its own flag,
- (b) Union flag will fly in Kashmir, symbolizing the allegiance of National Conference and Kashmir to Union of India.

As a corollary to these two points Abdullah and Nehru also agreed that Kashmir Constituent Assembly would elect Head of the State known as Sadri-Riyasat who would hold office during the "pleasure of Indian President." Dr. Karan Singh, son of Maharaja Hari Singh was to be elected as Sadri-Riyasat. As Sadri-Riyasat [which literally means Head of the State] was to hold office at the pleasure of the president. He was to report the happenings and affairs of the Jammu and Kashmir State to the to the President of India. Instead of the President, Karan Singh was in regular correspondence with Pandith Nehru, in reporting to him the Kashmir affairs.

At the behest of the Indian intelligence agencies Praja Parishad the political party that represented the aspiration of Hindu population in Jammu region launched an agitation against the Delhi Agreement. Their slogan was that two flags and two Head of the State will not be tolerated by Hindu Dogras of Jammu. This agitation was launched to pave the way for

Abdullah's ouster from power. The president of Jana Sang at that point of time was Shyama Prasad Mukherji who in 1947 was member of the cabinet headed by Nehru. Nehru had with great subtlety devised Delhi Agreement so that Jammu Hindus, would start a public movement for ouster of Abdullah. In fact soon after Delhi Accord between Nehru and Abdullah the Praja Parishad agitation was launched in Jammu? The Jana Sang supported it? On 4th Dec. 1952, Abdullah complained to Nehru, "in the name of closer association with India they are acting in a manner which might imperil that association." What did Abdullah mean when he used the expression "imperil that Association?" The denouement to these enigmas is provided by the upshot of the Korean War and its impact upon Indian foreign Policy. We notice that in 1952, Pakistan economy had touched the Nadir. The prices of Jute and Cotton, their main exports, were falling at a rapid pace. The balance of payment was now under transformation from a previous surplus of Rs.520,000,000- to a deficit of Rs.870,000,000- and the gold and sterling reserves fell from Rs.1481,000, 000- to Rs.606,000, 000. This situation was to be seen in the light of the fact that Pakistan was also facing huge refugee problem. By the end of 1948, the migratory movement reached its peak when 6,599,000 Muslims from India chose to settle in Pakistan while 5,563,000 non-Muslims migrated to India. This situation was further complicated by the fact that in 1948, a dangerous movement for creation of Pashtunistan was continuing in N. W. F. P. Again Pakistan was involved with India after 1948 about the use of six Punjab Rivers for irrigation. The Punjab Rivers Sutlej, Beas and Ravi served both countries but India decided to use more waters from these rivers for its dams. In 1952, it was agreed by India and Pakistan, that engineers and experts of International Bank, would study the problem from the angle of reconstruction and development. In these circumstances Pakistan decided to support U. S. A. in Korean War. Pakistan had no other choice in the matter. This was a matter of Life and Death for Pakistan for its own survival.

Friendly relations with U. S. meant that Pakistan would also co-operate with Western Powers against U.S.S.R. India realized that henceforth Pakistan would not implode due to economic pressures. This was the most conclusive upshot of the Korean War. India realized that Pakistan would now exist and play the role of a front line State for U.S. in South Asia.

India also realized that Pakistan would prefer to join various defence pacts with U. S. and receive considerable economic aid. So situation was now completely changed. Nehru now wanted complete integration of Kashmir with India. The Korean War had shattered the Indian dream that Pakistan would cease to exist or vanish from South Asia under economic pressures. Indian politicians now realized that Pakistan was now a reality. India had to backtrack on the assurances of plebiscite given to the people of Kashmir. The New Kashmir policy of India was now aimed at full economic integration of Kashmir. The Jammu Praja Parishad was founded by an R. S. S. activist Balraj Madhoke who was in confidence of Maharaja Hari Singh and Sardar Patel, the Home Minister of India. Pundit Prem Nath Dogra, a trusted man of Maharaja Hari Singh, was its president. In May, 1951, the proposal to convoke constituent Assembly was made. The Praja Parishad deliberately boycotted the elections to the constituent Assembly. All the seventy two members were elected unopposed. Sheikh Abdullah realized what it meant. It meant the first move towards full integration of J & K State with India was afoot. On November, 1950, on the inauguration of the Assembly, Abdullah was compelled to plead for autonomy within Indian Union. He publicly declared in his speech (to quote his own words), "with the exception of items grouped under defence, foreign affairs and communications in the instrument of accession we have complete freedom to frame our constitution in the manner we like while safeguarding our autonomy to the fullest extent. [Unquote].

Karan Singh, the son of Hari Singh, was elected as Sadri-Riyasat on 15th Nov. 1952, for a five years term. The drama of Constituent Assembly ratifying Kashmir's accession to India was enacted with great finesse in contextual concordance the main Indian objectives. The teleological purpose of all these Indian objectives was focused on undoing partition and reinstituting one India. In July, 1948, when U. N. commission visited New Delhi Nehru had a long discourse with Joseph Korbel, the father of Madlene Albright former U.S. Secretary of State. According to Joseph Korbel Nehru on a special lunch party confidentially told him, "When I lunched with Mr. Nehru he talked freely and fully about the problem." It does not correspond with our mentality to wage wars, he said. We had the British here for 150 years and fought for our independence by peaceful means and not by arms. Now that we have achieved our goal we find we must fight against people who for so many years have lived here with us. We have always been for United India but when we saw no other solution than partition we accepted it. It should be so natural to have with Pakistan the closest possible co-operation. We want to co-operate and work towards co-operation and one day integration will be inevitable come. If it will be in four, five or ten years I do not know. Unquote. [See Danger in Kashmir by Joseph Korbel, page 127, 1954 Edition]. Nehru was convinced that Pakistan would again confederate with India. In this situation Sheikh Abdullah could not comprehend that he was being utilized as a pawn to achieve this purpose of unification of India. Nehru deliberately against the wishes of powerful congress leaders like Sardar Patel, Kirpalani, and others encouraged him to adopt a Kashmir centric political movement, that was aimed at the ouster of Hari Singh who was a symbol of Hindu Dogra aspirations. He calculated that ouster of Maharaja would widen the gulf between Jammu and Kashmir region. Nehru wanted this divide to become unbridgeable. He proposed Delhi Agreement in 1952, with the suggestion that Kashmir should have its own flag and Sadri-Riyasat. This mobilized the Hindus of

Jammu region who had at his behest launched the Praja Parishad agitation for full integration of Kashmir. Nehru earlier over ruled Sardar Patel and others who opposed the Land Reforms, proposed by Sheikh Abdullah. Nehru knew that the Monasteries in Ladakh owned huge landed property and proposed Land Reforms would induce Ladakhis to oppose the Kashmiri Rule of Sheikh Abdullah. Joseph Korbel has succinctly summed up the situation in Ladakh in June, 1952, in these terse words: "The Head Lama of Ladakh, Kaushuk Bakola, is a member of the constituent Assembly in Srinagar but from time to time he likes to assert his independent position and to promote the slogan 'Ladakh for Ladakhis'. Towards the end of 1949, however, he saw the communist shadow sliding over Tibet. He then declared that people of Ladakh were growing anxious about the security of their Land and their culture and religion. This menace from outside is threatening not only Ladakh but the whole of Jammu and Kashmir State and pleaded with Srinagar for appropriate defence measures. When however, he began to realize his position between the 'Devil of Land Reform and deep blue sea of communist Rule in Tibet that might engulf him he began to put increased emphasis on the claim of autonomy within India. But should this fail he warned in June, 1952, Ladakh may seek political union with Tibet as a last course left to us. Unquote. [See Danger in Kashmir, page 230]. The policies of Pandit Nehru were to polarise Hindu, Muslim population in J&K State, so that an independent Kashmir remained politically unattainable objective.

In this backdrop of facts we find that Sheikh Abdullah was really striving for an autonomous Kashmiri speaking Kashmir valley. It was Nehru who encouraged him to pursue this course. India would agree to an independent Kashmir valley only if Pakistan, India and Kashmir confederated once again and overtly created one India. India had to encourage Sheikh Abdullah to pursue the dream of an independent linguistic State of Kashmir as India was also encouraging at that time Sheikh Mujeeb-ur Rehman in East Pakistan to pursue the creation of

Bangla Desh. India was at that period also supporting Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan to strive for an independent linguistically homogenized Pushtoonistan. Nehru's real aim was, dismemberment of Pakistan. Dismembered Pakistan under economic compulsion would confederate with India, was his logic.

In his telegram Cipher 1116/ 29th Oct., 1947, Symonds the British High Commissioner in New Delhi sent a Cablegram to London intimating that V. P. Menon, the Secretary of State in India a trusted Protege of Sardar Patel, the Home Minister of India, suggested to him that one of the possible solutions of Kashmir imbroglio could be joint administration of Jammu and Kashmir State. It was in pursuance of this policy Nehru was utilizing Sheikh Abdullah as a pawn on the chess board of Indo-Pak politics. At this stage we would take a bird's eye view of Indian policy towards East Pakistan. Sheikh Mujeeb-ur Rehman who represented Bengali Muslim aspirations wanted to establish a fully homogenized autonomous East Pakistan. His movement for an autonomous linguistic State commenced in 1951. The British policy till 1946 was to disallow the entry of East Pakistani Muslims in civil services. Why? In 1947 there was only one East Pakistani in Indian Civil Service. Why? In police force no East Pakistani could hold higher ranks. Why? The British did not develop the railways in East Pakistan. Why? Only slow moving river communications were allowed. Why? Then came the partition of India. The British saw to it that all resources from East Pakistan were taken to Calcutta. Why? Simply the aim was to feed Calcutta's vast industry. Some Muslims of West Pakistan also owned industries in East Pakistan and many Biharis migrated to East Pakistan. The entire industry in East Pakistan in 1947 was in the hand of Hindu industrialists who migrated to West Bengal. So after 1947 till 1953 no industrial development took place in East Pakistan. So East Pakistan began to get disillusioned. Nehru knew this situation. It was his policy to support the spread of disillusionment in East Pakistan. Pakistan and India during the period 1947-1953 could not reach a consensus on the question of Evacuee Prop-

erty Laws to be enforced by two countries with regard to East Pakistan. This was a deliberate ploy. It encouraged wealth drain from East Pakistan into India. Pakistan had no choice in 1952 but to employ army for anti-smuggling drive officially known as "Operation Jute" in Eastern Pakistan. The economic misery in East Pakistan was proliferating. From 1947 to 1953 according to official estimates published by Pakistan and not denied by India some 800 million rupees in terms of foreign exchange were annually taken to West Bengal. East Pakistan was also a victim of educational backwardness. According to S. M. Ikram [see his book 'Modern Muslim India and Birth of Pakistan' published by Ashraf, Lahore, and Page 327]: at the time of partition:

- (a) 95% of the 1290 high schools and
 - (b) 47 colleges existed in East Bengal.
 - (c) Were privately organized and financed by Hindus.
- Unquote.

British apathy towards East Pakistan from 1857 till 1946 is simply inexplicable. Oxford History of India, has offered no explanation about British apathy towards East Bengal. It was a part of Indian foreign policy to support Sheikh Mujeeb-ur Rehman as a Symbol of Bengali nationalism since 1951 when he first led demonstrations against West Pakistanis. As such Nehru as a matter of sustaining Indian foreign policy had also to encourage Sheikh Abdullah to publicly advocate the cause of independent Kashmir. Independent Kashmir slogan would also induce Bengalis to strive for Bangladesh. Nehru was killing two birds with one stone. Kashmir could only exist as an independent Kashmir if there was a confederation of India, Pakistan and Kashmir. Nehru had inculcated this idea in the mind of Abdullah as one of the options for resolution of Kashmir dispute. On 5th Nov., 1950, the constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was inaugurated by Abdullah who in his inaugural address made the following telling observations: "We have to consider the alternative of making ourselves an East-

ern Switzerland of keeping aloof from both States [India and Pakistan] but having friendly relations with them. This may seem attractive in that it would appear to pave the way out of the present deadlock. To us as a tourist country it could also have certain obvious advantages. But in considering independence we must not ignore practical considerations. Firstly, it is not easy to protect sovereignty and independence in a small country which has not sufficient strength to defend itself on our long and difficult frontiers bordering so many countries. Secondly, we do not find powerful guarantors among them to pull together always in assuring us freedom from aggression." Unquote.

What did Sheikh Abdullah mean when he said, "Powerful guarantors among them?"

Among them meant the two countries India and Pakistan. They could guarantee the existence of an independent Kashmir only if they confederated with each other. This is the same idea that V. P. Menon had suggested to Mr. Symmond, the British High Commissioner in Delhi on 29th Oct., 1947. In 1953, the idea of India and Pakistan confederating in the manner suggested by Abdullah became an impossibility due to the different policies pursued by India and Pakistan with regard to U.S.S.R in Asia. The Korean war rejuvenated the Pakistan economy enabling it to exist as an independent state. The cold war between U. S. S. R and U. S. had entered into a new phase. Korean War ended in June, 1953. At that time the foreign policy of Pakistan was being conducted by very able and astute Sir Mohd Zaffar Ullah Khan. He encouraged Pakistan to have:

- (a) Co-operation with Common-Wealth Countries,
- (b) To get elected to Security Council which it got elected in December, 1953
- (c) To support U. S. policies.

As such in April, 1954, an agreement was signed with Turkey an ally of the U. S. for collaboration in economic field. In May, 1954, an agreement was signed with U. S. for obtain-

ing military aid. In December, 1954, Sir Zaffar Ullah had to quit Pakistan on the ground of belonging to Qadyani sect but his foreign policy had ensured the stability of Pakistan consequently giving a death knell to the concept of India, Pakistan and Kashmir confederation. India would hence forth openly collaborate with U. S. S. R. and strive to gain the leadership of non-aligned countries. Nehru realized that now in view of changed political scenario the idea of India, Pakistan and Kashmir confederation was impossibility. He now considered Sheikh Abdullah a political illiterate, as a political burden, and took steps to oust him power. The policy of Congress since 1930 was to woo Kashmiri Muslims. In pursuance of this avowed policy the Muslim congress Leader Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in 1929 advised the influential grandson of the Muslim cleric Shah Muhammad, Maulana Habib-ur Rehman who had joined congress to form Majlis Ahrar in Punjab. Shah Muhammad was the most prominent cleric of Punjab who had issued a Fatwa declaring Sir Syed Ahmed Khan as a Kafir. The aims and objects of the Ahrar Party declared: "unyielding opposition to the establishment of Pakistan." The point to be noticed is that these objectives were announced by Ahrars in 1929. The idea of Muslim homeland was first adumbrated by Dr. Iqbal in 1930 when he presided over the annual session of Muslim League in Allahabad. Ahrar Party in Punjab would be the bitterest opponent of the All India Muslim League in Punjab and if Muslim insurrection erupted in Kashmir it would empathize with Kashmiri Nationalism and channalise it towards supporting the cause of secularism propounded by Indian National Congress. The British on their part were fully satisfied that the Kashmir Committee in Punjab, that would lend its full succour to the cause of Kashmiri Muslims in Kashmir, would be led by an Ahmadi, who was the son of the founder of the Mirzai cult of Muslims. Loyalty to British Raj was an article of faith, for these Qadyanis. British knew that Ahrar who represented Puritan Islam and were infact a political wing of the All India Congress, would oppose the influence of Qadyani's in

Kashmir politics. They would support the the Kashmiri Muslim insurrection against Dogras on the religious plea of helping Kashmiri Muslims but with the real aim of excluding the Qadyani influence in Kashmir. This in turn would enable the Congress to channalise Kashmiri Muslim Nationalism. The Kashmiri pundits who were employees in the British Residency in Srinagar seem to have got the scent of the impending Kashmiri Muslim insurrection against Dogra Rule. That is why Prem Nath Bazaz an important Kashmiri Pundit social activist in 1930 itself sought the guidance of Mr. M. K. Gandhi as to how to deal with the problem of awakening of Kashmiri consciousness amongst Kashmiri Muslims. No historian can explain away this chronological sequence of events by merely attributing the same to the eventuation of unexpected coincidences of desultory happenstance. I would conclude this chapter with an observation of Eric Hobsbawn who said, "Yet the fact remains that history has moved away from description and narrative to analysis and explanation from concentrating on the unique and individual to establishing regularities and to generalization. In a sense the traditional approach has been turned upside down." Unquote.

One conclusion we can safely draw is that Kashmir's struggle for freedom in 1930, was engineered by Nehru and Gandhi so that the idea of Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims would not be actualised, and Kashmir the Muslim dominated would side with Hindu India, debunking Jinnah's two nation theory that was the ideological foundation of the State of Pakistan.

[CHAPTER - VII]

On 9th August 1953, according to a meticulous well thought out plan Karan Singh the Head of the State in exercise of his constitutional powers, dismissed Sheikh Abdullah from the office of Prime Minister of J & K State. The second order authorized his detention in prison. Both orders were carried out with great precision. Sheikh Abdullah was put under arrest.

In Kashmir it was widely believed that Nehru was the author of this conspiracy. The purpose was obvious. Nehru wanted that Sheikh Abdullah should be presented to the world as symbol Kashmiri Nationalism. He wanted at this stage the apotheosis of Abdullah from Zero to Hero. The arrest would transform Abdullah into a living icon. Now, he being the voice of the people, Pakistan would be compelled by the unexpected evens, to support Abdullah. Kashmiri Nationalism striving for an independent Kashmir Valley would become a vibrant force. The consequences of Pakistan offering material, moral and political support to Kashmiri ethnic patriots would provide justification to India to openly support the militant Bengali Nationalism in East Pakistan. Pakistan being a geographical absurdity would encourage India to intervene militarily in East Pakistan to bring about the dismemberment of Pakistan. This policy was fully supported and endorsed by U.S.S.R. The Indian attitude towards Kashmiri Nationalism is to be seen in the light of events eventuating in East Pakistan. Nehru was not averse to a semi independent Kashmir only if Pakistan under compulsion of circumstances would confederate with India. That stage of confederation would be reached when first Pakistan was dismembered. The new state of Bangla Desh would be totally dependent on India. This was the Corner-stone of the Indian Foreign Policy. Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman was also

in league with the Government of India. Some events in East Pakistan may be noticed at this stage. There were according to census of the Pak Government, some near about 50,00,000 Hindus in East Pakistan whose loyalty was to West Bengal in India. One thousand miles of Indian Territory separated the two wings i.e., the East and West Pakistan. Pakistan realized the difficulties of unification of East and West Wing. According to Anthony Mascarenhas the author of "Rape of Bangladesh" in 1958, Pakistan Cabinet formally considered a proposal by President Iskander Mirza for confederation with Afghanistan and Iran. This shows that the foreign policy of Pakistan was grounded on the premise:

- (a) that it would never confederate with India and
- (b) If it had to confederate it would prefer to confederate with Iran and Afghanistan. The dismemberment of Bangladesh [East Pakistan] was envisioned by the political class in Pakistan that constituted the Federal Government. Seeds of conflict were already sown in East Pakistan. Liyaqat Ali Khan realized the implications of the Indian game of supporting Bengali Nationalism. The Bengali leadership wanted:
 - (i) that East Pakistan should be linguistically oriented State,
 - (ii) and economic disparities between East and West Pakistan should enable East Pakistan to have an autonomous status with right to Foreign Trade.

Liyaqat Ali Khan proposed a bi-cameral legislature at the Centre. He insisted that, In this bicameral legislature East and West Pakistan would have equal representation. Soon thereafter, Liyaqat Ali Khan was assassinated under a conspiracy that still is a mystery. Liyaqat Ali Khan was aware that 56% of the Pakistan population lived in East Pakistan. The two could exist as a confederation but not as one state. Khawaja Nizam-uddin could not translate this policy into reality in 1952. Even in 1953, a similar proposal from Mohd. Ali Bogra could not be

worked out for the reason that before he could achieve his purpose, he was turned out of office. No body has identified the behind the scene lobbies that got Liaqat Ali Khan assassinated or saw to it that Mohd. Ali Bogra was given the boot.

These events from 1947-1953 in East Pakistan were also responsible in influencing the thinking of Nehru. He supported Mujeeb-ur-Rehman led Bengali language Agitation in East Pakistan that reached its climax in 1952. This agitation was having the full backing of the entire Indian think-tank. Realizing the danger that Bengali Muslim Politics was being manipulated by Indian Politicians, Pakistan government made an official declaration that Bengali language shall be on par with Urdu. Unfortunately the economic situation in West Pakistan during 1950-1955 was on a downhill course. In the period 1950 to 1955, Pakistan had to spend a sizeable amount on its defence. The East Pakistan received only twenty percent of development expenditure, although the population of East Pakistan was showing an increase of 2.9 % during this period. The inference that India was supporting Bengali nationalism is based upon the official statement of Prime Minister of Pakistan, on May 17th 1952, that East Pakistani disturbances were a result of "Foreign Conspiracy". India never denied this charge. On the other hand to create a ground for independent Bengal State India in May, 1954, was also encouraging Sheikh Abdullah to envision an independent Kashmir. On August 4th 1954 unprecedented floods devastated East Pakistan. Due to economic misery Bengali separatism was turning militant. On the other hand according to Mr. B.N. Mullick, the head of Indian Intelligence, the disturbances following the arrest of Abdullah lasted for nearly three weeks only. Thereafter, people resorted to a peaceful agitation. People realised Independent Kashmir was a nebulous concept. The Indian policy to neutralize, militant Kashmir nationalism, was based on the view that a policy of economic betterment of a class of people in Kashmir would be profitable. This class due to material benefits would support India. Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad was chosen by India to be

the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir to execute this policy. Abdullah in his autobiography "*Atish Chinari*" has remarked that Nehru "was not happy at my continuing detention. On one pretext or the other, Bakshi, managed to avoid it. Being basically fair minded, Jawaharlal, started realizing, that my captivity was due to no fault of mine." This assessment is correct. Nehru arrested Abdullah so that a movement for independent Kashmir could originate in Kashmir. As Pakistan would support this movement, India would get a justification for intervening in East Pakistan. India would agree to an independent Kashmir that would confederate with it. Kashmiri nationalism was being manipulated by Indian Intelligence agencies with this sinister objective. Kashmiri nationalism was a nothing but a marvel of Indian political engineering aimed to destroy Pakistan. Mir Qasim, Ex chief Minister in his biography has pointed out that Abdullah was arrested on 9th August, 1953, and just two days thereafter instructions were received from New Delhi that contacts should be re-established with him by Kashmir government. Mr. G.M Sadiq who later became the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State was the points man chosen by India to hold negotiation with Abdullah. Pakistan keeping in view, these ground realities signed a pact with U.S in May, 1954 for obtaining military assistance. Pakistan also became a party to South-East Asia defence treaty and in March, 1956, joined the council of CETO, which held a special session in Karachi. In September, 1955, Pakistan had along with Turkey, Iraq and Britain signed the Middle-East defence treaty-popularly known as Baghdad pact. Indian efforts to militarily intervene and destabilize Pakistan were to some extent thwarted by these pacts of mutual defence. India also realized that hence forth it would have to greatly rely upon U.S.S.R for dismemberment of Pakistan. In 1954 Nehru wrote to Mohd. Ali Bogra the Prime Minister of Pakistan that India in view of the military pact between Pakistan and United States now was not bound to honour its commitments about Kashmir. The real question is about Indian

mind set. This mind set is explained in succinct words. Indian Journalist G.C Thomas in these words:

"The Muslim nationalist in Pakistan, who, ardently supported Jinnah's Two nation theory would prefer instead to see greater Islamic State whereby Pakistan would confederate with other Muslim states, west of Sub-continent in Central Asia and Middle East. This is perceived as logical extension of the creation of Pakistan. The utility of Central Treaty Organization signed in 1955 that brought about Pakistan, Iran and Turkey together under Western Sponsored military Pact against Communism, was seen by Pakistan more in terms of Collaboration, this produced among three non Arabic Islamic States. Not surprisingly Pakistan was the main mover behind the several programs of the Regional Co-operation for Development - Ceto's subsidiary economic Organisation- although the interests of Iran and Turkey were more polite and lukewarm. Both the Organizations were eventually terminated following the overthrow of Shah of Iran in 1979. On the other hand the Hindu Nationalist would prefer to see a narrower Hindu State called Hindutva, where religious minorities would be subservient to Hindu interests." Unquote. See "*The Book Perspectives on Kashmir*" Edited by Raju G.C. Thomas (page 35).

The emergence of Muslim block was perceived by India as a threat to Indian Security. The dismemberment of Pakistan became the Chief objective of Indian politics. Retention of Kashmir by India became imperative to show case its secularism. The Kashmiri nationalism was only to be manipulated to justify India supporting Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan. It was realised that after dismemberment of Pakistan a confederation consisting of India, rump Pakistan and Kashmir would be formed and later it would incorporate other neighbouring SAARC Countries. This policy objective followed by India since 1947 created concern in U.S. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State in the U.S. visited Delhi in May, 1953. He urged,

"(a) bilateral agreement with Pakistan on Kashmir

- (b) that would be outside the U.N. or,
- (c) some sort of partition of Kashmir."

Abdullah was arrested on 9th August, 1953, and immediately in the same month of August Mohd Ali Bogra, Pak Prime Minister came to visit New Delhi. India gave the impression that it was eager to resolve Kashmir dispute. However, a war with Pakistan was being contemplated by the Indian think tank. This situation compelled Pakistan to enter into a military Pact with U.S. India immediately back-tracked on its assurances given to Bogra. Nehru now advocated the theory that in May, 1954, U.S. Pak military pact had altered the "entire context of the Indo Pak relations." The context was confederation between "India, Pakistan and Kashmir". The U.S had assured India that military aid to Pakistan would be limited and would never enable it to alter the *status quo* in Kashmir militarily. In this backdrop we have to appreciate the non-alignment policy touted by India at that period. The aim was to assure the United States that

- (a) India's Pro U.S.S.R policies were only a facade. In fact the non-alignment movement would contain Russia, and only, further U.S interests in South Asia.
- (b) Non-Alignment would be used to fetter U.S.S.R's ambitions in Asia.

This was a pharisaical political attitude of deluding both U.S and U.S.S.R. India was doing a balancing act and playing a dual role by being loyal to both U.S and U.S.S.R. This dual policy in fact enabled India to invite Bulganin and Krushchev to visit Kashmir in December 1955. The two Russian leaders visited Srinagar on 9th. December 1955. On 10th. December Krushchev made a public declaration that Kashmir was an integral part of India. India was assured that U.N resolution on Kashmir had become non-implementable, as U.S.S.R would now, veto, any security resolution on Kashmir. India and U.S.S.R thought that Bangladesh now had to emerge after the dismemberment of Pakistan. This was the understanding

reached between the Indian leaders and the U.S.S.R leadership in 1955. The upshot of this policy was: that Indian contemplated, that it was very essential:

- (a) To engineer a Kashmiri Nationalist movement that would have support of most of the domestic nationalist Indian parties convincing Abdullah and Kashmiri leadership that they would achieve their goal of independence or greater autonomy if they pursued their agitation in a constitutional manner, abandoning any armed struggle against India.
- (b) All Indian secular and nationalist parties had evolved a consensus on Indian policies in Kashmir. They would emphasise and support Abdullah's quest for greater autonomy, so that Kashmiris are not driven to the wall, or in frustration resort to Armed struggle. Rather Kashmiris were assured that India wanted Kashmir, India, Pakistan confederation to emerge at an appropriate time in future.
- (c) India, in the meantime was to forge secret links with Sheikh Mujeeb ur Rehman, the symbol of Bengali nationalism, and assure him of military help incase, the Bengalis for seeking a Bangladesh resorted to an armed struggle against Pakistan. Nehru in pursuance of this policy was eager to release Sheikh Abdullah in 1955. However, a cautious approach was adopted. Sheikh Abdullah's most trusted lieutenant Mirza Afzal Beigh was first released in 1955. He was encouraged by the socialists and other secular leaders of various Indian Nationalist Parties to form an Organisation known as Kashmir Plebiscite Front that would strive for securing the right to self determination for people of Kashmir in a constitutional manner denouncing any armed struggle in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah in the mean- while was to be offered reconciliation by the Central Government. In 1956, Nehru wrote several letters to Dr. Karan Singh

who was then the Sadri-Riyasat of J & K, alluding to the Possibility of Sheikh Abdullah's release from Prison. A bunch of these letters are contained in the book "Selected correspondence between Nehru and Karan Singh". It goes to the great credit of Pakistan Army, that it was alive to the situation. As the very existence of Pakistan was in jeopardy in October 1958, General Mohd Ayub Khan captured political Power in Pakistan. Army alone could succeed in keeping East and West Pakistan as one Unit. Pakistan army realized that serious differences had cropped up between U.S.S.R and China. Communist world was not a monolithic giant. India was close to U.S.S.R but it had not succeeded in resolving its border dispute with China. Ayub Khan realized that U.S was also closely monitoring the turn of events especially the conflicts inherent in Sino-Soviet border problems. The U.S was also monitoring the situation from a totally different angularity. The Sino-Indian border dispute could now result in an out break of a Sino-India border war. If this war eventuated then Nehru would turn to West for military assistance. This was also the period when India decided to play a dual role. The Communist Party of India held a special session in January, 1955 and openly declared to support the policies of Nehru who advocated non-alignment. Non-alignment was touted to create a bridge between U.S.S.R and the U.S. It was double-barrelled instrument. Moscow found this convenient. Under instructions from Moscow the Communist Party of India was to take a low profile. In elections of 1951-1952, the workers of Communist Party worked hard so that Indian National Congress and Socialist Party recaptured the support of the workers. Communists in these elections could only seek 27 seats out of 497 in the House of People and only 12 seats in the Council of States. Congress-Communist collision was exposed by Dr. Satya Narain Sinha in his

speech in June, 1952 in Indian Parliament. In point of fact, he accused the Communist Party of India, of being an agent of the Moscow. Dr. Sinha was a former Pro-Soviet Indian Leader. What takes the cake is, the fact, that he openly claimed that Communists had infiltrated the Indian Ministry of Defence. Sheikh Abdullah's dismissal was done with the concordance of Ministry of Defence This policy to engineer an independent Kashmir movement would allow opportunity to India to encourage Sheikh Mujeeb-ur Rehman to launch a struggle for Bangladesh.

The Socialist Party was empathizing with Sheikh Abdullah so that he forms a Plebiscite Front that would mobilize Kashmiri Public opinion on separatism but will prevent them from an armed struggle against India. This policy was to translate into reality the basic idea of Kashmir, India, Pakistan confederation. India realized that this was possible because Pro-U.S.S.R elements had also infiltrated the ranks of policy makers in East Pakistan. This inference arises from the result of elections in March, 1954 in East Pakistan. We find that :

- (a) Virtually in March, 1954, elections in East Pakistan people Voted enbloc against the emergence of Muslim League. This showed the manifest separatism of the Bengalee People.
- (b) People voted in favour of the United Front that was more Sympathetic to Bengali aspirations of a linguistic State.
- (c) Communists secured large number of seats out of 309 seats with the help of Hindu Bengali voters. These Hindu Bangalee voters of East Pakistan always looked for inspiration towards India.

Sheikh Mujeeb ur Rehman the leader who represented and symbolized Bengalee nationalism was in league with India and U.S.S.R . Pakistan on 5th. July, 1954 banned the Communist Party in East Pakistan. Later on 24th July, 1954, the Commu-

nist Party was banned in West Pakistan also. Pakistan had no other choice.

The Indian National Congress at grass root levels was an amalgam of the workers of R.S.S who had been absorbed into it in pursuance to the advice of Sardar Vallab Bhai Patel, the Congress leader, who was very close to Golwalkar the R.S.S chief. Thereafter the communist workers also infiltrated the Congress at the behest of Moscow, especially from June 1952 onwards. Now the Indian National Congress had a wing that represented the Hindu aspirations, called the rightist wing and a section called leftists who advocated socialism and non-alignment. Nehru was the cementing force between the rightist and the leftist segments of the party. Both wings showed complete concordance with the idea of a Unified India. All other Indian nationalist parties were also unanimous that Pakistan should be dismembered, to create once again a unified India. The dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 was to secure two political objectives:-

- (a) the financial integration of the Jammu and Kashmir State with Union of India, was rapidly to be achieved and
- (b) the ratification of the instrument of accession by Kashmir Constituent Assembly was to be got done immediately, so that India could thereafter provide full succour to the Bengali secessionist movement in East Pakistan, without worrying about Kashmir.

These two objectives were achievable. Already India had succeeded in bringing about the :-

- (a) "failure of Dixon Plan" and,
- (b) failure of efforts by British Common Wealth for a joint Indo-Pak Force to monitor plebiscite in jammu & Kashmir State.
- (c) India also engineered the complete failure of Dr. Frank Graham Mission. Graham submitted, in point of fact, five reports to the U.N, Security Council without any

outcome. In 1956, the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly ratified the instrument of accession executed between Maharaja and the Govt. of India. It declared in Nov., 1957, "The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall remain an integral part of the Union of India." From 1955 to 1957, the role of Plebiscite Front was that of a protest Organisation, that would only issue public statements demanding right to self-determination for the people of Kashmir. No active movement was visible in Kashmir. This was the period also when Govt. of India provided massive financial aid to the stooge Bakshi government. The purpose of this financial aid was two fold:

- (a) massive construction of Roads and Bridges that would be useful to the Indian Armed forces, by enhancing their mobility.
- (b) To bring about economic development in Kashmir, so that people of Kashmir realized that they are better off in India, than in Pakistan.
- (c) India also wanted to create a class of contractors, Orchardists, and traders, who would have an economic and vested interest to support Pro-India Bakshi regime in Kashmir. In 1958, when Ayub Khan met Nehru, he found to his dismay that Nehru advocated that Kashmir was only one of the issues to be settled. If Kashmir conflict was to be resolved, India and Pakistan, will first have to settle all other out-standing disputes. Ayub realized that Indian policy was that no change should take place; so far geographical boundaries of India are concerned. Ayub realized that U.N. was totally paraplegic due to cold war rivalries. In retrospect, we now better understand, why India deliberately, under the advice of Lord Mount Batten referred the Kashmir dispute to the U.N. Reference of Kashmir dispute to U.N was not due to error of judgment by Nehru. It was a

part of a larger diabolical plan. No doubt ostensibly Mount Batten supported this demarche, but Kashmiris suspect that India also was in league with U.S.S.R who supported this political movement to protract resolution of Kashmir dispute.

Kashmiri suspicious in this behalf are grounded upon following backdrop facts:

- (a) In 1942 Britain and U.S.S.R. had become allies in their War against Germany
- (b) British intelligence connived at the escape of the National Congress Leader Subhash Chander Bose to Afghanistan.
- (c) From Afghanistan Subhash Chander Bose and his party went to Moscow, they established some links with the U.S.S.R government. Bose, was a true patriot who never approved of Nehru's double dealing with both U.S and U.S.S.R.
- (d) Be that as it may, the fact remains that in 1942 itself 50 prominent leaders of communist party joined Congress. Since 1947 these Leftist Congress members were in the driver's seat. In 1950, itself Soviet Union Started Constructions of Air-Fields on the "EDGE OF SINKAING - KASHMIR-SOVIET BORDERS" at the urging of Indian national Congress leaders.
- (e) Nehru deliberately with a definite political purpose supported by U.S.S.R referred the Kashmir dispute to U.N. The purpose was obvious. To delay the resolution of Kashmir dispute. To utilize the interregnum for dismemberment of Pakistan. To engineer a Confederation of India, Pakistan Bangladesh. Kashmir nationalism would be manipulated, to join this confederation. We discover that Nehru who was already having some tacit understanding with U.S.S.R did not invoke chapter 7 of the U.N Charter, that gives mandatory powers to security council to take urgent steps to stop aggression or acts of

Aggression by any Country in the World. Nehru deliberately invoked chapter No.6 of the U.N. charter that only allows mediatory role to the U.N. U.S.S.R influence is apparent on the face of Indian policies of that period. Mountbatten was only made scape-goat for this purpose. Joseph Corbel succinctly sums up the position of India in his book "Danger in Kashmir" page 181, (to quote his own words).

"On the other hand if India felt so strongly that the aggressiveness of Pakistan in Kashmir was the heart of the dispute why had she not asked the Security Council to deal with it according to chapter seven of the charter, which is concerned with "Acts of Aggression" why had she invoked only chapter six, concerning "Pacific Settlements of Disputes"?

"This may of course have been a serious error in political judgment on her part which she was now attempting to correct. But it is highly questionable whether having decided to follow one procedure, India could now legitimately insist that the Security Council could proceed only on the basis of the assumption of Pakistan "act of aggression." But finally and it would appear decisively India had already accepted as the basis for the solution of the Kashmir dispute the Commissions resolutions, which contained no direct condemnation of Pakistan and by so doing had forfeited the right to fall back on such arguments as Pakistani aggression."

"One would be more readily inclined also to understand the moral motives which underlie the Indian attitude towards the Kashmir Conflict, if they emanated from principled policy applicable to any International Situation. But if India seriously considered Pakistan to be an aggressor in Kashmir, how could she decline to see an act of clear cut aggression in the participation of Chinese troops in the war against United Nations in Korea? In the case of Kashmir, the basic premise of India's charge against Pakistan - that Kashmir was part of India has never been ruled upon by United Nations. But in the case of Korea

the U.N. had openly condemned the aggression of the North Korean Communists, it had called upon its members to assist the victim of aggression and when the Chinese forces joined in the invasion it passed a resolution branding China as aggressor. Nevertheless India refused to vote for the resolution." [Unquote].

I have excerpted this lengthy quotation from the book "Danger in Kashmir" to emphasize the point that India deliberately accepted the U.N resolutions and deliberately forfeited its right to fall back on such arguments as Pakistani aggression" only because its basic policy was to bring about a situation of procrastination. The reason is apparent from the following remarks of Joseph Corbel at page 32 of his book "In Delhi, this suspicion was evidenced by a pronounced and unconcealed contempt towards, Pakistan the very existence of which Nehru found it difficult to accept" Unquote. Even today this is the Crux of Indo-Pakistan problems. India pursued a policy of supporting ethnic strife within Pakistan. Massive material support was given by India to Afghanistan and Pukhtoon tribals for establishment of a Pukhtoon state. The relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan had touched the nadir, The two countries had broken of diplomatic relations in the year 1955. They were actually on the brink of a War. The Propaganda of Punjabi domination of East Pakistan was engineered by India. The internal domestic situation in Pakistan had become precarious from 1947 till 1952. Pakistan, saw the rise and fall of seven Prime-Ministers. The first Prime Minister Liyaqat Ali Khan was assassinated at a Public meeting in Rawalpindi. Later Indian government gave political asylum to his widow, who, lived on a political pension in Srinagar. This also gravid wit great signification.

He was succeeded, not by a Punjabi but a Bengali Muslim leader Khawaja Nizam -ud-din. His vacillations on policy decision on East Pakistan led to his dismissal. He was succeeded by Mohd Ali Bogra a Bengali gentleman, but who could not

reconcile the differences within Pakistani establishment. He was replaced by Chowdhry Mohd Ali, who wanted to reach an understanding with Hussian Shaheed Suharwardhy of East Pakistan on the question of parity of East Pakistan with West Pakistan. He gave Pakistan its first Constitution that had the support of the Awami League of East Pakistan. As a logical sequence, he made way for Mr. H.S. Suharwardhy the Veteran Bengali leader to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The Politics of Suharwardhy were at variance with the aspirations of the people of West Pakistan. He was then replaced by a Mahajir, Chundrigar, an unknown Bombay barrister as a stop gap measure. Chundrigar resigned after forty days and was replaced by Malik Feroze Khan Noon. I have stated these facts to focus attention on the question, that Nehru's policies towards Kashmir were dictated largely by the political uncertainty that prevailed within Pakistan. All the Indian moves regarding Kashmir's integration with India especially financial integration, were planned keeping in view the political instability within Pakistan. The policy of balkanization of Pakistan had, full U.S.S.R support. The Russian Policy was clear as broad day light. It would physically invade Afghanistan slice Pakistan and obtain the Gawadar, warm water port for itself. Nehru's policies in Kashmir were a part of this grandiose plan. The balkanization of Pakistan in 1958 was imminent. In retrospect it seems, it is an irony of fate, that Nehru's far sight on Kashmir, omitted to notice one important historical fact. In 1946, it was the enthusiasm of Muslim soldiers in British Army that compelled British to accept the reality of Pakistan as a homeland for Muslims. In 1948, the Pakistan army thwarted the Indian designs to secure strategic locations, near West Pakistan. Now, in 1958, the same Pakistan Army stepped in, to save the situation and save Pakistan from balkanization. On 7th. October, 1958 under compulsion of circumstance, the Army under the leadership of Gen. Ayub took over the reigns of Govt. in Pakistan. Pakistani Army realized that U.S.S.R was trying to get strategic depth in Afghanistan. Its next aim was

balkanization of Pakistan. The people of Pakistan realized this situation, and for the next ten years fully supported Army rule in Pakistan. Nehru also realized that now Sheikh Abdullah was of no immediate use to him. He had served his utility by helping to create Plebiscite Front in Kashmir, that was a secular organization with some influential Kashmir Pundits (Non Muslims), like Mr. Kashyup Bandhu and Janki Nath Kakroo, and some Dogras of Jammu as its prominent leaders. Mirza Afzal Beg the alter-ego of Sheikh Abdullah was being guided by Mr. Jaya Prakash Narain and other Socialists leaders of India which assured that there would be no armed struggle by Kashmiri Youth against India. In this political scenario the Indian intelligence agencies infiltrated the ranks of Plebiscite Front and encouraged its leaders to establish contacts with Pakistan. A diabolical plan to involve Sheikh Abdullah in a Conspiracy case was hatched by the Indian Intelligence Chief Mr. B.N. Mullick and approved by Nehru in a highly unprincipled manner. According to B.N. Mullick the Chief of Indian intelligence by October 1957 first information report of an offence of conspiracy was formally drawn up by the concerned Police. By the month of January 1958, the entire range of conspiracy was discovered. The entire Conspiracy consisted of activities aimed at Publishing:

- (a) Inflammatory Pamphlets
- (b) Posters
- (c) News bulletins, showing how India had desecrated religious places and as a letter from the Sheikh demanding plebiscite had been smuggled out to the Security Council. It was said that inferential proof of conspiracy was established. One may ask the question, if these ridiculous charges of Sheikh - Pakistan conspiracy had any element of truth then why was Sheikh Abdullah released on 8th. January, 1958? He addressed huge public meetings advocating agitation by the people against Kashmir Government. Sheikh was rearrested on

April 30, 1958. Nehru was insisting that by the end of March, 1958, case against Abdullah should be produced in a court of law. Yet, according to Mullick "a greater disappointment awaited us, when a couple of days later Pundit Nehru decided that Sheikh Abdullah should not be prosecuted" [see the book "My years with Nehru", page 89, Allied Publishers Delhi.

The question arises if Nehru wanted that a court case should be lodged in March, 1958, why within a couple of days he decided that Sheikh Abdullah should not be implicated? Ultimately on May 21st. 1958, a complaint was filed in the court of Special Magistrate Jammu, under sections 121-A and 120-B of the Ranbir Penal Code and section 32 of the Security Rules against 25 conspirators that excluded the name of Sheikh Abdullah. The question arises why? According to the Indian Intelligence Chief in 1958 to quote his own words, "Sheikh Abdullah was also holding secret meetings in his house in which the question of demanding a plebiscite for merging the State with Pakistan, large scale enlistment of Razakars who could be imparted instructions in the handling of bombs and other arms which were being received from Pakistan and making contacts with Pakistan were planned. Large amounts of money also started coming both from the contact in the office of the Deputy High Commission of Pakistan at Chandigarh and from Pakistan direct. Some of the money was received by Begum Abdullah. How else could the propaganda and the Razakars be financed. There were no local funds from which these large expenses could be met. As things were coming to a climax and it was apparent that Sheikh was doing everything possible to join hands with Pakistan and by creating disorders in the State, to give an excuse to Pakistan to intervene directly he was rearrested on 30th April, 1958. At the time of his arrest a draft of the Plebiscite Front Resolution dated April, 7, 1958, which gave a clear call:-

- (a) for breaking ties with India and

- (b) more or less accepted accession to Pakistan as the aim of Front was recovered from his house.

The draft had many corrections in Sheikh Abdullah's own hands, proving clearly that he had taken part in its pre-partition. Unquote. Note :[this was is was Exhibit No.p-169 in the Kashmir Conspiracy case (See the Book "My years with Nehru", page 85]. In spite of this direct evidence why Nehru insisted that no case should be lodged against Abdullah in a law Court? What game was he playing? Why did M.C.Setalved, the then Attorney-General of India, with draw from this case? What role KGB of Russia had in this matter? Why 40 Co-Conspirators were not included in the charge-sheet that was filed in the Court? A supplementary charge sheet was filed in the Court on October 1958, citing Sheikh Abdullah, as an accused he was brought to the Court as an accused on 24th October, 1958. The prosecution case was closed on 17th June, 1960 in the Court of special Magistrate. On 25th January, 1962 the special Magistrate committed Sheikh Abdullah to the Court of sessions to stand trial before that Court for an offence of Conspiracy. In October 1962, Sino India border dispute resulted in a limited War in Ladakh and North Eastern Frontier districts of India in which China emerged triumphant. The U.S. ensured that Pakistan would stay neutral of in this War. Thereafter the U.S adopted a policy of massive military aid to India, and India also embarked upon a course of frantic buying of enormous quantities of arms and military equipment from all over the world. Europe was now openly supporting India and supplying huge armaments. These events have pushed Pakistan into the lap of China. Sino-Pakistan Collaboration was the only bulwark against the imminent disintegration of Pakistan. Now India's only hope was that there was still a possibility to dismember Pakistan by giving succour to the Bengali separatist movement led by Sheikh Mujeeb-ur- Rehman in East Pakistan. Of course it was realised by India, that China would ensure integrity of West Pakistan. This was the period when disillusionment in East Pakistan had reached its apogee. It is

also an irony of history, that Ayub Khan from 1958 till 1965 devoted all his efforts at development of East Pakistan. The economic development in East Pakistan was more rapid than in Indian West Bengal. So at this stage the Indian Foreign Policy was based upon:

- (a) Extending Friendship to East Pakistan
- (b) Persistent Confrontation against West Pakistan.

India realized that Sino-Pakistan friendship would be the biggest stumbling block for its policy of "India, Pakistan, Kashmir confederation". In this back drop it can be appreciated that Nehru never wanted Abdullah to be implicated in the Conspiracy case as, he was also encouraging Sheikh Mujeeb-ur Rehman to allow East Pakistan to secede from Pakistan. Charges of conspiracy by Abdullah with Pakistan were trumped up charges. The 1962 humiliating defeat of India by China in Sino-Indian war changed the entire scenario. India realized that it would have to woo Sheikh Abdullah again to his side. Bakshi Ghulam Mohd, the betenoir of Abdullah would have to be removed from the scene and G.M.Sadiq, the man who in 1953 was appointed as a points- man to hold talks with Abdullah would be appointed as the Prime Minister of Kashmir for sometime till Abdullah would be won over to Indian side. In September, 1963, Nehru wrote a letter to Bakshi Ghulam Mohd, suggesting that the conspiracy case against Abdullah be withdrawn. It is significant to notice that soon after India's debacle in Sino-Indian war of 1962, the socialist leader Jaya Prakash Narain and forty nine members of Indian Parliament wrote a letter to Nehru to use his powers as Prime Minister of India and withdraw the case filed in the Court of Session, Jammu, against Sheikh Abdullah. These incidents are not mere coincidences. They form the apercu of a definite policy. The entire Indian Parliament was supporting Nehru in quest for his India, Pakistan, and Kashmir confederation. This formula was to be presented to Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan, only, after securing the dismemberment of Pakistan by encour-

aging East Pakistan to secede from it. Bakshi was removed from the scene under Kamraj Plan, that laid down the policy that all existing Chief Ministers of different States in India, should resign and work for the party. This plan was put into execution in August, 1963. However, due to internal squabbles of National Conference a political non-entity Shamus ud-din was chosen as the leader of Legislative Party in Kashmir Assembly and he became the Prime Minister of Kashmir. On 27th December, 1963, the holy Relic (a hair of Prophet Muhammad's beard) was stolen from the Holiest Shrine of Hazratbal. The entire Kashmir rose in revolt against this act of sacrilege. Huge processions were taken out by the people raising anti-India slogans. The relic was recovered back within seven days by the Indian Intelligence agencies. Mullick gives the following account:

"I had taken every step possible to ensure the safe return of the '*Moe-Muqadas*' to its place of rest. If I failed today (4th January, 1964), there would be little chance left of its subsequent restoration. It might never be found. The consequences would be serious indeed. India's position in Kashmir would then be very difficult. And I would have let down my leader who had reposed so much trust in me. At 5 PM that day we recovered the *Moe-Muqadas*! I can not describe the process which led to its replacement at the place from which it had been removed on December 27th. This was an intelligence operation never to be disclosed." Unquote [see his book, "My years with Nehru" page 142.]

What Mullick does not know or pretends not to know, or what he considers "an intelligence operation never to be disclosed, is known to every child on the streets of Srinagar. The people are of the conviction, that the wing of Intelligence Bureau that was funded by U.S.S.R, committed this sacrilege and

the purpose was obvious. India after Sino-Chinese war of 1962 was now drifting towards U.S. The theft of holly relic in Kashmir created a (sense of insecurity) amongst Kashmiri Muslims who raised and gave full vent to their anti-India sentiment. This made India realize that despite having spent billions of rupees in Kashmir on economic upliftment the Kashmiri Muslims felt insecure within Indian Union. To retain Kashmir, India would have to rely on U.S.S.R. and as such, India was again thrown back into the lap of U.S.S.R. that wanted dismemberment of Pakistan.

The theft of holy relic had led to massive anti-India demonstrations in Kashmir. This upshot of this episode had shocked, stunned and amazed Nehru. According to Mullick, "I told him that from the spectacle that I had seen from December, 31st till the *Moe-Muqadas* was recovered, it had secured to me that Kashmir was not part of India ----- so, a new look had to be taken at Kashmir and our Kashmir Policy required a new orientation." Unquote [see page 164 of his book "My years with Nehru". The new orientation on Kashmir was that Sheikh Abdullah was to be associated, for finding a lasting solution to the Kashmir Problem. He was released from prison. He came to New Delhi met Nehru. Nehru sent him to Pakistan to persuade Pakistan to accept the Indian Formula of Kashmir, India Pakistan confederation. Nehru had not budged an inch from his well settled policy of unification of India. On this aspect India had the full support of U.S.S.R. The situation was the same that existed in 1947-48, when Jinnah told Margaret 'Bourke White' a life magazine correspondent, that if: "Russia walks in here, the whole world is menaced." (See Bourke White, Halfway to Freedom). Indian Foreign Policy was clear with regard to Pakistan.

- (a) First Pakistan would be induced to enter into a Kashmir, India-Pakistan confederation, and if it rejected this option then
- (b) India would give military help to Awami League in East

Pakistan so that Pakistan is ultimately dismembered.

Ayub Khan out-rightly rejected the option of confederation. Sheikh Abdullah had to cut short his visit to Pakistan as Nehru died on 27 May 1964, due to a massive heart-attack. Shastri became the Prime Minister of India. By now the communists had fully infiltrated the India National Congress. This situation compelled Ayub Khan to grant facility to U.S for U-2 reconnaissance flight from Peshawar over Soviet territory. One more fact that may be recalled is that people of Kashmir suspected that U.S.S.R had some hand in the theft of holy relic from Hazratbal Shrine. This situation compelled Ayub Khan to look towards China for support. In 1963, Pakistan actually demarcated its borders with China that also included territory in Northern part of Jammu And Kashmir State. This treaty with China encouraged Mr. Z.A. Bhutto of Pakistan to advocate the theory that before India engineered an armed revolt against Pakistan in Eastern wing as a pre-emptive measure, Pakistan should engineer an armed revolt against India in Kashmir. In August, 1965 armed infiltrators were sent into Kashmir to ignite a Kashmiri uprising. National Conference did not support this armed uprising. Even Afzal Beg's Plebiscite Front remained mute. On September 6, 1965 India declared War on Pakistan. At that time U.S did letdown Pakistan as it suspended the supplies of armaments to Pakistan. Now U.S. took the back seat. A U.N sponsored peace was negotiated in January 1966 at Tashkent. Soviet pressure had forced the Ayub Khan to freeze the Kashmir issue. He knew that now India would be in a position to engineer a revolt by Awami League in East Pakistan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto resigned as Foreign Minister of Pakistan on the ground that Ayub Khan had made a political surrender on Kashmir under U.S.S.R. pressure. There were widespread demonstrations against Ayub Khan's regime. He resigned in March, 1969. Yahya Khan, The army Chief of Pakistan became the President of Pakistan. Several important questions beg the answer but have not been answered so far; namely:

- (1) Why did U.S led down Pakistan in 1965 War?
- (2) Why did Ayub Khan Succumb to U.S.S.R at Tashkent?
- (3) Was there some tacit understanding between U.S.S.R and U.S.A to contain China?
- (4) Is it a fact that because Pakistan ceded some territory to China in northern areas of Kashmir, that compelled the U.S. not to support Pakistan, in its seventeen days War with India?
- (5) Why did Z.A. Bhutto resign from the Ayub Cabinet? Was he in league with China?
- (6) What was the secret understanding with China in 1963 when border was settled between Pakistan and China?
- (7) Why did Pakistan arrange a meeting between Sheikh Abdullah and Chou En Lie in 1964 in Algiers when Sheikh was returning to India after Hajj? Why did Chou En Lie invite Sheikh Abdullah to China? And on what considerations Sheikh Abdullah avoided to visit China?
- (8) What understanding India had reached with Sheikh Abdullah during 1964-1965 period? What back" track diplomacy was employed by Indian government in reaching an understanding with National Conference led by Seikh Abdullah?
- (9) Why did India take massive steps in 1965 to fully integrate Kashmir with India, by bringing about constitutional amendments of far reaching consequences? Is it India suspected imminent Chinese interference in Kashmir?

These are formidable queries and require serious considerations. Is it a fact that there was some sort of tacit understanding between U.S, India and U.S.S.R to dismember Pakistan, so that a new country Bangladesh would emerge in South Asia that would confederate with India, and, U.S would be able to encircle China?

We may or may not be able to answer these questions on the basis of available data but one thing is clear beyond doubt that Indian Intelligence Agencies succeeded in developing a liaison with the Awami League in East Pakistan. It is also an established fact that soon after 1965 Pakistan failed to achieve its economic stability. On 3rd. June, 1966, Z.A.Bhutto, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan in his speech in National Assembly charged India with "encouragement of secessionist propaganda in East Pakistan". Bhutto's exit from Ayub's cabinet enabled India to develop deep contacts with Awami League in East Pakistan. This is why nobody in East Pakistan protested against Tashkent agreement. At that period Pakistan was in possession of solid evidence that was produced before the special court in famous Agartala Conspiracy case against Sheikh Mujeeb-ur Rehman for conspiring with India to establish Bangladesh. In January, 1968, the Federal Government of Pakistan referred to the court of special judge the case popularly known "as Agartala conspiracy case", against 35 persons including Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman. The diary of Lieut.-commander Muazzim was the real smoking gun, revealing a sinister plot to dismember Pakistan. The diary is significant as:

- (a) It contained a full drawn map of future Bangladesh.
- (b) It also contained the National Anthem of Bangladesh.
- (c) It contained a detailed outline plan of action for carrying out attacks on army cantonments in East Pakistan.

In March 1971 for attacks on cantonments in East Pakistan the same pattern was adopted by Mukti-Bahani. It was the Bengali masses support that was given to Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman that, compelled the Pak governments to withdraw Agartala conspiracy case. In February 1966 Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-Rehman had outlined his six point program for autonomy of Bangladesh. Point No: 5 of this programme showed that real aim was confederation of Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. Foreign trade was the exclusive domain of federating units. The

federating units were to meet the requirements of the federal government. In simple terms it meant that Foreign policy of Pakistan would be determined by the federating units. The entire Bangladesh Freedom struggle is to be comprehended in the contextual backup provided by the statements of Indian leaders of that period. India and Russia entered into a treaty of friendship with the object of establishing Bangladesh. Mr. D.P. Dhar, a Kashmir pundit leader, was appointed as chairman of the Foreign policy co-ordination committee of India. Under his guidance now the Soviets were directly organizing the affairs of Mukti Bahani the armed wing of the Awami league. Thereafter they launched an armed struggle against Pakistan. Under D.P.Dhar's advice three Headquarters were setup by Indian Army, near Bangladesh,

- a) First tactical H Q was set up at Balughat,
- b) Second HQ was established near Cooch-Behar,
- c) The third, tactical Headquarters was setup at Agartala with a view to provide direct military assistance to Mukti-Bahani.

In this sequence of events it would be pertinent to mention that on 4th April 1971, a special session of All India National Congress was called that passed a special resolution pledging all out support to the people of Bangladesh. A Provisional government of Bangladesh was allowed to function from West-Bengal in India.

On 31st. March 1971 a seminar was organized by the Indian council of world affairs in New-Delhi. It was addressed by Mr. M K Subramanian the Director of the Indian Institute of Defence Studies who advocated that break-up of Pakistan was in India's interest. [See the Hindustan Times April, 1st, 1971]. In this behalf reader may also peruse an article in the Economist London, 24th April, 1971, on 24th May 1971 Indira Gandhi made a resounding speech in Indian parliament saying: "If world does not take heed we shall be constrained to take all such measures as may be necessary." Mr. Jaya Prakash

Narain, the socialist leader, who was all along pleading the cause of Sheikh Abdullah, and was negotiating terms of an accord with Kashmir National conference leaders, addressed a huge public meeting on 6th. July 1971 in Bihar and advocated that India should go to war with Pakistan. At that time Jaya Prakash Narain was the bridge between Sheikh Abdullah and the Government of India. He had reached some understanding with Abdullah. The speech of Jaya Prakash Narain was extensively reported in the Hindustan Times issue of 7th July, 1971. The terse comment of The New Statesman, London, July 2nd. 1971, is now a quotable quote. It said: "India could stand and watch her main enemy eliminate itself as a threat to her power through internal conflict." The crux came when Indian Defence Minister in a public speech openly declared, that "the evacuees (from East Pakistan) will be sent back to Bangladesh and not to Pakistan. His speech was widely reported in The Amrita Bazaar Patrika (an influential Indian News Paper) in its issue of June, 3rd. 1971, published from Calcutta. On 16th. December, 1971, General Niazi surrendered to the commander of the Indian Army, Bangladesh was born on the map of South Asia. The creation of Bangladesh was considered essential for two reasons:-

As far back as 1949, the Government of Pakistan had called the world Muslim Conference in Karachi (July, 1949). This conference led to the formation of Motamar Alami-i-Islami [Muslim World Congress which in fact aimed at Muslim awakening in Muslim Countries of West Asia, [See the book by Aslam Siddique: "Pakistan Seeks Security" Published by Longman's Green, 1960" Karachi, page 82 to page 89].

Second, this Pan Islamic Conference was attended by delegates from 18 Muslim Countries. The then Finance Minister of Pakistan Mr. Ghulam Mohd. pleaded that Muslim countries should evolve a system of:

- a) Collective Bargaining &
- b) Collective security.

Epilogue

This had set the alarm bells ringing in New Delhi. India could not bear the emergence of a Muslim block in West Asia. To dismember Pakistan became inevitable and imperative for India, and U.S.S.R who aimed to occupy Afghanistan.

After the creation of Bangladesh, India found it convenient to once again woo Abdullah. The Times, London in its issue of 14th. October 1968. noticed that:

"Sheikh still clings to the principles of secularism and parliamentary democracy and personally opposes Kashmir's accession to theoretic Pakistan." Unquote

The correspondent of Times, London had rightly placed his hands on the pulse of the top National conference Leadership in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah could never accept Kashmir aligning itself with Pakistan. This ideological commonality between Congress and Abdullah- became the foundation of a dialogue between Sheikh Abdullah and Indian Government. On 6th. November 1968 the Government of India reached an understanding with National conference leadership. After the emergence of Bangladesh the National Conference leadership also felt that time was ripe to reveal the understanding reached by it with Government of India. A special session of the Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front was convened on 5th. July 1974, Mirza Afzal Beg, alter-ego of Sheikh Abdullah, in his presidential address is reported to have said:

"We are prepared to consider in all sincerity the re-establishment of relations with Centre on the basis of

- a) Literal and
- b) Lexical

Interpretations of Article 370 and its implications" Article 370 of the Indian constitution laid down in explicit terms that provisions of Indian constitution and Indian laws would be applied to Kashmir state only with the consent of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. On 11th. February 1975 Sheikh

Abdullah wrote a letter to Mrs. Indira Gandhi in which he reaffirmed the "Accession of the state of Jammu & Kashmir to India." By now Kashmir chapter of National Congress party had been established in J & K State. Sheikh Abdullah was of the view that Congress and Plebiscite Front should merge back in National Conference. This was not acceptable to Federal government. Its policy was:

- a) that no regional party should be allowed to strike deep roots in the soil of Kashmir.
- b) other Indian National parties should be encouraged to extend their activities to the J&K state. The policy of merger of J&K State with India was to be pursued to its logical conclusion.

To reinvigorate this policy, a special session of All India Congress Party was convened. At this special session, a strong resolution it was urged that merger of National Conference, Congress, and Plebiscite Front would be "a retrograde step, particularly, in the context of national integration." See for details the HINDUSTAN TIMES, issue of 10th. June, 1975.

The people of Kashmir, who were fed on the pipe dream of an independent Kashmir Confederating with both India and Pakistan, were amazed, stunned and flummoxed by this declaration. They realized that it was the official policy of the Federal Government, not to encourage any regional party to flourish in Jammu & Kashmir. Sheikh's attitude after the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, had undergone a climacteric change. The prestigious paper Amrit Bazaar Patrika in its issue of 9th. Sept. 1973 commented:

"What Sheikh says in Public does not reflect his real attitude, that he has taken at the negotiations" unquote. The same paper on 20th. September 1974 commented: "Political compulsions perhaps leave no better alternative to the Sheikh, than the public posture of the kind, he has chosen to take. It is well known that Sheikh's cur-

rent negotiations have not been favourably viewed by the pro-Pakistan elements in Kashmir, Presumably, the Sheikh's public posture is intended to neutralize these elements." These negotiations culminated in the Kashmir accord of 1975, between Government of India and Sheikh Abdullah. Pro Pak elements instead of getting neutralised found new resurgence in Kashmir.

Normally the emergence of Bangladesh should have culminated in India, Pakistan, Kashmir, Bangladesh confederation. The Indians could not actualize this Foreign policy objective because of the Bhutto factor that impacted upon the Public opinion in Pakistan. I have invented the term Bhutto factor as in my view Mr. Z.A Bhutto single handedly thwarted Indian designs. He was the voice of the people. He was able to induce Indira Gandhi to reach an agreement on Kashmir in 1972 popularly known as Shimla Pact. The Shimla Agreement provide that two countries should resolve to settle their differences by peaceful means, meaning, thereby that the cease fire line in Jammu & Kashmir should be the line of control and that would not be altered. This enabled him to regain:

- a) 5139 square miles of Pak territory occupied by Indian Forces.
- b) And release of ninety thousand prisoners of war.

However, his foreign policy was to maintain Islamist Military linkages of Pakistan and at the same time to the Muslim world, Project India as an enemy of any Muslim bloc, that may emerge in West Asia [Asian Survey volume no:18, page 1260, December, 1978 issue.] The domestic policy of Bhutto was based upon modernization of Pakistan. That could only be achieved through socialism. So the Bhutto appeal was aimed at:

- a) Middle Class socialists
- b) Industrial workers

- c) Landless labourers, with the teleological purpose of
- d) total restructuring of social institutions in Pakistan.

Ultimately these measures would pave the way for China-Pakistan, Iran axis to be formed. Bhutto anticipated that Russia may invade Afghanistan that would further lead to balkanization of Pakistan. The Chinese connection of Pakistan thwarted the evil designs of India. In this complex situation Sheikh Abdullah was compelled to accept that accord ensuring some measure of autonomy within the frame-work of Indian constitution. The crux of the accord was that:

"The State of Jammu and Kashmir which is constituent unit of the Union of India shall in its relation with the Union continue to be governed by Article 370 of Indian constitution. Article 370 ensures regional autonomy of Jammu & Kashmir State. It was also agreed that the residuary power of legislation shall remain with the state, however parliament will continue to have power to make laws relating to the prevention of activities directed towards disclaiming, questioning, disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India, or bringing about cession of a part of the territory of India or secession of a part of the territory of India from the union or causing insult to the Indian National flag, the Indian National Anthem and the Constitution." Unquote.

The other clauses of Indira-Sheikh accord of 1975 are of subsidiary importance Bhutto's pro China policy prevented Bangladesh from confederating with India. The emergence of China -Pakistan alliance infact totally shattered Nehru's dream of a United India. Indira Gandhi also realised that vast changes were taking effect in neighbouring Afghanistan. U.S.S.R was determined to invade Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan at that time the military power brought Daoud to the centre stage. He was assisted by pro-soviet elements to gain power. The most prominent pro Soviet political operatives like Pacha Gul Wafadar, Faiz Mohammad and Abdul Hamid Mohtat became the members of his cabinet. In Afghanistan the Soviets called the shots, Mrs. Gandhi in June 1972 agreed to Shimla agreement because she knew that Soviets in coming years would invade Afghanistan and slice through Peshawar to reach the Port of Gawadhar in Baluchistan. At that time Pakistan would be compelled to confederate with India. Mrs. Indira Gandhi was in league with USSR. She knew that after the creation of Bangladesh the new pro-Afghan Government would raise the issue of Pushtunistan with a view to further dismember Pakistan.[see Louis Dupree: Afghanistan Published by Princeton white] In Daoud the USSR had a proxy for helping to destabilize Pakistan without the USSR taking the responsibility for such activity." [See Louis Dupree's Monograph Afghanistan, published at the behest of International Studies, Hoover Institution (1980)]. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto the President of Pakistan realized this imminent peril. After all Afghanistan was the "gateway to Middle-East Oil reserves close to warm water port of Gawadhar in Baluchistan". Bhutto realized that US response would not be effective as US armed forces were faraway from the region. Bhutto realised that only if Pakistan possessed an A- Bomb it could ensure its integrity. The U.S. would not like that a Muslim country like Pakistan should become a nuclear power. With the blessings of U.S, a coup d'etat in 1977 was engineered by Pakistan Army. Mr. Z. A. Bhutto the only Pakistan Politician with a huge public following was ousted from power. It was Bhutto who in 1973 succeeded in obtaining a consensus of all Political Parties in Pakistan for enacting a democratic oriented constitution. This was the only way to establish political stability in Pakistan. He pragmatically recognized Bangladesh. All this was done so that Pakistan could create a nuclear bomb. Bhutto knew that an A-bomb alone could ensure the sustaining of the ideological basis of

Pakistan. On July, 5th. 1977 General Mohammad Ziaul-Haq assumed power in Pakistan. This was part of the grand plan of the US. The U.S anticipated that Afghanistan at that point of time had become politically unstable. On 5th. December, 1978 Afghanistan signed a friendship treaty with USSR in Moscow. In February 1979, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan was murdered in Kabul. Taraki Government had offered to willingly become a stooge of Soviets. Taraki Government was ousted from the power by a Fazullah Amin in September, 1978. In December 1979 USSR invaded Afghanistan. The reason was Amin refused to issue a declaration inviting USSR to Afghanistan. Amin knew his declaration would legalize the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. By January 1st. 1980 fifty thousand Soviet troops were in Afghanistan. The Afghan situation paved the way for rapprochement between US and China. Pakistan became a bridge between US and China. In US an anti Soviet public opinion would force US to support Pakistan. This would nullify all Indian designs of invading Pakistan. This also provided opportunity to Pakistan to keep Kashmir issue alive and kicking. This is how Pakistan's integrity was secured.

One thing was clear beyond shadow of doubt. The Jihad in Afghanistan would impact the Muslim population of Kashmir Valley. An armed struggle by Kashmiri Muslims against Indian occupation of Valley, seemed inevitable. Against its volition Pakistan for its survival was bound to be drawn into the maelstrom of terror. This was the real Hobson's choice for Pakistan. Soon terror and Pakistan became synonymous. Pakistan was a pawn in the hands of destiny.

[EPILOGUE]

Francis Rene Chateaubriand, the noted French author and statesman [1768-1848] is reported to have said:

"Grecian history is a poem, Latin history a picture, Modern history a chronicle." Unquote.

I would dare to add to his comment and say "Kashmir history is sheer confusion." In fact, the process of history writing is to salvage some what, something from the deluge of time. I really admire Francis Bacon, who so unerringly pointed out:

"... Out of monuments, names, words, proverbs, traditions, private records and evidences, fragments of stories, passages of books, and the like, we do save and recover, somewhat from the deluge of time." Unquote.

Even saving some fragment of history or a past event and while recounting it, what is required is, absolute probity, honesty of purpose and sincerity of heart. If this is the objective of a chronicler, then, I feel, that in this concluding chapter of my monograph on Kashmir Politics and history, I would eschew to analyse the rise of insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir State as, the State is still in the vice-like grip of violent militancy, and reasons of my own personal security, greatly impair the imaginative of objectivity required for such an endeavour. Hussain Haqqani, in his book *Pakistan Between Mosque and Military* at page 288 points out:

"... By the end of 1991, the ISI was helping Pakistan, and International volunteers, including veterans of Afghan Jihad to cross-over into

Indian controlled Kashmir, and, mount guerrilla attacks against Indian forces. Thus Kashmiri 's indigenous struggle for self- determination became linked with global Jihad of Islamists." Unquote

Hussain Haqqani, does not tell us, who are the Veterans of Afghan war who have crossed-over into Indian controlled Kashmir? The answer is Al Qaida. If Al Qaida and Taliban have included Kashmir in its agenda, the question is, how can India and Pakistan resolve Kashmir dispute bilaterally? In my view the real war in Kashmir is about water resources. Then how can a Section of ISI of Pakistan remain neutral? The water shortages in India and Pakistan are to reach a dangerous level? Northwest India and Pakistan are mostly dependent on Indus river water.

India has embarked on a strategy of building dams on Indus and Jehlum rivers.

India has secured the entire waters of;

- a. Sutlej
- b. Beas
- c. Ravi

The three Eastern rivers. It is busy damming up the three Western rivers, at the present moment namely:

- a. Chenab
- b. Jehlum
- c. Indus River

All three rivers that flow through J&K State territory. The headwaters of these three rivers are being controlled by India. Pakistan is in dire straits. Afghanistan has raised a voice against the damming up of Kabul river. Now, climate change and receding glaciers are bound to diminish water supply in Indus river upto thirty three percent. This is going to turn Pakistani Punjab into a waste-land. The upshot of this situation is that the Pakistan supported militancy in Kashmir is correlated to

the shortages in the flow of Chenab, Jehlum and Indus river. Acute water shortages would not allow the resolution of Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. Survival of Pakistan is at stake Zulfikar Ali Bhutto realized this situation of water shortages. The confrontation with India was going to be perpetual according to his perceptions. In contemporary times in Darfur and Sudan water scarcity due to global warming compelled the Arab-African relationship to rupture, leading to a bloody global warming triggered genocide, so that at present the global warming has become the most important political factor, that is also bound to impact Indian sub-continent. With water supply swiftly diminishing in Indian rivers, both India and Pakistan will be compelled to remain antagonists. He was of the firm opinion that Pakistan can only survive as a Nation, if Pakistan becomes a part of Iran-China Axis. So that India is deterred to starve Pakistan by damming up these rivers. Al-Qaida and Taliban also in coming years would be heavily dependent on arms supply from China. India and U.S. do not want Iran, Pakistan and China axis to actualize. Instead they are advocating a India- Pakistan, Bangladesh confederation. Nepal, Burma, and Sri Lanka, may not join this axis. Bhutan and Maldives will in coming years be incorporated into this new Indian Empire. In this back drop of facts the China has created political instability in South-Asia by projecting itself as the arm supplier to Muslim insurgents in South Asia. Kashmiris realise resolution of Kashmir dispute is not possible, without securing the goodwill of China. This situation has reduced the present India-Pakistan bilateral dialogue and confidence building measures to the level of a meaningless charade. As far as Kashmir is concerned China is not a secondary or tertiary party. In fact, it is the Primary Party. India and Pakistan have lost the essential capability to resolve Kashmir dispute without Chinese concordance. Indian and Pakistan bilaterally cannot resolve Kashmir dispute. Samuel P. Huntington, with great insight, and imagination in a forceful manner has made a commentative remark of far reaching signification. To quote

his own words:

".....India seizes the opportunity offered by China's being tied down in East Asia to launch a devastating attack on Pakistan with a view to totally degrading that countries nuclear and conventional capabilities, It is initially successful, but the military alliance, between Pakistan, Iran and China is activated, and, Iran comes to Pakistan's assistance with modern and sophisticated military forces. India becomes bogged down fighting Iranian troops and Pakistani guerrillas from several different ethnic groups. Both Pakistan and India appeal to Arab States for support. India warning of danger of Iranian dominance of south West Asia, but the initial success of China against the United States have stimulated major anti-western movements in Muslim societies." Unquote.

See his book "The clash of civilizations and the remaking of World Order page 314 [First published by Simon & Schuster, 1996 and Penguin Books India (P) Limited, 1997]. Resolving Kashmir dispute is not easy. It is not some curious plot in a coarse fabliau, that has a denouement.

The real problem with all potential Kashmir dispute solutions mooted by the think tank of two countries is that in them, the core theme is omitted, the meat of the matter is overly romanticized with a waggish beginning, also added to it is a lot of *fac-tiae* so that all these nostrums, which are being touted, have a non-rational ending, keeping in view contemporary ground-realities in South Asia.

The ageing Indo-Pak political actors with their hippocratic faces trying to resolve Kashmir dispute seem as feckless as legless cripples vying with each other to edge past swift horses in a hippodrome is the only analogy that comes to the mind. The results of these equestrian circuses are already pre-arranged.

Whatever the merits or demerits of the "United States of Kashmir," the fact remains the idea of an autonomous Kashmir has created a misenscene of despair, that like maundering cloud, is now imperceptibly overwhelming the political atmosphere of the Kashmir Valley. Autonomous Kashmir as a conception, is no better than, what in Latin is understood by the term "Acherontis Pabulum". Kashmiris feel this idea is moonshine.

Legally speaking the idea is un-implementable in view of the basic structure theory propounded by the Supreme Court of India in "Keshavananda Bharti's case". Second, such an idea will not receive ratification from the Indian Parliament. BJP the largest rightist party in Indian Parliament has avowed that Kashmir centric talks with Pakistan should be within the parameters of Indian constitution. At present India is modernizing its armed forces at feverish pace to militarily enforce the present status quo in Kashmir. The newly inaugurated Indian Naval base in south India, and, Navy Centric spending of Indian Army budget to the tune of additional Rupees Eighty four thousand crores is something ominous for Islamabad although India and Pakistan are proclaiming that they have reached a level of friendship and co-operation. Historical precedents should never be disregarded. I shall exemplify my point by reference to British history. Soon after termination of world war second, Churchill personally wrote effusively affectionate letters to Stalin, thanking him profusely for Russian assistance. He went out of his way and lavishly hailed the grand endeavours of Red Army in defeating Germany. Military historian have highlighted his Greetings to Red Army on 23rd February, 1945. On this very day Churchill according to Russians historians, ordered collection of German weapons in eventuality of conflict with U.S.S.R. In March 1945, he held a secret cabinet meeting for an immediate offensive against U.S.S.R. In the meanwhile 10 German Divisions had surrendered on Western front. These German forces were granted amnesty if they would fight the Russians. Russian have come up with the theory, that July 1st, 1945 was the date set for invasion of

U.S.S.R. General Patton of the U.S.A fully supported this "OPERATION RANKIN". General Patton named it the second front. The same situation is at present prevailing in Indian sub-continent as both India and Pakistan while professing friendship are preparing themselves for war. In my view the present Indo-Pak bonhomie is camouflage for a gory internecine conflict bound to eventuate between India and Pakistan in or about year 2025. Kashmiris believe that Musharraf also knows that he cannot translate into reality his idea of an autonomous Kashmir. The Muttahida Majlis Ammal of Pakistan, the largest opposition party has not expressed its concordance with this conception. Also a look at the existing Jammu & Kashmir Constitution shows that only Indian Citizens can be voters and legislators. As such a common Assembly for Indian held Kashmir and Pakistan Administered Kashmir is a constitutional impossibility. In Jammu & Kashmir state a new constituent Assembly will have to be convened to frame a new constitution, allowing the creation of a joint assembly for Indian held Kashmir and Pakistan " Administered Kashmir. This is a far fetched idea and totally non-realistic.

The Demographic alteration of population in Indian held Kashmir has already become a fait accompli. According to Lt. General (Retd.) J.R. Mukherjee, the total population of Kashmiri Speaking Muslims is only forty eight percent and the population of Jammu region is fifty two percent. In other words, the Kashmiri Muslims have been reduced to a minority in J& K State. As such Kashmir legislature will never be able to amend the present Kashmir Constitution. In other words the requirement that Kashmir Elector should be the Citizen of India is now a permanent feature of the Jammu & Kashmir Constitution of 1957. In other words even if a new constituent Assembly is convened it would never be able to frame a new constitution, and so the creation of joint Assembly for two Kashmir is a legal impossibility.

The Government of Jammu & Kashmir has openly declared

Epilogue

that those Jammu Muslims who migrated to Pakistan or Pak Administered Kashmir, and, also similarly circumstanced Kashmiri Muslim's now inhabiting POK, will not be resettled in J&K State. To effectuate this policy the constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir adopted the definition of Permanent Resident, with emphasis on citizenship of India as qualification to be permanent resident of J&K state. The entire accession of J&K State with Union of India is grounded upon this adamant bedrock of State Policy; that is that Kashmiri Muslim diaspora should not be allowed to return to Kashmir.

Another aspect of the matter is that a powerful section of Pakistan Army is openly opposed to an autonomous Kashmir with porous borders with India. This segment of the Pakistan Army is of the opinion, that the fall of Dhaka in 1971 and the emergence of Bangladesh became possible, only because:

First, Bangladesh had porous borders with India and

Second, Awami League in conspiracy with India openly advocated a policy of regional autonomy. At present the same situation is prevailing in Pak-Administered Kashmir for regional autonomy. Other parallels may be summarised as under:-

In seventies in East Pakistan Economic activity started declining as foreign investors refused to invest due to uncertain political conditions. The same situation prevails in J&K State at present. No Indian investor is willing to invest in Kashmir Valley. Pakistan army believes that after autonomous Kashmir is instituted, India will bring about a process of polarization of Kashmir speaking and non-Kashmiri speaking population in the same manner it engineered the polarization of Bengali speaking and Non-Bengali speaking population in East Pakistani in 1971.

Pakistan Army also believes that India, would gradually with-draw economic support to J&K State, so that the economic burden is passed on to Pakistan. The economic activity will be reduced and industrial development will suffer in the same manner, as happened in East Pakistan in 1971. Across the

board, all policy makers in Pakistan know that an autonomous Kashmir will provide India incentive to galvanize separatist elements in N.W.F.P. Sindh and Baluchistan states of Pakistan. This will lead to balkanisation of Pakistan. Sooner or later India will give expression to its avowed policy of undoing Pakistan. The Rightist Hindu Party (B.J.P) has openly declared this objective as *raison d'être* for its own existence. Its official organ, *Organiser* as far back as October 2nd. 1971 declared: "Pakistan has to be got rid off at any sacrifice," The paper was patronized by former Prime Minister Mr. A.B. Vajpayee. It is worth recalling that on June 2nd. 1971 the then Indian defence Minister, while addressing a public meeting in West Bengal declared the official policy of the Indian Government. He openly said:

"The evacuees from East Pakistan will be sent back to Bangladesh, and not to Pakistan." Please see *AMRIT BAZAR PATRIKA*, published from Calcutta on June 3, 1971. If I am wrong in quoting dates, the Ministry of Information, Govt. of India, should issue a rebuttal. Again the Defence Minister of India as reported in press on October 30, 1971 declared in *Jullunder*: to quote his own words:

"India would go as far as Lahore and Sialkot, and, keep them too."

A section of the Pakistan Army is also convinced that a segment of armed forces of Pakistan are so much under the influence of the U.S: that President Musharaf is not being fed with correct information about the ground realities existing in Pakistan. The same conditions prevailed in Pakistan in 1971. Yahya Khan was not fed with real information. Lastly one has to admit that this radical section of the Pakistan Army is sympathizing covertly with *MUTTIHIDA MAJLIS AMMAL*, It is openly opposed to the idea of an autonomous Kashmir with Porous borders with India. Autonomous Kashmir will also not have the support of Jammu Hindus. As such it is realized that an autonomous Kashmir will trigger off a civil war in J&K

State. In seventies this actually happened in East Pakistan. Some events may be recalled. On March 2nd. and 3rd. 1971, the properties of Non-Bengalis in Jinnah Avenue in East Pakistan were set on fire followed by looting and arson in Nawabpur Area. This exercise may be repeated in Jammu where Muslims are in minority. On the contrary the indications are that a powerful section of Pakistan Army is advocating full independence to Pak Administered Kashmir after brokering a defence pact with China. Thereafter China will take-over the economic burden of militancy in Kashmir by forging a link between Maoists insurgents in Nepal and Kashmiri insurgents. Kashmiri insurgents will receive arms via Nepal and Tibet from China. *MUTTIHIDA MAJLIS AMMAL* is fully supporting this idea. Benazir Bhutto toyed with this idea, but did not translate it into reality. Samuel P. Huntington was the first to notice this new angularity in the politics of Pakistan. In his "*Clash of Civilizations*" he wrote [to quote his own words]

"... Under these conditions, the Confucian-Islamic connection will continue and perhaps broaden and deepen. Central to this connection has been the cooperation of Muslim and Sinic societies opposing the west on weapons proliferation, human rights, and other issues. At its core have been the close relations among Pakistan, Iran and China, which crystallized in the early 1990's with the visit of President Young Shangkun to Iran and Pakistan and of President Rafsanjani to Pakistan and China.

"These pointed to the emergence of an embryonic alliance between Iran, Pakistan and China, and, that an attack on Pakistan would be considered an attack on Iran. Reinforcing this pattern Benazir Bhutto visited Iran and China, immediately after becoming Prime Minister in October, 1993.

"The cooperation among on three countries has included regular exchanges, among political, military and bureaucratic officials and joint efforts in a variety of Civil and Military areas, including defence production, in addition to weapons

transfer from China to other States. The development of this relationship has been strongly supported by those in Pakistan belonging to independence and Muslim Schools of thought on Foreign policy who look forward to a Tehran, Islamabad, Beijing axis, while in Tehran it was argued that the distinctive nature of the contemporary world, required, 'Close and consistent cooperation' among Iran, China, Pakistan and Kazakhstan." Unquote

MUTTIHIDA MAJLIS AMMAL is still supporting this view point and hopes Osama Bin Ladin from his headquarters located on the borders of China and Tibet, will be soon able to open his second front in Kashmir by the year 2025 A.D. Kashmir Valley at the moment is wrapped in a raging inferno, and, river Jhelum has already been transmuted into a soft flowing Acheron flowing through this hellish Valley. The disaster is looming large on Kashmir's Horizon. We mentally prepare ourselves for bloody Indo Pak conflict in 2020, or 2025. This Cassandra like Prophecy may be read in conjunction with my article entitled 'Kashmir, at Brink of Precipice' dated: May 12th 2004 (The Kashmir Times Jammu) in which I pointed out the facts of new situation. I wrote with great frankness to quote my own words:

"Kashmir political actors who till yesterday considered themselves at the centre stage of an ongoing, ever unfolding political drama, have found out their utter dismay that they are in fact redundant buffoons in an opera bouffe, sheer objects of scorn, and derision, and in fact people treat them like geckos lacking any social standing and who have become part of social garbology. Soon they will be tossed into the trash can of history. Kashmiri people it may be commented ne-me-ne contrade centi, have rejected the recent electoral process in the State as sham. This is the verdict of the people. This is the bitter ground reality. It does not bother the people which political in the ongoing elections will claim victory, and, which political party will bear the stigma of Gerry-mandering and manipulation of electorate. Elections 2004 in Kashmir have topsy turvied

the dialectics of democracy, in this State, across the board.

"The Indian think tank that consists of many old, indolent opiated geezers with lot of hubris, should wake up from their deep slumber, and, realize the obvious, that is, that elections have widened the Kashmir-Jammu Divide that is something very frightening and ominous [Unquote] I further said that :

Samuel P. Huntington is of the Opinion or is right in expressing a generalization that:

"... .. Democratization conflicts with westernization, and democracy is inherently a parochial zing and not a cosmopolitan zing process. Politicians in noun western societies do not by election demonstrate how western they are:

Electoral competition instead stimulates them to fashion what they believe will be the most popular appeals, and those are usually:

- a. ethnic
- b. nationalist and
- c. religious in character " Unquote"

The same situation prevails today. The Jammu & Kashmir regions are guided by diametrically opposite principles due to Polarisation of Hind and Muslim populations in J&K State.

Incompatibility of principles originates from the profound feelings in Kashmir that Jammu region is geographically different from Kashmir region, second Jammu people are ethnically different from Kashmir people, third Jammu people are culturally different from Kashmir people. These feelings plus the ongoing process of miscegenation in Jammu with Punjabi Hindus and the future population increases in Jammu region will fuel the feelings of regional autonomy for Jammu in Jammu region. In coming years in Jammu region there will be acceleration of religious observances with emphasis on Hindutva, more emphasis on Punjabi dress and values, revitalization of Punjabi culture and reassertion of "Punjabi" in public life and an aversion increasingly oriented towards Kashmir va

ley. The total revival of Punjabi, Dogri way of life will also widen the hiatus between Jammu Hindus and Jammu Muslims. At present complete polarisation has already taken place in Jammu and Kashmir State.

The people of Kashmir have adopted a policy of rejectionism towards elections, as they feel that elections within the ambit of Indian Constitution will stultify their right to self-determination. The people of Jammu have participated in the elections to boost political parties that believe in complete integration of Jammu and Kashmir State with Union of India. This new polarization means:

- a) That with Jammu gaining parity with Kashmir region in representation in Kashmir Legislature, there will be resurgence of demand for abolition of Article 370. Jammu people will strive for complete merger of J&K state with India. Demographic alteration has already taken place in Jammu region of J&K State, that would enable them parity in state legislature.
- b) No Kashmiri regional party like National Conference or PDP will ever get in future elections a working cohesive majority.
- c) So far the symbolic post of Chief Minister is concerned, the Jammu Legislators with whose coalition the future government will be formed in the State will revive demand for rotation principle, something that has happened in Cyprus.
- d) Only coalitions will be able to form a government in J&K State. Jammu & Kashmir State will become another Cyprus in south Asia.

This situation reminds me of what Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said while deciding *Schenck V/S United States* 249 US 47 [1919]. The eminent Judge said:

"... All life is experiment, and, all men stand on an equal footing of ignorance, regarding the ul-

timite meaning of life."

Democracy at any particular stage is nurtured by social and economic matters. The type of democracy we are instituting in J&K State by encouraging the demographic alteration of Jammu Region is bound to give rise to a Cyprus like situation.

"Ladakh will lay emphasis on regional autonomy. China will encourage such politics in Jammu & Kashmir State. Already in order to contain India, China, Pakistan, Iran axis is in the offing. Unofficially it exists. On 26th. October 2004, China has begun reconstructing old silk road i.e., constructing a land route linking Central Asian States with China and Pakistan. China is the second largest consumer of fuel oil in the world. China so far was depending on fuel oil by purchases in the Singapore market. Revival of old silk route will enable China to obtain oil from Iran and Central Asian Muslim States. China has still not wholly given up its claim to Arunachal Pradesh, now a part of India. It is an established fact that China is the main supplier of small arms to ULFA in the North East India, a fact that was corroborated by the seizure of consignment of sophisticated weapons in Chittagong Port. This could not be possible, unless Bangladesh has also tacitly joined the unofficial China, Iran, Pakistan nexus. The smoking gun evidence was provided, when on 2nd. April 2004 from two trawlers in Chittagong Port:

- a) 4,930 S.L. Rs and SMGs
- b) 11,43, 520 rounds of ammunition.
- c) 27,020 pieces of T82/2 Rocket Propelled Grenades.
- d) 2000 Grenade Launchers.
- e) 150 Rocket Launchers.
- f) 6,392 magazines were seized. According to the estimate of Indian Intelligence Agencies, these arms were meant for North-East insurgent groups such as: ULFA, NSCN (I-M), PLA, NDFB, NLFT, ATTF. According to secret reports submitted by Indian intelligence agencies, the

present government in Bangladesh is conniving at the major arms smuggling operations in which ULFA insurgents are involved. In other words it is in the interest of China to keep the pot boiling for Indians in North-East India.

In this changed political scenario the Chinese- Kashmir policy will get a new orientation. Chinese realize that its border dispute with India is not easy for any resolution.

China is also advocating the theory that Islamic and Confucian States have a common interest to withstand Western Universalism. India and Israel are now major pillars of this Universalism. Christian Russia would soon emerge as the third Pillar, China also realizes that religious divide between India and Pakistan will compel both countries for a Spanish walk that would never take them to converging point called a Federation. So, if this Hindu Muslim divide also suffuses the political processes in the J&K State, then Muslim insurgents would look towards China for Succour, Ladakh and Askardu will be the routs for supply of arms to insurgents in Kashmir.

"The population increases in Jammu region will lead to greater representation of Jammu people in Kashmir Assembly. The marginalization of local regional parties, will occur. They will be allowed to form governments with the support of Indian National Parties like Congress or BJP. The sequel would be that these government would become a go-between between the people of Kashmir and the Central Governments. So good governance would wither away.

"The government in Kashmir would always be under compulsion to gratify the aspirations of the majority Hindu community in Jammu region while disregarding the Jammu Muslims who have already been reduced to a minority.

Pakistan is avoiding this dicey situation. As old silk route is being revived and Pakistan is to be linked with Central Asian Countries via; China the present political equations will suffer unexpected permutations. Kashmiri People will realize that

people of J & K State would have greater economic advantages, if they align themselves with China, rather than India.

"Rafsanjani, on his way to China 1993 actually pleaded for strategic alliance with Islamabad. He openly declared that an attack on Pakistan would be considered an attack on Iran. Pakistan on its part has realized the obvious. It has now to distance itself from Saudi influence, and forge a regional alliance with Iran, with a view to avoid devastating Shia Sunni Civil War, in Pakistan. "India US Israel alliance has exacerbated the situation. Now China has to act in a pre-emptive manner to contain India. Pakistan and Bangladesh can only exist as an Independent State if they forge alliance with China, otherwise they will be coerced to confederate with India. To comprehend this situation we have to develop a realist theory of International relations and according to this theory confrontations between States cannot be avoided by sheer mutual trade and economic cooperation. Some years back the US Defence Department declared a new strategy of preparing two major regional conflicts, one against North Korea and other against Iraq. China also is preparing two major regional conflicts one in Kashmir and the other in Taiwan. In my considered view the demographic alteration of population in Ladakh in coming years, will initiate this process. Pakistan administered Kashmir also will willingly allow some Chinese Muslim from Sing Kiang to get settled in Askardu and Kargil. Some Afghans may be settled in Muzaffarabad. In terms of practical politics this situation can still be avoided if India gives up its dream of becoming a global power, accepts the reality of the existence of Pakistan and Bangladesh, and concedes the right of the Kashmiri people to decide their fate according to the resolutions of UN Security Council.

Since 1971 till date, no census, has taken place in J&K State. So far POK is concerned no demographic alteration has occurred in the region. According to Alstair Lamb [See his book:

"... The Muzaffarabad regime is not easy

to classify. While depending upon Pakistan for its military and economic, survival (not least because of its importance for watering of the West Punjab by rivers which ran through it and by vast projects like Mangla, which over the years to come to be situated on its soil) it was not entirely a puppet State. In some respects it was a kind of Kashmir Government in exile, as such it provided a forum for Kashmiri politicians who represented widely divergent views as to the kind of time, it was inevitable that Pakistan would watch closely and intervene actively in, its political processes, economic, political and military, it could not be hope to survive."

".....So long as Azad Kashmir existed, there was a constant temptation, as Maharaja, has observed, for Kashmiri Nationalist in Srinagar to seek some formulae for the unification of the divided Kashmir; State, through means other than India arms and diplomacy".

".....There can be no doubt however that the prospect of a deal between Sheikh Abdullah and Azad Kashmir for what might be called an 'Integral settlement of Kashmir question caused great anxiety in New Delhi; and it was certainly a contributing factor in Sheikh Abdullah's downfall in 1953." Unquote

"On the contrary in Indian held Kashmir the Jammu Hindus are convinced and satisfied that demographic alternation of Jammu region has been accomplished fully. In future, Jammu will never secede from India. Pakistan is still treating Azad Kashmir as a Government in exile, and, as such people of Pakistani Punjab have avoided to have alliance of matrimony and trade with

the people of Azad Kashmir. The upshot of this policy is that the population of Azad Kashmir has not suffered any demographic alteration. This gives advantage to India. The population of Jammu region has already doubled and of POK remains same. The way out for Pakistan is to recognize Pakistan held Kashmir as an Independent State, and to enable it to enter into a defence pact with China. China will assist in the reunification of Azad Kashmir with Kashmir Valley. Nehru had realized this danger in October 1947 itself as is evident from the memorandum from Indian Foreign Department to Prime Minister of England Mr. Attlee dated 25th. of October, 1947 in which it was stated:

".....Kashmir northern frontiers, as you are aware, run in common with three countries, Afghanistan, the USSR and China, security of Kashmir is vital to the Security of India."

Especially China will be compelled to ensure the safety of Azad Kashmir if it is granted independence in view of Sino-Pakistan Border Agreement of 2nd March 1963 so that China now has territory perilously close to Indo-Pak cease fire line in Kashmir. China has also to secure its defences. No solution of Kashmir is possible without Chinese consent. Although these view were expressed several years back, I still adhere to them.

I would conclude this epilogue with the confession that I am not a soothe sayer nor a prognosticator or a clairvoyant. The year 2007 is only an indicator of the catastrophe that is looming large on the horizon. In Kashmir Times I have written several articles to draw pointed attention to the obvious verity that Militancy in J&K State is not sponsored by any Foreign Country but is a reaction to the rise of Hindutva in India. In a multi-ethnic multicultural multi-religious and polyglot country like India the polarization of communities on religious,

cultural or linguistic considerations can only lead to perpetual strife. In post- Nehru era, Indira Gandhi symbolized populism. To achieve immortal glory she left no stone unturned to dismember Pakistan. The dismemberment of Pakistan removed the need for Pakistan to be secular. A non-secular Pakistan would invite the populists in India to strive for a non-secular India. In fact India now is a fundamentalist State based on fear. The fear of disintegration of India is the cornerstone of its domestic and foreign policy. As a counter blast to this policy the unification of Pakistan and Bangladesh is in offing. One cannot ignore the verity that China is the watchful Cerberus of South Asia. It would never like that Russia should once again emerge as a Super-power. So, china would never look with favour upon Russian-Indian axis. China would also vitally support Central Asian oil rich countries to forge an alliance with Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. The Indian -Russian axis has polarized Pakistan and China to form a countervailing force in South Asia. The upshot of this situation is that Kashmir dispute will not be resolved in near future, so long China and India continue to remain antagonists in South Asia. Russia also is endeavouring to re-emerge as a super-power. Already Russia and European Union are on a collision course. Economic rivalry between them will prevent Russia from becoming a part of European Union. Revival of cold War in coming years will pave the way for China to support the West Asian countries in adopting an anti-US stance. As such Chinese interference in Kashmir affairs is imminent. Joseph Korbel with Prophetic vision, saw, this danger in Kashmir. His book 'Dance in Kashmir' alluded to the possibility of Kashmir becoming a battle-ground in south Asia. History it seems is going to vindicate his prophesy.

At this stage, the reader who has familiarised himself with the backdrop facts, may, better appreciate the ideas I wanted to convey through the prologue of my book "Understanding the Kashmiri Mind". Contextually speaking I referred to contemporary facts, and summarised my musings in these words:

Some contemporary Kashmiri political actors who are at present, deeply involved with discovering possible solutions to the intricate Kashmir conundrum, have so far in spite of their best endeavours, succeeded only in reducing this highly significant Asian flash point imbroglio in the perspective of current realities to the base level of a humorous (or I am not accused of an over statement) a coarse fabliau.

The real problem with these imaginary solutions is that in them, the core theme is omitted, the meat of the matter is overly romanticized with a waggish beginning, a lot of facetiae and an abrupt non-rational ending, making a mockery of the Kashmir problem.

The ageing political actors with their Hippocratic faces seem as feckless as legless cripples vying with each other to edge past swift horses in a hippodrome, especially when the results of this equestrian circus, are already pre-arranged. Whatever the merits or demerits of the "United States of Kashmir," the fact remains the idea of an autonomous Kashmir has fabricated a misenscene of despair that like maundering clouds is imperceptibly overwhelming the political atmosphere of the valley.

Autonomous Kashmir as a conception is no other than what in Latin is understood by the term "Acherontis Pabulum" and is so revulsive as an obscene theatrical plot, that it would only amuse the trashy minded bambino's in a honky tonk house.

First, the idea is un-implementable in view of the basic structure theory propounded by the Supreme Court of India in Keshavananda Bharti's case. Nobody has instructed Musharraf about the implications associated with this case. Second, such an idea will not receive ratification from the Indian Parliament especially, in the light of the animadversion expressed by B.J.P through the missive of former Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee to the Prime Minister. The minatory allusions that Kashmir centric talks with Pakistan are without the parameters of Indian Foreign Policy is in fact enunciation of the B.J.P grandstanding

that B.J.P would not vote in favour of any solution that is Kashmir Centric. This is as plain as pikestaff. Third India is modernizing its armed forces at feverish pace to militarily enforce the present status quo in Kashmir. The newly inaugurated Indian Naval base, and, Navy Centric spending of Indian Army budget to the tune of additional Rupees Eighty four thousand crores is something ominous for Karachi. Historical precedents should never be disregarded. I shall exemplify my point by reference to British history. Soon after termination of world war second, Churchill personally wrote effusively affectionate letters to Stalin, thanking him profusely for Russian assistance. He went out of his way and lavishly hailed the grand endeavours of Red Army in defeating Germany. Historians have highlighted his Greetings to Red army on 23rd February, 1945 however on this very day Churchill according to Russian historians, ordered collection of German weapons in eventuality of conflict with U.S.S.R. Historians also recollect that in March 1945, he held a secret cabinet meeting for an immediate offensive against U.S.S.R. In the meanwhile 10 German Divisions had surrendered on western front. These German forces were granted amnesty if they would fight the Russians. Russian historians have come up with the data that July 1st 1945 was the date set for invasion of U.S.S.R. General Patton of the U.S.A fully supported OPERATION RANKIN. General Patton named it the second front.

In my view the present Indo-Pak bonhomie is camouflage for a gory internecine conflict to eventuate between India and Pakistan in or about year 2015.

Second, even Musharraf cannot translate into reality his idea of an autonomous Kashmir, as, Muttahida Majlis Ammal, the largest opposition party has not expressed its concordance with the conception, so far.

Third, the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution predicates that only Indian Citizens can be voters and legislators, so a common Assembly for Indian held Kashmir and Pakistan Ad-

ministered Kashmir is a constitutional impossibility.

Fourth, Demographic alteration of population in Indian held Kashmir has already become a fait accompli. According to Lt.General (retd.) J.R. Mukherjee, the total population of Kashmiri Speaking Muslims is only forty eight percent and the population of Jammu region is fifty two percent. As such Kashmir legislature will never be able to amend the Kashmir Constitution. In other words the requirement that Kashmir Elector should be mandatorily the Citizen of India is now a permanent feature of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution of 1957.

Fifth, The Government of Jammu and Kashmir has openly declared that those Jammu Muslims who migrated to Pakistan or Pak Administered Kashmir, and, also similarly circumstances Kashmiri Muslim's now inhabiting POK, will not be resettled in J&K State. The defining moment for such execution of State policy took place, when the constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir adopted the definition of Permanent Resident, with characteristic emphasis on citizenship of India in pursuance to the policy of Dogra Ruler Hari Singh who according to Sir Burjur Dalal, the then Chief Justice of Kashmir, in his famous Dalal Report Published in 1931, frankly pointed out that the definition of State Subject was framed by Maharaja so that the Muslim's who migrated to Punjab due to atrocities committed during Sikh Rule, do not return to the State of Jammu & Kashmir. The entire accession of J&K State with Union of India is grounded upon this adamant bedrock of this State Policy.

Another angularity for viewing this problem is the fact that a powerful section of Pakistan Army is openly opposed to an autonomous Kashmir with porous borders. This segment of the Pakistan Army is of the opinion, that the fall of Dhaka in 1971 and the emergence of Bangladesh became possible, only because:

- First, Bangladesh had porous borders with India.
- Second, Awami League in conspiracy with India openly

advocated a policy of regional autonomy. At present the same situation is prevailing in Pak-Administered Kashmir for regional autonomy.

Third: Economic activity started declining as foreign investors refused to invest due to uncertain political conditions in East Pakistan. The same situation prevails in J&K State at present.

Fourth: After autonomous Kashmir is instituted, India will bring about a process of polarization of Kashmir speaking and non-Kashmiri speaking population in the same manner it engineered the polarization of Bengali speaking and Non-Bengali speaking population in East Pakistan in 1971.

Fifth: India, would gradually withdraw economic support to J&K State, so that the economic burden is passed on to Pakistan. So economic activity will be reduced and industrial development will suffer in the same manner, as happened in East Pakistan in 1971.

Sixth: Autonomous Kashmir will provide India incentive to galvanize separatist elements in N.W.F.P, Sindh and Baluchistan creating the same scenario that existed in East Pakistan in January 1971.

Seventh: At this stage India will give expression to its avowed policy of undoing Pakistan. One has to recall that the weekly organizer of October 2nd, 1971 openly declared:

"Pakistan has to be got rid off at any sacrifice." The paper was patronized by former Prime Minister Mr. A.B. Vajpayee on June 2nd, 1971 the then Indian defence Minister, while addressing a public meeting at Bahula in West Bengal declared the official policy of the Indian Government. He openly said:

"The evacuees from East Pakistan will be sent back to Bangladesh, and not to Pakistan." Please see AMRIT BAZAR PATRIKA, published from Calcutta on June 3, 1971. If I am wrong in quoting dates, the Ministry of Information, Govt. of India, should issue a rebuttal. Again the Defence Minister of

India, as reported in press on October 30, 1971 declared in Jullunder: "India would go as far as Lahore and Sialkote, and, keep them too."

Eighth: A section of the Pakistan Army is convinced that a section of the intelligence agencies of Pakistan are so much under the influence of the U.S: that President Musharraf is not being fed with correct information about the ground realities existing in Pakistan. The same conditions prevailed in Pakistan in 1971 also..

So this radical section of the Pakistan Army is sympathizing covertly with MUTTIHIDA MAJLIS AMMAL, and, is openly opposed to the idea of an autonomous Kashmir with Porous borders with India. Autonomous Kashmir will not have the support of Jammu Hindus and would lead to Civil War in Jammu region. This actually happened in East Pakistan on March 2nd and 3rd 1971, when the properties of Non-Bengalis in Jinnah A venue were set on fire followed by looting and arson in Nawabpur Area. I have vividly delineated the feelings of a section of Pakistan Army only to point out that this section of Pakistan Army soon will gain ascendancy and force the present Pakistan Government to grant full independence to Pak Administered Kashmir after brokering a defence pact of Azad Kashmir with China. Thereafter China will takeover the economic burden of militancy in Kashmir, by forging a link between Maoists insurgents in Nepal and Kashmiri insurgents. Kashmiri insurgents will receive arms via; Nepal and Tibet from China. MUTTIHIDA MAJLIS AMMAL is fully supporting this idea: Benazir Bhutto toyed with this idea inspired by Maulaana Fazul-ur-Rehman, the ideologue who guided Bhutto in her policies towards China. Samuel P. Huntington was the first to notice this angularity in the politics of Pakistan. In this "Clash of Civilizations" he wrote to quote his own words:

".. ..under these conditions, the Confucian-Islamic connection will continue and perhaps broaden and deepen. Central to this connection

has been the cooperation of Muslim and Sinic societies opposing the west on weapons proliferation, human rights, and other issues. At its core have been the close relations among Pakistan, Iran and China, which crystallized in the early 1990s with the visit of President Young Shangkun to Iran and Pakistan and of President Rafsanjani to Pakistan and China.

These pointed to the emergence of an embryonic alliance between Iran, Pakistan and China, and, that an attack on Pakistan would be considered an attack on Iran. Reinforcing this pattern Benazir Bhutto visited Iran and China, immediately after becoming Prime Minister in October 1993.

The cooperation among the three countries has included regular exchanges, among political, military and bureaucratic officials and joint efforts in a variety of Civil and Military areas, including defence production, in addition to weapons transfer from China to other States. The development of this relationship has been strongly supported by those in Pakistan believing to independence and Muslim Schools of thought on Foreign policy who look forward to a Tehran, Islamabad, Beijing axis, while in Tehran it was argued that the distinctive nature of the contemporary world, required, 'close and consistent cooperation' among Iran, China, Pakistan and Kazakhstan."

MUTTIHIDA MAJLIS AMMAL is still supporting this viewpoint and hopes Osama Bin Ladin from his headquarters on the borders of China and Tibet, will be soon able to open his second front in Kashmir by the year 2015 A.D. So far we Kashmiris are concerned, Kashmir Valley at the moment is wrapped in a raging inferno, and, river Jhelum has already been transmuted into a soft flowing Acheron. The disaster is looming large on Kashmir Horizon. We prepare ourselves for bloody Indo-Pak in 2015 A.D.

This may be read in conjunction with my article entitled 'Kashmir, at Brink of Precipice' dated May 12th 2004 (The Kash-

mir Time Jammu) in which I pointed out the facts of new situation.

Kashmir political actors who till yesterday considered themselves at the center stage of an ongoing, ever unfolding, political drama, have found out their utter dismay that they are infact redundant buffoons in an opera bouffe sheer objects of scorn and derision, and in fact people treat them like geckos lacking any social standing and who have become part of social garbology. Soon they will be tossed into the trashcan of history. Kashmiri people it may be commented ne-me-ne contrade centi, have rejected the recent electoral process in the State as sham. This is the verdict of the people. This is the bitter ground reality. It does not bother the people which political in the ongoing elections will claim victory, and, which political party will bear the stigma of Gerry mandering and manipulation of electorate. Elections 2004 in Kashmir have topsy turvied the dialectics of democracy, in this State, across the board.

The Indian think tank that consists of many old, indolent opiated geezers with lot of hubris, should wake up from their deep slumber, and, realize the obvious, that is, that elections have widened the Kashmir, Jammu Divide something every frightening and ominous.

I recall that when in late eighties the Kashmir Bar Association with utter crassitude supported the demand for two capitals in J&K State. I, as a matter of principle resigned publicly from this association. I have always envisioned a Jammu and Kashmir State as it existed on the eve of the partitions, playing a pivotal role, in the affairs of South Asia. It grieves me greatly to realize that in integrity of Jammu and Kashmir State is once again in jeopardy.

My views on current situation may not be very clear but as British History Scholar HG Gelber tells us, to quote his own words:

".. .. The purpose of studying history is to create doubt. There are few facts, incidents, developments in the story of man,

whose meaning can be taken for granted. There are no interpretations, which can claim final validity.

The explanation most likely to be wrong, is invariably is that which is too neat, easily lists five causes and six effects of everything." Unquote (See his essay "The coming of the Second World War")

These words for me have great signification as honest to goodness, I really feel the tour de force of what the Russian Sociologist Peterim. A. Sorokin has tellingly said:

".....We are seemingly between epochs; the dying sensate culture of our magnificent yesterday and the coming ideational culture of creative tomorrow the light is fading. The night of the transitory period begins to loom before with its nightmares, frightening shadows and heart rending horrors". Unquote

I realize I am a child of a transitory period, so I would avoid specifics and concentrate on generalities, as, generalities alone some time survive the trauma of a transition.

Samuel P. Huntington is of the opinion or in expressing a generalization that:

".....Democratization conflicts with westernization,

and democracy is inherently a parochial thing and not a cosmopolitan thing process. Politicians in non western societies do not elections by demonstrating how western they are:

Electoral competition instead stimulates them to fashion what they believe will be the most popular appeals, and those are usually:

- a. ethnic
- b. nationalist and
- c. religious in character". Unquote

This reflection of Samuel P. Huntington is vindicated by the manner elections in year 2004 were held in Jammu and Kashmir State. I have no hesitation in saying that Elections 2004

in the

State of Jammu and Kashmir have opened an ever widening gulf between the Kashmir and Jammu regions. [In fact this was bound to happen. New social and economic facts have emerged due to conscious and deliberate population increases going on unabated in the Jammu region. Over the years several hundred thousand marriages between the scions of Dogra community and Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs have taken place. [In fact several lakh Hindus from neighbouring Punjab have already settled in Jammu region. Jammu people have forged trade linkages with people in Punjab, Haryana and Delhi. This change has given rise to new economic and social facts. Henceforth the entire industrial developments in Jammu region will be linked to industrial developments in Haryana and Punjab. This process will lead to some sort of integration of Jammu region with Punjab, something, which Dogra rulers wanted to avoid only saving their principedom.

This should have brought a sense of security amongst the people of Jammu region but curiously enough it has escalated the sense of insecurity in the Jammu region, impelling the population of Jammu region to voice their demand for fresh census taking and de novo redistricting of the region, so that the people of Jammu region are enabled to enhance their representation in the Kashmir Legislature.

Such a process cannot be stymied for a long period. The composition of J&K Legislature is bound to undergo substantial change in near future. As a chain reaction will set in, the relationship between the Jammu and Kashmir region will be governed not by any Uniform Principles, but, by the emerging incompatibility of principles.

Incompatibility of principles originates from the profound feelings that Jammu region is geographically different from Kashmir region, second Jammu people are ethnically different from Kashmir people, third Jammu people are culturally different from Kashmir people, fourth Jammu people are reli-

giously different from Kashmir people. These feelings plus the ongoing process of miscegenation with Punjabis and the future population increases in Jammu region will fuel the feelings of regional autonomy for Jammu. In coming years there will be acceleration of religious observances with emphasis on Hindutva, more emphasis on Punjabi dress and values, revitalization of Punjabi culture and reassertion of Punjabi in public life and an aversion increasingly augmented towards Kashmir valley. The total reinstitution of Punjabi, Dogri way of life will also widen the hiatus between Jammu Hindus and Jammu Muslims as Jammu Muslims population will not be augmented and their minority status will be further accentuated, leading to feelings of greater insecurity. So Jammu people and political parties shall insist for a new census in the State in order to enhance their representation in the Jammu and Kashmir Legislature.

Elections 2004 have polarized the population of Jammu and Kashmir State. The people of Kashmir have adopted a policy of rejectionism towards elections, as they feel that elections within the ambit of Indian Constitution will stultify their right to self determination. The people of Jammu have participated in the elections to boost political parties that believe in complete integration of Jammu and Kashmir State with Union of India. This polarization means:

- a. That with Jammu gaining parity with Kashmir region in representation in Kashmir Legislature, there will be resurgence of demand for abolition of Article 370 and revival of Praja Parishad in Jammu.
- b. No Kashmiri regional party like National Conference or POP will ever get in future elections a working cohesive majority.
- c. So far the symbolic post of Chief Minister is concerned, the Jammu Legislators with whose coalition the future government will be instituted in the State will revive demand for rotation principle, something that has hap-

pened in Cyprus.

- d. Only a coalition will be able to form a government in future so that government policy-making choices will be seriously impaired. In other words no law will pass muster that would safeguard the status of permanent residents within the parameters of the Kashmir Constitution and perpetually Kashmiri distinct identity will be out-jawed.
- e. Henceforth within the government itself there will be difference of opinion as to the function of representative government, and, commitment to the particular value hierarchy that government should promote distinctness of J&K State will get impaired. This will alter the conceptual framework within which the government functions and, now emphasis will be on independent development of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh region.
- f. There will be one government with tripartite division of decision making in the State.

This situation reminds me of what Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said while deciding *Schenck Vs United States* 249 US 47 [1919]. The eminent Judge said

"..... All life experiment, and, all men stand on an equal footing of ignorance, regarding the ultimate meaning of life".

Democracy at any particular stage is nurtured by social and economic matters.

The type of democracy we are instituting in J&K State by encouraging the demographic alteration of Jammu region is bound to give a rise to a Cyprus like situation.

Now Ladakh will emphasis on regional autonomy will become important for China. In fact China should be beholden to the simpleton judges of the Jammu and Kashmir Full Bench that have interpreted the State Subject laws in a manner con-

ducive to the integration of Ladakh with Tibet. If a Ladakh girl marries a Chinese boy shall retain her State Subject status and the Chinese boy and his progeny will inherit from her. The wiseacre judges of J&K High Court could not understand this logic.

Already in order to contain India, the China Pakistan, Iran axis is in the offing. Unofficially it exists. On 26th October, 2004 China is going to revive old silk road that means constructing a land route linking central Asian States with China and Pakistan. China is the second largest consumer of fuel oil in the world. China so far was depending on fuel oil by purchases in the Singapore market. Revival of old silk route will enable China to obtain oil from Iran and Central Asian Muslim States. China has still not wholly given up its claim to Araunchal Pradesh. China is the main supplier of small arms to ULF A in the North-East India, a fact that is corroborated by the seizure of consignment of sophisticated weapons in Chittagong Port. This could not be possible, unless Bangladesh has also joined the unofficial China, Iran, Pakistan, Nexus.

On 2nd April, 2004 from two trawlers in Chittagong Port:

- a. 4,930 S.L.Rs and SMGs.
- b. 1,43,520 rounds of ammunition
- c. 27,020 Pieces of T82/2 Rocket Propelled Grenades.
- d. 2000 Grenade Launchers. e. 150 Rocket Launchers.
- f. 6,392 magazines were seized.

According to the estimate of Indian Intelligence Agencies, these arms were meant for North-East insurgent groups such as: Ulfa, NSCN (IM), PLA, NDFB, NLFT, ATTF. According to secret reports submitted by Indian intelligence agencies, the present BNP Jammatt Coalition ruling Bangladesh is conniving at the major arms smuggling operations in which ULF A insurgents are involved. In other words it is in the interest of China to keep the pot boiling for Indian in North-East. In fact the Indian intelligence Agencies have raised their finger of sus-

picion towards the involvement of Mr. Salauddin Choudhury for whose candidature as Secretary General of OIC. Mr. Murshed Khan the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh lobbied specially by visiting turkey twice.

So, now in the changed scenario Chinese Kashmir policy will get a new orientation. Chinese realize that its border dispute with India is not easy for any resolution, because Hindu civilization has never accommodated Buddhist Civilization. Islamic and Confucian States have a common interest to withstand western universalism. India and Israel are two major pillars of this Universalism. Christian Russia would soon emerge as the third Pillar, China also realizes that religious divide between Indian and Pakistan will compel both countries for a Spanish walk, that would never take them to converging point called a Federation. So, if this Hindu Muslim divide also suffuses the political processes in the J&K State, then Muslim insurgents would look towards China for Succor, Ladakh will be the route for supply of arms to insurgents in Kashmir.

The population increases in Jammu region will lead to greater representation of Jammu people in Kashmir Assembly and the marginalisation of local regional parties, who will be allowed to form governments with the support of National parties like Congress or BJP. The sequel would be that these government would become a go-between between the people of Kashmir and the Central Governments. So good governance would wither away. The government in Kashmir would always be under compulsion to gratify the aspirations of the majority Hindu community in Jammu region while sidelining the Jammu Muslims who have been reduced to a minority. So on the principle that societies sharing cultural affinities cooperate with each other, the Jammu Muslims will develop bounds of empathy with people of Azad Kashmir, giving rise to movement for an independent Azad Kashmir, that would enter into a defense pact with China.

Pakistan is avoiding this dicey situation under pressure

form USA at the moment, but once old silk route is revived in October 2004 and Pakistan is linked with Central Asian Countries via; China the present political equations will suffer unexpected permutations. Sheer chaos will take over Jammu and Kashmir State, as Chinese consumer goods will inundate this State that would show India in a poor economic light. People will realize that people of J&K State would have greater economic advantages, if they align themselves with China.

An apercu of Pakistan's road map on Kashmir shows a step by step approach. First, Pakistan would put the suggestion that Muzaffarabad - Srinagar route should be restored and people of two Kashmir allowed commutation without the necessity of a passport.

Second, Indian should restore the autonomy to Kashmir then new alignments will emerge. The Chief Minister will be reduced to the status of a domesticated tan Tony pig while the Chief Minister of Pak-held Kashmir will be elevated to the status of a Manager for Chinese interests in Azad Kashmir.

Second phase would be the admission of Pak-held Kashmir to the unwritten strategic alliance that exists between China, Iran and Pakistan. When I say that strategic alliance between China Iran, and Pakistan exists, I am not indulging in any mind game.

Rafsanjani, on his way to China in 1993 actually used these words in Islamabad and openly declared that an attack on Pakistan would be considered an attack on Iran. Pakistan on its part has realized the obvious, that it has to distance itself from Saudi influence, and forge a regional alliance with Iran, with a view to avoid devastating Shia Sunni Civil War.

India US Israel alliance has exacerbated the situation, where China has to act in a preemptive manner to contain India. Pakistan and Bangladesh can only exist as an Independent State if they forge alliance with China, otherwise they will be coerced to confederate with India, that is something detrimental to Chinese interest in South Asia. We have to develop a realist

theory of international relations and according to this theory confrontations between States cannot be avoided by sheer mutual trade and economic cooperation. Some years back the US Defense Department declared a new strategy of preparing two major regional conflicts, one against North Korea and other against Iraq. Now China is preparing two major regional conflicts one in Kashmir and the other in Taiwan. In my considered view the demographic alteration of population in Ladakh in coming years, will initiate this process, as Pakistan Kashmir will willingly allow some Chinese Muslim from Sing Kiang to get settled in Askardu and Kargil. Some Afghans may be settled in Muzaffarabad. In terms of practical politics this situation can still be avoided, if India gives up its dream of becoming a global power, accepts the reality of the existence of Pakistan and Bangladesh, and concedes the right of the Kashmiri people to decide their fate according to the resolutions of UN Security Counsel. Any other solution is an exercise in futility. The prospect of a bleak and dreary future, like some frightsome nude Androgynous, Anthropoid is descending from lofty sky of Ollr imagination to perpetuate our endless, never ceasing nightmare, as people of Kashmir suspect that for the nonce, have reached an agreement to continue dialogue on Kashmir with a further agreement that is pursuance of his dialogue the will not reach a final agreement.

An earlier article entitled "Kashmir Elections 2004, are a Known, Unknown" [April 10, 2004 The Kashmir Times Jammu] draws pointed attention to the fact that Chinese interference in Kashmir Affairs is now in the realm of possibility.

One has not to convene a secret seance of Ghousts, Ghouls, demned Souls, Evil spirits, Seannachie of yore, and local spiritualists at some secret cave in Koh Maran hills adjoining Lake Nageen to discover the recondite intelligence that Kashmir Elections 2004 are a known, unknown a felicitous phrase I have borrowed from Donald Rumsfeld US Secretary of State who relishes picturesque speech to express his warped political views

on West Asia, and, if we are not transcending present knowledge, we can acclaim and acknowledge the ground reality that politics in Kashmir is equally warped as in West Asia.

Elections in Kashmir are known, unknown, because once 1947 people have never participated in this process for historical reasons. Historical reasons cannot be brushed aside as useless Logodaedaly. On 26th Oct. 1947, Maharaja acceded to the Dominion of India and instrument of Accession provided that Maharaja transferred to Dominion of India the subject pertaining to Election to Dominion Legislature, that was empowered to legislate in regard to the subjects included in schedule to the instrument of Accession.

Yet the Dominion of India did not enact any electoral laws under which people could elect their representatives to the Dominion Parliament. On 16th April 1949, Nehru had a long detailed meeting with Sheikh Abdullah. Therefore no elections were held in the State, and four members were nominated to the Constituent Assembly of India. One need not reiterate that Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was a rigged Assembly brought into existence without holding elections who nominated the four members to the Constituent Assembly of India? It is the interim Government instituted by Maharaja headed by Abdullah that nominated four members to represent J&K State in the constituent Assembly of India. To make the picture complete it may be stated that nominations were referred to Hari Singh, who still was an autocratic despot and at the relevant time was sojourning at Dehra Dun. Hari Singh as Maharaja of Kashmir in May 1949 deputed for representatives (who included Sheikh Abdullah) to the Constituent Assembly of India.

These representatives joined the Constituent Assembly of India on June 6th, 1949. Till then Maharaja had not abdicated the throne. So people of Kashmir have not ratified the original Indian constitution is a historical fact, and need not be disputed by any student of Indian History Elections were thereaf-

ter held in March 1957 and in 1962. According to Alstair Lamb to quote his own words.

"Most students of political history of Jammu and Kashmir State, however, nor agree that like 1951 elections for the Constituent Assembly, both the 1957 and 1962 Legislative Assembly Elections were so manipulated (largely by controlled nominations and managed turnouts) as to throw no significant light upon the realities of popular opinion in the State." Unquote

What are the realities of popular opinion in the State?

It 25 seats were kept vacant for the people of PoK in the Constituent Assembly of J&K State, and actually now the J&K Constitution of 1957 provides that 25 seats shall be kept vacant for the people of PoK, then, why did not Indian Constitution keep any seat vacant for people of PoK in the Indian Constitution itself? What is its significant? Historical records shown in 1948 itself Nehru suggested LOAC should be treated as an International border. Does it mean that Indian Constitution accepts the position that PoK is not an integral part of India? When Parliamentary Elections are held in J&K State; does the electorate endorse this viewpoint? And why is it that for electing Legislative Assembly. Under the provisions of J&K Constitution one has to be a permanent Resident of J&K State, but, Indian Constitution and Indian Electoral Laws do not lay down any such rigid conditionality for elections to Parliament. Why?

The reason is obvious beyond any shadow of doubt. Since 1947 till this date more than three hundred thousand inter state marriages have taken place in Jammu Region. Most of the Jammu Dogras and Sikhs have married their sons and daughters in the districts of Punjab and Haryana like Patiala, Amritsar, Jallandar, Chandigarh and Delhi; and most of the people from Punjab and Haryana have settled in Jammu region leading to a subtle demographic change in the Jammu region. This demographic change is manifest from the fact that in 1946 or 1947

or till then hardly two or three hundred pilgrims used to visit the Holy Vishnu Devi Cave, and, now annually six or seven Lakhs pilgrims from India visit Katra. One has only to surf the pages of Kashmir Gazetteer for logistics pertaining to pilgrims who visit Katra to come to this conclusion. Katra has been turned into an important Hindu shrine.

Since 1971 till date, no census, has taken place in J&K State. So for PoK is concerned no demographic alteration has occurred. The reason is again obvious. According to Alstair Lamb:

".....The Muzaffarabad regime is not easy to classify.

While depending upon Pakistan for its military and economic, survival (not least because of its importance for watering of the West Punjab by rivers which ran through it and by vast projects like Mangla, which over the years to come to be situated on its soil) it was not entirely a puppet State. In some respects it was a kind of Kashmir Government in Exile, as such it provided a forum for Kashmiri politicians who represented widely divergent views as to the kind of time, it was inevitable that Pakistan would watch closely and intervene actively in, its political processes, economic, political and military, it could not be hope to survive."

"... So long as Azad Kashmir existed, there was a constant temptation, as Maharaja, has observed, for Kashmiri nationalist in Srinagar to seek some formulae for the unification of the divided Kashmiri State, through means other than India arms and diplomacy."

". . . There can be no doubt however that the prospect of a deal between Sheikh Abdullah and Azad Kashmir for what might be called an 'Integral settlement of Kashmir question caused

great anxiety in New Delhi;' and it was certainly a contributing factor in Sheikh Abdullah's downfall in 1953". Unquote

So what emerges from this discussion is that:

The Jammu Hindus are convinced that demographic alteration of Jammu region has been accomplished fully, and judicially legitimized by Full Bench Judgment of J&K High Court, and, as such in future, Jammu will never be sundered from us.

India, come what may. Second, that Pakistan is still treating Azad Kashmir as a Government in exile, and, as such people of Pakistani Punjab have avoided to have alliances of matrimony and trade with the people of Azad Kashmir, and the upshot of this policy is that the population of Azad Kashmir has not suffered any demographic alteration is static. This gives advantage to India, as population of Jammu region has nearly doubled, and of PoK remains same. Third, as some stage Pakistan may recognize Azad Kashmir as an independent State, so as to enable it to enter into a defence pact with China, and, then China can assist in the reunification of Azad Kashmir with Kashmir Valley. Nehru had realized this danger in October 1947 itself as is evident from the memorandum from Indian Foreign Department to Prime Minister of England Mr. Attlee dated: 25th of October, 1947 in which it was stated:

".....Kashmir northern frontiers, as your are aware, run in common with three countries, Afghanistan, the USSR and China, security of Kashmir is vital to the security of India."

Especially China will be compelled to ensure the safety of Azad Kashmir if it is granted independence in view of SinoPakistan Border Agreement of 2nd March 1963 so that China now has territory perilously close to indo-Pak cease fire line in Kashmir. China has also to secure itself. No solution of Kashmir is possible without Chinese intervention that is imminent.

In this historical perspective one more fact may be recorded that Kashmiris have always boycotted Indian Parliamentary Elections as they feel they have yet to decide their own future, and, Government of India has accepted the position that Kashmir is a dispute to be resolved by means of a comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan.

Even otherwise the elections are legally flawed. As, since, 1971 no census in the State of J&K, has taken place. With correct electoral rolls there can be no apportionment of seats. Now the importance of apportionment may be stated:

1. Apportionment determines who are going to represent people in the parliament.
2. Apportionment determines distribution of political power in Legislature of J&K State.
3. Indian Constitution envisages political representation on the basis of population and not locality or region.

So far apportionment is concerned what is important is, to find out:

"... What is the population mean of the State, what are the most populous districts and what are the least populace districts, what is the percentage over state average, and what is the minimum majority i.e. the smallest percentage of State population that could elect a representative, keeping in view the population of various ethnic, and linguistic groups so that the legislature is not mal apportioned. "Without Census and correct electoral rolls, the elections are flawed. We are facing the same situation that is described by Justice TOM Clark of the US Supreme Court, while dealing with an apportionment issue in *Baker V s Carr* [1962] in these words:

"... The majority of the people of Tennessee, have no practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls to correct the existing invidious discrimination. The State has no initiative and referendum present under the law. The Majority of the voters have been caught up in a legislative straight

civically. Militant, electorate, and an aroused popular conscience of the peoples representatives. This is because of legislative policy has riveted the present seats in the Assembly to their respective constituencies, and, by votes of their incumbents reapportionment of any kind is prevented." Unquote

The people of Jammu and Kashmir have also been riveted to their Constituencies, without finding out the demographic alteration of population in Jammu region. These elections as such are a farce. They do not represent the public opinion. They are meant to pass on the political power in the hands of the National Parties, like BJP or Congress who have no concern with the local sentiments. As the demographic metamorphosis of Jammu has placed it in a dominant position, the, next step, for the election commission would be to rearrange redistricting process on population basis, so that there is divided control of the government in Jammu and Kashmir State. Thereafter no local Kashmiri political party can be a winning party of 'strong cohesion-producing majority'.

See the comments of Lockhard 'State and Local Government' page 318 especially his view:

In 1959, in Pennsylvania such skewed representation of this sort deprived the Democrats of a badly needed working majority.

The demographic alteration of population of Jammu region has ensured that firstly representation of Indian Parliament in future will be skewed in favour of Jammu region. Secondly, that in future no regional political party will ever secure a working cohesive majority. Thirdly, the electoral process of national parties like BJP or Congress.

The upshot of this situation is that people of Kashmir will again whole heartedly boycott the Parliamentary Elections in the year 2004 and also thereafter. To reach a settlement with the Kashmiri leadership alone will become an exercise in futility. These elections will only lead to stepped up militancy in the State, the demographic alternation of population in Jammu

region will encourage China to bring about the demographic alteration of population in Ladakh; leading to its merger with Tibet, China will play a major role in the resolution of Kashmir dispute and Pakistan will be too happy that it would be relieved of bearing the economic burden in Kashmir. In fact the visit of recent Chinese military delegation to Pakistan is gravid with meaning and some sort of understanding in this behalf is getting underway soon some new evil for people of Kashmir is gestating in the womb of time.

How the Kashmiri people will respond to the fast changing political scenario makes it imperative for political observers to make endeavors to understand the Kashmiri mind. The book "Understanding the Kashmiri Mind" is a small effort in this behalf. However I would epilogise this introduction with a request to the reader to reflect on what BOSWORTH

SMITH said in the year 1889 (to quote his own words):

"Again, Islam in its various ramifications is a subject so vast and so complex and is so full of apparent contradictions, that independent enquirers may honestly at the most apposite results. It ought for this reasons to be approached from as many and as different points of view as possible: and assuredly the precise point of view from which I have approached it whether it be best Peres or not, is the one from which hitherto, there has been hardly any attempt to approach it at all."

These remarks mutatis mutant's may be applied to my dissertation by the perceptive reader for stimulating his own discernment on this subject.

In sum, I may point out that the political scenario has again undergone a sea-change in the year 2009 in Pakistan. a democratically government in Pakistan finds itself in jeopardy in the year 2009. to a most perceptive observers of Indian sub-continent it seems martial law is imminent in Pakistan in the year 2009, unless divine providence intervenes to change the course of history.

[SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY]

- Abba, F.A., *Profiles of Abdullah*, Srinagar 1980.
- Abdullah, Sheikh M., "Kashmir, India and Pakistan", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1965. Abdullah, Sheikh M., with a Monograph by Y.D. Gundevia. *The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah*, Dehra Dun 1974.
- Addis, Sir J.M., *The India-China Border Question*, Centre for International Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963.
- Agarwal, H.O., *Kashmir Problem -Its Legal Aspects*, Allahabad 1979.
- Ahmad, M., *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, Karachi 1967.
- Ahmad, N., "China's Himalayan Frontiers: Pakistan's Attitude", *International Affairs*, 1962.
- Aitchison, C.U., ed., *Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, etc.*, Volume XIV, Calcutta 1929.
- Akbar Khan, Ex-Major-General, *Raiders in Kashmir. Story of the Kashmir War (1947-48)*, Karachi 1970.
- Akbar, M.J., *The Siege Within. Challenges to a Nations's Unity*, London 1985.
- Akbar, M.J., *Nehru, The Making of India*, London 1988.
- Akhtar, J.D., *Political Conspiracies in Pakistan. Liaquat Ali's Murder to Ayub Khan's Exit*, Delhi 1969.
- Alder, G.J., *British India's Northern Frontier 1865-1895*, London 1963.
- Alder, G.J., *Beyond Bokhara. The Life of William Moorcroft, Asian Explorer and Pioneer Veterinary Surgeon 1767-1825*, Lon-

don 1985.

- Ambekar, G.V., & Divekar, V.D., *Documents on China's Relations with South and South east Asia 1949-1962*, Bombay 1964.
- Asghar Khan, M., *The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965*, London 1979.
- Atal, Major-General H., *Nehru's Emissary to Kashmir (October 1947)*, New Delhi 1972.
- Austin, G., *The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation*, Oxford. 1966.
- Ayoob, M., & Subrahmanyam, K., *The Liberation War*, New Delhi 1972.
- Ayub Khan, M., *Speeches and Statements*, (October 1958-June 1964), 6 vols., Karachi n.d.
- Ayub Khan, M., "The Pakistani-American Alliance. Strains and Stresses", *Foreign Affairs*, January 1964.
- Ayub Khan, M., *Friends not Masters. A Political Autobiography*, London 1967.
- Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, *India Wins Freedom*, New Delhi 1959.
- Azad Kashmir, Government of, *The Kashmir Liberation Movement*, Muzaffarabad n.d.
- Azad Kashmir, Government of, *Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Visit to Azad Kashmir*, Muzaffarabad 1976.
- Bahl, M., *Whither Kashmir*, New Delhi n.d.
- Bains, J. S., *India's International Disputes: a Legal Study*, London 1962.
- Bamzai, P.N.K., *A History of Kashmir: Political. Social-Cultural, From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, Delhi 1962.
- Bamzai, P.N.K., *Kashmir and Power Politics: from Lake Success to Tashkent*, Delhi 1966.
- Bamzai, P.N.K., *Kashmir and Central Asia*, New Delhi 1980.

Bibliography

- Bamzai, P.N.K., *Socio-Economic History of Kashmir (1846-1925)*, New Delhi 1987.
- Barnds, W.J., *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, London 1972.
- Bashir, J.K., *Big Power Role in the Indo-Pak Conflict of 1971*, Lahore n.d.
- Bazaz, Nagin, *Ahead of His Times*, Prem Nath Bazaz: *His Life & Work*, New Delhi 1983.
- Bazaz, P.N., *The History of the Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir*, New Delhi 1954. Bazaz, P.N., *Kashmir in Crucible*, New Delhi 1967.
- Bazaz, P.N., *Democracy Through Intimidation and Terror. The Untold Story of Kashmir Politics*, New Delhi 1978.
- Beg, A., *Captive Kashmir*, Lahore 1957.
- Beg, A., *The Wailing Vale. Blood-stained Story of Kashmir*, Lahore 1969.
- Beg, Mirza Mohammed Afzal, *Sheikh Abdullah Defended*, Srinagar n.d.
- Bhatt, R.K.K., *Political and Constitutional Development of the Jammu and Kashmir State*, New Delhi 1984.
- Bhushan, S., *Karakoram Road*, New Delhi 1978.
- Bhushan, V., *State Politics and Government: Jammu and Kashmir*, Jammu Tawi 1985.
- Bhutto, Z.A., *Speeches before United Nations General Assembly 1957-1965*, Karachi n.d.
- Bhutto, Z.A., *The Myth of independence* London 1969.
- Birdwood, Lord, *A Continent Decides*, London 1953.
- Birdwood, Lord, *Two Nations and Kashmir*, London 1956.
- Blinkenberg, L., *India-Pakistan. The History of Unsolved Conflicts*, Copenhagen 1972.
- Brecher, M., *The Struggle for Kashmir*, New York 1953.
- Brecher, M., *Nehru: a Political Biography*, London 1959.

- Brines, R., *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict*, London 1968.
- Burke, S.M., *Pakistan's Foreign Policy. An Historical Analysis*, London 1973.
- Butt, S., *Kashmir in Flames (An Untold Story of Kashmir's Political Affairs)*, Srinagar 1981.
- Callard, K., *Pakistan: a Political Study*, London 1957.
- Campbell Johnson, A., *Mission with Mountbatten*, London 1951.
- Caroe, Sir O., "The India-China Frontiers", *Geographical Journal*, 130, 1964.
- Chagla, M.C., *Kashmir, 1947-65*, Delhi 1965.
- Chaudhry, M.S., *Der Kaschmirkonflikt. Seine Ursachen, sein Wesen sowie Rolle und Bemühungen der Vereinten Nationen*, 3 vols., Munchen 1976.
- Chhabra, G.S., & Charak, S.D.S., eds. *Jammu & Kashmir. Aspects of Socio-Political History*, New Delhi 1986.
- Chohan, A.S., *The Gilgit Agency 1877-1935*, New Delhi n.d.
- Chohan, A.S., *Historical Study of Society and Culture in Dardistan and Ladakh*, New Delhi n.d.
- Chopra, S., *U.N. Mediation in Kashmir: a Study in Power Politics*, Kurukshetra 1971.
- Chopra, V.D., *Genesis of Indo-Pakistan Conflict on Kashmir*, New Delhi 1990. Choudhury, G.W., *Pakistan's Relations with India 1947-1966.*, London 1968. Choudhury, G.W., *The Last Days of United Pakistan*, London 1974.
- Chowdhury, S.R., *The Genesis of Bangladesh*, London 1972.
- Clubb, E.O., *China & Russia. The "Great Game"*, New York 1971.
- Collins, L., & Lapierre, D., *Freedom at Midnight*, London 1975.
- Connell, J., *Auckinleck*, London 1959.
- Corfield, Sir C., *The Princely India I Knew from Reading to Mountbatten*, Madras 1975.
- Cunningham, A., *Ladak, Physical, Statistical and Historical*, London 1854.

- Das, M.N., *Partition and Independence of India. Inside Story of the Mountbatten Days*, New Delhi 1982.
- Das, T., *Sino-Pak Collusion and U.S. Policy*. New Delhi 1972.
- Das Gupta, J.B., *Indo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1955*, Amsterdam 1958.
- Drew, F., *The Jummoo and Kashmir Territories*, London 1875.
- Durand, A.G.R., *The Making of a Frontier*, London 1900.
- East, W.G., Spate, O.H.K., & Fisher, C.A., *The Changing Map of Asia. A Political Geography*, 5th ed., London 1971.
- Edwardes, M., *Nehru. A Political Biography*, London 1971.
- Elliott, Maj.-General J.G., *The Frontier 1839-1947*, London 1968.
- Everest-Phillips, M., "British Consuls in Kashgar", *Asian Affairs*, February 1991. Fazili, M.A., *Socialist Ideas & Movement in Kashmir (1919-1947)*, New Delhi 1980.
- Feldman, H., *Revolution in Pakistan. A Study of the Martial Law Administration*, London 1967.
- Feldman, H., *From Crisis to Crisis. Pakistan 1962-1969*, London 1972.
- Feldman, H., *The End & the Beginning. Pakistan 1969-1971*, London 1975.
- Fleming, P., *News from Tartary. A journey from Peking to Kashmir*, London 1936.
- Forbes, A.D.W., *Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia. A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949*, Cambridge 1986.
- Forsyth, Sir T.D., *Report of a Mission to Yarkand in 1873*, Calcutta 1875.
- Fraser, G.M., *Flashman and the Mountain of Light*, London 1990.
- Fraser-Tytler, W.K., revised by M.C. Gillett, *Afghanistan. A Study of Political Development in Central and Southern Asia*, 3rd ed., London 1967.
- Gajendragadakar, P.B., *Kashmir. Retrospect and Prospect*. Patel

- Memorial Lectures*, Bombay 1967.
- Galbraith, J.K., *Abaasador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years*, London 1969.
- Ganai, A.J., *Kashmir and National Conference and Politics (1975-1980)*, Srinagar 1984.
- Ganju, M., *Textile Industries in Kashmir Jammu and Kashmir State*, New Delhi 1945.
- Ghai, P.V., *The Partition of the Punjab 1849-1947*, Delhi 1986.
- Ghose, D.K., *Kashmir in Transition 1885-1893*, Calcutta 1975.
- Gopal, S., *Jawaharlal Nehru. A Biography. Volume One: 1889-1947*, London 1975.
- Gopal, S., *Jawaharlal Nehru. A Biography. Volume Two: 1947-1956*, London 1979.
- Gopal, S., *Jawaharlal Nehru. A Biography. Volume Three: 1956-1964*, Delhi 1984.
- Goswami, B.N., *Pakistan and China: a Study in their Relations*, Bombay 1971.
- Great Britain, Government of, *Accounts and Papers, 1890, LIV. East Indies. Papers Relating to Kashmir*. C 6072, London 1890.
- Great Britain, Government of, *Accounts and Papers, 1892, LVIII. East Indies. Correspondence Relating to the Operations in Hunza-Nagar*. C 6621, London 1892.
- Gundevia, Y.D., *Outside the Archives*, Hyderabad 1984.
- Gupta, H.R., *The India-Pakistan War 1965*, 2 vols., Delhi 1967.
- Gupta, H.R., *The Kutch Affair*, Delhi 1969.
- Gupta, K., "The McMahon Line 1911-45: the British Legacy", *China Quarterly*, 47, 1971.
- Gupta, K., *The Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier*, Calcutta 1974.
- Gupta, K., *Spotlight on Sino-Indian Frontiers*, Calcutta 1982.
- Gupta, K., "Sino-Indian Border. Legacy and Responsibility",

- Frontier*, 8 September 1984.
- Gupta, K., *Sino-Indian Relations 1948-52. Role of K.M. Panikkar*, Calcutta 1987.
- Gupta, S., *Kashmir: a study in India-Pakistan relations*, New Delhi 1966. Hafizullah, M., *Toward Azad Kashmir*, Lahore 1948.
- Hamid, Maj., General S.S., *Karakoram Hunza. The Land of Just Enough*, Karachi 1979.
- Hasan, K. Sarwar, ed., *Documents of the Foreign Relations of Pakistan. China, India, Pakistan*, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi 1966.
- Hasan, K. Sarwar, ed., *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Pakistan. The Kashmir Question*, Karachi 1966.
- Hassan Khan, G., *The Kashmiri Mussulman*, Srinagar 1973.
- Hassnain, F.M., *Gilgit: the Northern Gate of India*, New Delhi 1978.
- Hassnain, F.M., ed., *Heritage of Kashmir*, Srinagar 1980.
- Hayward, G.W., "Journey from Leh to Yarkand and Kashgar, and Exploration of the Sources of the Yarkand River", *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, XL, 1870.
- Hedin, S., *Big Horse's Flight: the Trail of War in Central Asia*, London 1936.
- Hedin, S., *History of the Expedition in Asia 1927-1935*, 3 parts, Stockholm 1943-44.
- Hodson, H.V., *The Great Divide. Britain-India-Pakistan*, London 1969.
- Holdich, Sir T., *Indian Borderland 1880-1900*, 2nd ed., London 1908.
- Hough, R., *Edwina, Countess Mountbatten of Burma*, London 1983.
- Ibrahim Khan, M., *The Kashmir Saga*, Lahore 1965.
- India, Government of, *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, New

- Delhi 1948.
- India, Government of, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China, September-November 1959 and a Note on the Historical Background of the Himalayan Frontier of India, White Paper II*, New Delhi 1959.
- India, Government of, *Kashmir and the United Nations*, New Delhi 1962.
- India, Government of, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China, July 1963 to January 1964, White Paper No. X*, New Delhi 1964.
- India, Government of, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters exchanged between the Governments of India and China, January 1964 to January 1965, White Paper No. XI*, New Delhi 1965.
- India, Government of Kashmir. *Text of Speeches by Mahomedali Currim Chagla, Union Minister of Education and Leader of the Indian Delegation, in the Security Council on September 17, 18 & 20, 1965*, New Delhi 1965.
- India. Government of, *Pakistan's Aggression in Kutch*, New Delhi 1965.
- India, Government of, *Facts about Kutch-Sind Boundary (in maps)*, New Delhi 1965.
- India, Government of, *Tashkent Declaration*, New Delhi 1966.
- India, Government of, *Indo-Pakistan Conflict. U.N. Documents January-April, 1966*, New Delhi 1966.
- Iqbal, S.M., & Nirash, K.L., eds., *The Culture of Kashmir*, New Delhi 1978.
- Ishaq Khan, M., *History of Srinagar 1846-1947. A Study in Socio-Cultural Change*, Srinagar 18
- Ismay, Lord, *The Memoirs of Lord Ismay*, London 1960.
- Ispahani, M.Z., *Roads and Rivals. The Politics of Access in the Borderlands of Asia*, London 1989.
- Jackson, R., *South Asian Crisis. India Pakistan-Bangla Desh*, Lon-

- don 1975.
- Jain, A.P., *Kashmir: What Really Happened*, Bombay 1972;
- Jain, J.P., *Soviet Policy Towards Pakistan and Bangladesh*, New Delhi 1974.
- Jain, J.P., *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*, New Delhi 1974.
- Jain, R.K., ed., *China South Asian Relations 1947-1980*, 2 vols., London 1981.
- Jammu and Kashmir, Government of, *Administration Report of the Jammu and Kashmir State for S. 2001 (13th April 1944 to 12th April 1945)*, Jammu 1946.
- Jammu and Kashmir, Government of, *Jammu and Kashmir 1947-50: an account of the activities of the first three years of Sheikh Abdullah's Government* Jammu 1951.
- Jammu and Kashmir (1949-1964) *Select Correspondence*, Penguin, New Delhi
- Johnson, W.H., *Report on his Journey to Ilchi, the Capital of Khotan, in Chinese Tartary*, *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, XXXVII, 1867.
- Joshi, D.K., *A New Deal for Kashmir*, New Delhi 1978.
- Kak, B.L., *Chasing Shadows in Ladakh*, New Delhi 1978.
- Kak, B.L., *Kashmir: Problems and Politics*, Delhi 1981.
- Kapur, M.L., *Kashmir Sold and Snatched*, Jammu Tawi 1968.
- Karan Singh, Dr., *Heir Apparent. An Autobiography*, Delhi 1982.
- Karan Singh, Dr., *Sadar-i-Riasat. An Autobiography. Volume Two 1953-1967*, Delhi 1985.
- Kashmir Bureau of Information, *Jammu Situation: Nehru-Mookerjee-Abdullah Correspondence, January-February 1953*, New Delhi 1953.
- Kaul, Lt-General B.M., *Confrontation with Pakistan*, Delhi 1971.
- Keay, J., *When Men And Mountains Meet. The Explorers of the Western Himalaya 1820-75*, London 1977.
- Keay, J., *The Gilgit Game. The Explorers of the Western Himalayas*

- 1865-95, London 1979.
- Khan, G.H., *Freedom Movement in Kashmir 1931-1949*, New Delhi 1980.
- Khan, M.M.R., *The United Nations and Kashmir*, Groningen/Djakarta 1955.
- Khan, Rahamatullah, *Kashmir in the United Nations*, Delhi 1966.
- Kissinger, H., *The White House Years*, London 1979.
- Knight, E.F., *Where Three Empires Meet*, London 1893.
- Korbel, J., *Danger in Kashmir*, Princeton 1954.
- Koul, G.L., *Kashmir Then and Now. (5000 B.C. to 1972 A.D.)*, Srinagar 1972. Kulkarni, V.B., *Pakistan. Its Origin & Relations with India*, London 1988.
- Kumar, V., *Anglo-American Plot Against Kashmir*, Bombay 1954.
- Lakhanpal, P.L., *Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute*, Delhi 1965.
- Lall, J., *Aksaichin and Sino-Indian Conflict*, New Delhi 1988.
- Lamb, A., *The China-India Border: the Origins of the Disputed Boundaries*, London 1964.
- Lamb, A., "The Sino-Pakistani Boundary Agreement of 2 March 1963", *Australian Outlook*, December 1964.
- Lamb, A., *Crisis in Kashmir 1947-1966*, London 1966.
- Lamb, A., *Asian Frontiers. Studies in a Continuing Problem*, London 1968.
- Lamb, A., *The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh*, Canberra 1973.
- Lamb, A., *Tibet, China & India 1914-1950. A History of Imperial Diplomacy*, Hertingfordbury 1989.
- Lattimore, O., *Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, Boston 1950.
- Lawrence, W.R., *The Valley of Kashmir*, London 1895.
- Leitner, G.W., *The Languages and Races of Dardistan*, Lahore 1977.
- Lorimer, E.O., *Language Hunting in the Karakoram*, London 1939.

- Low, D.A., ed., *Soundings in Modern South Asian History*, London 1968.
- Lumby, E.W.R., *The Transfer of Power in India 1945-7*, London 1954.
- Macartney, Sir G., "Eastern Turkestan: the Chinese as rulers over an alien race", *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, 1909.
- Mackinder, Sir H., *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, London 1919.
- Madhok, B.R., *Kashmir, Centre of New Alignments*, New Delhi 1963.
- Madhok, B.R., *Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh. Problem and Solution*, New Delhi 1987.
- Mahajan, M.C., *Looking Back*, London 1963.
- Mahajan, S., *Debacle in Baltistan*, New Delhi 1973.
- Mahmood, S., *A Political Study of Pakistan*, Lahore 1975.
- Maillart, E. K., *Forbidden Journey: From Peking to Kashgar*, London 1937.
- Malmesbury, Countess of, *The Life of Major-General Sir John Ardagh*, London 1909.
- Mansergh, N., Penderel Moon, D.M. Blake & L. Carter, eds., *Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India. The Transfer of Power 1942-47. Volume IX. The fixing of a time limit 4 November 1946-22 March 1947*, London 1980.
- Mansergh, N., Penderel Moon, D.M. Blake & L. Carter, eds., *Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India. The Transfer of Power 1942-47. Volume X. The Mountbatten Viceroyalty: Formulation of a Plan 22 March-30 May 1947*, London 1981.
- Mansergh, N., Penderel Moon, D.M. Blake & L. Carter, eds., *Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India. The Transfer of Power 1942-47. Volume XI. The Mountbatten Viceroyalty: Announcement and Reception of the 3 June Plan 31 May-7 July 1947*, London 1982.

- Mansergh, N., & Penderel Moon, eds., *Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India. The Transfer of Power 1942-47. Volume XII. The Mountbatten Viceroyalty: Princes, Partition and Independence 8 July-15 August 1947*, London 1983.
- Mason, K., *Abode of Snow*, London 1955.
- Maxwell, N., *India's China War*, London 1970.
- Maxwell, N., "China and India: the Un-negotiated Dispute", *China Quarterly*, July- September 1970.
- Menon, K.P.S., *Delhi-Chungking. A Travel Diary*, Bombay 1947.
- Menon, K.P.S., *Twilight in China*, Bombay 1972.
- Menon, V.P., *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States*, London 1956.
- Menon, V.P., *The Transfer of Power in India*, London 1957.
- Misra, K.K., *Kashmir and India's Foreign Policy*, Allahabad 1979.
- Misra, K.P., ed., *Studies in Indian Foreign Policy*, Delhi 1969.
- Moorcroft, W., & Trebeck, G., ed. H.H. Wilson, *Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan and the Panjab*, 2 vols., London 1841.
- Morgan, G., *Ney Elias. Explorer and Envoy Extraordinary in High Asia*, London 1971.
- Morgan, G., *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia 1810-1895*, London 1981. Muhammad Ali, Chaudhri., *The Emergence of Pakistan*, London 1967.
- Mullik, B.N., *My Years With Nehru. Kashmir*, New Delhi 1971.
- Murty, T.S., *India China Boundary. India's Options*, New Delhi 1987.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, Vols. XI, XIV, XV, New Delhi 1978, 1981, 1982.
- Nooraini, A.G., *The Kashmir Question*, Bombay 1964.
- Nyman, L.E., *Great Britain and Chinese, Russian and Japanese Interests in Sinkiang, 1918 -1934*, Malmo 1977.
- Om, H., *Muslims of Jammu & Kashmir: A Study in the Spread of*

- Education and Consciousness, 1857-1925*, New Delhi 1986.
- Pakistan, Government of, *Verdict on Kashmir: being an account of the Security Council Debate from 21st February to 2nd April 1951*, Karachi 1951.
- Pakistan, Government of, *India's Threat to Pakistan: Correspondence between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India 14 July-11 August, 1951*, Karachi 1951.
- Pakistan, Government of, *Negotiations between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India regarding the Kashmir Dispute (June 1953-September 1954)*, Karachi 1954.
- Pakistan, Government of, *Kashmir in Maps*, Rawalpindi 1954.
- Pakistan, Government of, *The Kashmir Issue: Statement to the Press by Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah*, Karachi 1958.
- Pakistan, Government of, *Kashmir Documents*, Karachi 1962.
- Pakistan, Government of, *Reports on Kashmir by United Nations Representatives*, Karachi 1962.
- Pakistan, Government of, *The Kashmir Crisis. Speeches at the Security Council by Mr. S.M. Zafar, Law Minister of Pakistan, September 18 and 20, 1965*, Rawalpindi 1965.
- Pakistan, Government of, *Speeches before the United Nations General Assembly, 1957-1965, by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of Pakistan*, Karachi 1965.
- Pakistan, Government of, *President Ayub on the Crisis over Kashmir*, Karachi 1965.
- Pakistan, Government of, *Story of Kashmir 1947-65*, Rawalpindi 1965.
- Pakistan, Government of, *Kashmir in the Security Council*, Karachi 1966.
- Pakistan, Government of, *Peace with Honour. Step by Step Approach to Resolve Indo-Pakistan Disputes*, Islamabad 1972.
- Pakistan, Government of, *The Simla Agreement. President Bhutto's Address to the Special Session of the National Assembly*, Islamabad 1972.

- Pakistan, Government of, *White Paper on the Jammu and Kashmir Dispute*, January 1977.
- Palir, Major-General D.K., *Jammu and Kashmir Arms. History of the J & K Rifles*, Dehra Dun 1972.
- Palit, Major-General D.K., *The Lightning Campaign. The Indo-Pakistani War 1971*, Salisbury 1972.
- Panikkar, K.M., *The Founding of the Kashmir State: a Biography of Maharajah Gulab Singh 1792-1858*, London 1953.
- Pandit, K.N., ed. *Ladakh Life & Culture*, Srinagar 1986.
- Pant, K., *The Kashmiri Pandit. Story of a Community in Exile in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, New Delhi 1987.
- Patel Sardar Vallabhbhai, ed. Durga Das, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50. Volume 1. New Light on Kashmir*, Ahmedabad 1971.
- Philips, C.H., & Wainright, M.D., eds., *The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives. 1935.1947*, London 1970.
- Phillimore, R.H., "Survey of Kashmir and Jammu, 1855 to 1865", *Himalayan Journal* 1959-60.
- Prescot, J.R.V., *Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty*, Melbourne 1975.
- Puri, B., *Jammu, A Clue to Kashmir Tangle*, New Delhi 1966.
- Puri, B., *Jammu and Kashmir. Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalisation*, New Delhi 1981.
- Puri, B., *Simmering Volcano. Study of Jammu's Relations with Kashmir*. New Delhi 1983.
- Qasim, M., *In Sheikh Abdullah's Words: Kashmir is India*, New Delhi n.d.
- Raina, A.N., *Geography of Jammu and Kashmir*, 3rd. ed., New Delhi 1981.
- Raina, N.N., *Kashmir Politics and Imperialist Manoeuvres 1846-1980*, New Delhi 1989.
- Rao. G. Nayarana, *The India-China Border*, Bombay 1968.
- Rao, H .S.G., *Legal Aspects of the Kashmir Problem*. New Delhi

- 1967.
- Razvi, M., *The Frontiers of Pakistan: A study o frontier problems in Pakistan's foreign policy*, Karachi 1971.
- Saeed, Lt.Colonel A., *The Battle of Chhamb* (1971), Rawalpindi 1973.
- Saraf, M.Y., *Kashmiris Fight- For Freedom*, 2 vols., Lahore 1978.79.
- Saray, M., "Turkish Officers sent to Kashgar in 1874": *Dogu Turkistan Seşi* (Voice of Eastern Turkistan), Vol. 2, No.6, August 1985.
- Saxena, H.L., *The Tragedy of Kashmir*, New Delhi 1975.
- Sayeed. K.B., *Pakistan. The Formative Phase 1857-1948*, Karachi 1968.
- Schomberg, R.C.F., *Between the Oxus and the Indus*, London 1935.
- Schomberg. R.C.F., *Unknown Karakoram*. London 1936.
- Sen, Lt..General L.P., *Slender was the Thread. Kashmir Confrontation 1947-48*, New Delhi 1969.
- Sender, H., *The Kashmiri Pandits. A Study of Cultural Choice in North India*, New Delhi 1988. .
- Sharma, B.L., *The Kashmir Story*, London 1967.
- Sharma, B.L., *The Pakistan-China Axis*. London 1968
- Sharma, B.L., *Kashmir Awakes*, Delhi 1971.
- Shastri, Lal Bahadur., *When Freedom is Menaced*, New Delhi 1965,
- Sherwani, L.A., *The Partition of India and Mountbatten*, Karachi 1986.
- Shipton. E., *Mountains of Tartary*, London 1950.
- Shukla, S.P., *India and Pakistan. The Origins of Armed Conflict*, New Delhi 1984.
- Siddiqui, K., *Conflict, Crisis & War in Pakistan*. London 1972.
- Singh, Balbir., *State Politics in India. Explorations in Political Processes in Jammu and Kashmir*, New Delhi 1982.

- Singh, Bhagwan. *Political Conspiracies of Kashmir*, Rohtak 1975.
- Singh, Bhupinder., *Indo-Pak Conflicts Over Kashmir*, Patiala 1983.
- Singh, Kirpal., *The Partition of the Punjab*, Patiala 1972.
- Singh, Sagat., *Pakistan's Foreign Policy. An Appraisal*, Bombay 1970.
- Sinha, Major S.K., *Operation Rescue. Military Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947-49*, New Delhi 1977.
- Shine, C.P., & Nightingale, P., *Macartney at Kashgar. New Light on British, Chinese and Russian Activities in Sinkiang, 1890-1918*, London 1973. Smith, D.E., *India as a Secular State*, Princeton 1963.
- Spate, O.H.K., "The Partition of the Punjab and Bengal", *Geographical journal*, CX, 1947.
- Spear, T.G.P., *The Oxford History of India*, 3rd Edition, Oxford 1958.
- Stanley Wolpert., *Jinnah*. Oxford University Press, London
- Stephens, I., *Horned Moon*, London 1953.
- Stephens, I., *Pakistan*, London 1963.
- Strachey, H., *The Physical Geography of Western Tibet*, London 1853.
- Sufi, G.M.D., *Islamic Culture in Kashmir*, Simla 1925.
- Syed, A.H., *China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale*, Amherst, Mass., 1974.
- Sykes, Sir P., *The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand, P.C., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.; a Biography*, London 1926.
- Symonds, R., *The Making of Pakistan. A Short Political Guide*, London 1950.
- Tarachand, Dr., *History of Freedom Struggle in India*. Ministry of Information and Publication, New Delhi
- Teichman, Sir E., *Journey to Turkistan*, London 1937.
- Teng, M.K., & Kaul, S., *Kashmir's Special Status*, Delhi 1975.
- Teng, M.K., *State Government and Politics. Jammu and Kashmir*,

- New Delhi 1985.
- Teng, M.K., *Kashmir Article 370*, New Delhi 1990.
- Thomson, T., *Western Himalaya and Tibet*, London 1853.
- Thorp, R., *Kashmir Misgovernment*, London 1870.
- Tikoo, P.N., *Story of Kashmir*, New Delhi 1979.
- Tilman, H.W., *Two Mountains and a River*, Cambridge 1949.
- Tilman, H.W., *China to Chitral*, Cambridge 1951.
- Trivedi, R.N., *Sino-Indian Border Dispute and its Impact on Indo-Pakistan Relations*, New Delhi 1977.
- Tucker, Sir F., *While Memory Serves*, London 1950.
- Tyndale-Biscoe, C.E., *Tyndale-Biscoe of Kashmir. An Autobiography*, London n.d.
- United States, Government of., *Foreign Relations of the United States 1947. Volume 111. The British Commonwealth: Europe*, Washington, D.C., 1972.
- United States, Government of., *Foreign Relations of the United States 1948. Volume V. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa. Part I*. Washington, D.C., 1975.